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1. Introduction
“While the economic approach
to behavior builds on a theory of
individual choice, it is not mainly
concerned with individuals. It uses
theory at the micro level as a power-
ful tool to derive implications at the
group or macro level. Rational indi-
vidual choice is combined with as-
sumptions about technologies and
other determinants of opportunities,
equilibrium in market and nonmar-
ket situations, and laws, norms, and
traditions to obtain results concern-
ing the behavior of groups. It is
mainly because the theory derives
implications at the macro level that
it is of interest to policymakers and
those studying differences among
countries and cultures.” Gary S.
Becker (1993, p. 402)
“One of the functions of theo-
retical economics is to provide fully
articulated, artificial economic sys-
tems that can serve as laborato-
ries in which policies that would
be prohibitively expensive to exper-
iment with in actual economies can
be tested out at much lower cost.”
Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1980, p. 696)
Think about the important choices that peo-
ple make in life. A far-reaching decision con-
cerns who to marry. Close on the list is how
many children to have, and how to raise them.
Women, in particular, may be concerned about
trading off their time between working, spend-
ing it with their children and husbands, and
leisure for themselves. What one chooses may
be influenced by social norms. Such norms
have prescribed who can work and what is
considered illicit behavior by young children
and adults. Gary S. Becker taught us that
studying this is within the purview of eco-
nomics.
Aggregating the behavior of individuals to
analyze the economy at large is the subject of
macroeconomics. Traditionally macroecono-
mists have been interested in explaining time
trends. Some of the strongest trends concern
shifts in the family. Over the course of the
past century in the United States there was
a large decline in the prevalence of marriage
and an increase in divorce, a dramatic drop
in fertility, an upsurge in educational attain-
ment, and a huge rise in married female labor-
force participation. Social norms about mar-
ried female labor-force participation shifted
and attitudes toward premarital sex changed
too. These shifts interest policymakers. Many
questions arise. Should the tax system be de-
signed to favor, or at least not penalize, mar-
riage and/or married female labor-force par-
ticipation? Should child care be subsidized?
What policies would be beneficial to children
growing up with single or divorced mothers?
Should policies be designed to encourage (dis-
courage) child bearing in countries with low
(high) rates of fertility?
To address these questions one needs eco-
nomic models, which can serve as Lucasian
laboratories to conduct policy experiments.
Some of the macroeconomics models used in
family economics are the subject of this re-
view. The review starts in Section 2 with a
simple model of married female labor-force
participation, which is used to analyze the rise
in married female labor supply. The model is
also used in Section 2.2 to study the timing
of births along the life-cycle and to investi-
gate the taxation of household income at either
the level of an individual or a couple (separate
or joint taxation). The discussion then moves
onto developing a model of marriage and di-
vorce in Section 3. The framework is em-
ployed to examine the fall in marriage and the
rise in divorce. It is also used in Section 3.2
to explain the recent uptick in positive assor-
tative mating, or the trend of people to marry
someone from the same socioeconomic class.
The drop in marriage has been associated with
a swelling of the fraction of children living
with a single mother. The plight of such chil-
dren is the subject of Section 4. Shifts in social
1
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norms are considered in Section 5; in particu-
lar, the shift in norms about married women
working and premarital sex. These norms are
endogenous in the models presented. Next,
models of fertility are reviewed in Section 6.
The review focuses on the decline in fertility
in developed countries and the rise in expen-
diture by parents on the development of their
children. This is Becker’s famous quality-
quantity tradeoff. Attention is also paid to
the enigma of the baby boom and the plunge
in fertility during wars. The discussion is re-
stricted to addressing facts and issues in de-
veloped countries.
Finally, before using an economic model for
policy analysis, it must be quantified. Sec-
tion 7 shows how a macroeconomic model of
the family can be matched with stylized facts
from the data, using the baby boom as an il-
lustration. These stylized facts are generally
moments—means, standard deviations, and
correlations—taken from cross-sectional and
time-series data. They also may include facts
from nonstructural regression analysis. The
model may be matched with the set of stylized
facts using a variety of estimation techniques.
The example here uses a minimum distance
estimation procedure, which incorporates in-
direct inference.
2. Married Female Labor Supply
“Of all historical change in the fe-
male labor force, the increased par-
ticipation of married women has
been the most meaningful...The
movement of married women from
the home to the marketplace has
been accompanied by social and
political change of enormous con-
sequence.” Claudia Goldin (1990,
p. 119).
The entry of married women into the labor
force was possibly the most significant change
in U.S. labor markets during the 20th cen-
tury. Today’s households are very far from
the stereotypical bread-winner husband and
housekeeper wife of the past. The world is
different now.
Almost no married women of working age
(25 to 54) participated in the labor market
in 1900. Today, about 75 percent of them
do (Figure 1). The increase in married fe-
male labor-force participation displays a S-
shaped pattern; the increase was slow initially
and followed by a period of rapid growth that
eventually leveled off. Large increases in fe-
male labor-force participation also occurred in
other developed countries (Figure 2). In con-
trast, the labor-force participation rates for un-
married women of the same ages increased by
a much smaller amount over this period. The
increase was particularly remarkable for mar-
ried women with young children (less than 6
years old). Their labor-force participation rate
more than tripled between 1960 and 2010.
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FIGURE 1. U.S. FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICI-
PATION, 1900-2010
Note: The graph shows the labor-force participation rates
for unmarried women, married women, and married women
who have at least one child under age 6. The sample is re-
stricted to 25- to 54-year-old women.
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1900-2000, and
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
The increase in female employment was ac-
companied by a decline in the time women
spend in household production. Figure 3
shows time use for men and women between
1965 and 2013. Total market work is defined
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FIGURE 2. FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPA-
TION, THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EU-
ROPE, 1960-2010
Note: The graph plots female labor-force participation for a
select group of countries. The sample is restricted to 25- to
54-year-old women.
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics.
as all time spent working in the market sec-
tor on main jobs, second jobs, and overtime,
including any time spent working at home,
plus commuting and break times. For men,
total market work fell from 51 to 38 hours
per week, a drop of 29 percent. For women,
however, the total increased from 23 to 25
hours per week, an 8 percent increase. Total
nonmarket work sums together time spent on
meal preparation and cleanup, doing laundry,
ironing, dusting, vacuuming, indoor house-
hold cleaning, indoor design and maintenance
(including painting and decorating), shopping,
and time spent obtaining goods and services
plus time spent on other home production such
as home maintenance, outdoor cleaning, vehi-
cle repair, gardening, and pet care. For men
total nonmarket hours increased from 10 to 13
hours, a 26 percent increase, while for women
they dropped from 32 to 21 hours, a 42 percent
decline. Total market and nonmarket hours
declined for both men and women by about 18
percent. This decline was matched by a rise in
leisure and time spent on child care for both
sexes (the increase in time spent on child care
by mothers is documented in Section 4).
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FIGURE 3. U.S. MARKET AND NONMARKET
HOURS, 1965-2013
Note: The graph shows total market and nonmarket hours
per week for men and women.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II) updated with the
2004-2013 American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
1. Household Production
A simple model of household produc-
tion is now presented to understand long-
term changes in married female labor supply.
Household production treats the home as a
small factory. The home uses inputs, interme-
diate goods and labor, to manufacture home
goods. In order to formalize these ideas, imag-
ine an economy populated by married couples.
Each person has one unit of time, so the total
time endowment of the household is 2. Sup-
pose the husband always works and spends the
fixed amount lm in the market at the wage rate
wm . The household collectively decides how
much the wife should work. Let l f denote the
wife’s hours in the market. Let w f represent
her wage in the market and   w f =wm be
the gender wage gap.
Households care about the consumption of
market goods, c, and the consumption of
home goods, n. All consumption is a public
good within the household. The household’s
preferences are given by
(1) U.c; n/ D  ln.c/C .1  / ln.n/:
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The household uses intermediate goods, d ,
and labor to produce home goods. Think
about d as proxying for the wide range of
products used at home, such as cell phones,
frozen foods, irons, microwaves, comput-
ers, refrigerators, washing machines, vacuum
cleaners, Tupperwares, inter alia. Assume that
the household production function has a con-
stant elasticity of substitution form,
(2) n D [d C .1  /.2  lm   l f / ]1= ;
where the parameter  controls the degree of
substitution between intermediate goods and
labor in household production, which is given
by 1=.1  /.
CONDITION 1: (Housework, 2   lm   l f ,
and intermediate goods, d , are “substitutes”
in home production) 0 <  < 1.
This condition implies that the elasticity of
substitution between intermediate goods and
housework is high (dubbed substitutes here) in
the sense that it exceeds 1 (the Cobb-Douglas
case). Intermediate goods can be purchased at
the time price w f q; i.e., q measures the goods
price in terms of the wife’s time. Hence, the
budget constraint of a household is
c D wm lm C w f l f   w f qd:
The household’s optimization problem is
then given by
max
c;n;d;l f
f ln.wm lm C w f l f   w f qd/
C.1 / ln.[dC.1 /.2 lm l f / ]1= /g:
Compute the first-order conditions for d and
l f . They are
w f q
c
D 1  [d C .1  /.2  lm   l f / ]
 d 1;
and
w f
c
 1  [d C .1  /.2  lm   l f / ]
 .1  /.2  lm   l f / 1:
The first-order condition for d equates the
marginal cost of buying more intermediate
goods with the marginal utility from consum-
ing the extra home goods that these interme-
diate goods generate. Similarly, the first-order
condition for l f equates the benefit of more
market hours for the wife with the marginal
utility of consuming less home goods. The
second first-order condition holds with equal-
ity if l f > 0: It is possible, however, that the
household finds it optimal to set l f D 0 so
that the wife allocates all of her available time
to home production. This will happen if the
marginal cost of market work is greater than
its marginal benefit.
Assume first that l f > 0. Dividing
these two first-order conditions and rearrang-
ing terms, a relation between d and l f can be
established:
d D

.1  /q

 1
 1
.2  lm   l f /
 R.q/.2  lm   l f /:
Note that the function R.q/ is decreasing in
q . By using this equation and the budget con-
straint, the first-order condition for l f can be
rewritten as
.2  lm   l f /

R.q/ C .1  /(3)
D .1  /.1  /


1

lm C l f   q R.q/.2  lm   l f /

:
(See Appendix A.A1 for the details.) The left-
hand side of this expression is decreasing in
l f . The right-hand side is increasing in l f .
So, if an interior solution exists, then it will
be unique.
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It is possible that when l f D 0 the left-hand
side of equation (3) is less than the right-hand
side. If so, the household will find it optimal
to set l f D 0 and the wife will not participate
in the labor market.
Now imagine a situation where, due to tech-
nological progress, the price of intermediate
goods used in household production declines.
It is easy to show that households will move
away from using labor in household produc-
tion toward using intermediate goods, a con-
sequence of condition 1. This will increase
women’s market hours. Likewise, it is also
easy to demonstrate that a decline in the gen-
der wage gap (a higher value of ) also leads
to an increase in female labor supply. If
l f D 0, so that the wife is not participating
in the market, then a large enough decline in
the price of intermediate goods or the gender
wage gap will entice her to enter into the labor
market.
PROPOSITION 1: (Married female labor
supply) Married female labor supply, l f , is
decreasing in the price of intermediate inputs,
q, and is increasing in the gender gap, .
[-SHAPED FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY
The framework described above suggests
a monotonic relation between technological
advance, which results in lower intermediate
goods prices and a lower gender wage gap (a
higher ), and female labor supply. There is
some evidence, however, that the relation be-
tween economic development and female la-
bor supply is [-shaped. This relationship is
illustrated in Figure 4 for a panel of countries.
Consider a simple extension of the model
presented above. Assume that households
still care about market consumption, c, and
home goods, n. Home goods are produced
with the household production technology de-
scribed earlier. The household, however, faces
a fixed cost of household maintenance, de-
noted by c. Imagine that c captures the bare
necessities that a household needs, such as ac-
commodations or basic furniture. The house-
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FIGURE 4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION FOR A
PANEL OF COUNTRIES, 1890-2005
Note: The figure plots the relation between log GDP per
capita and female labor-force participation for a panel of
countries. The fitted line is FLPD 514:45   118:05 
lnGDPC7:21  lnGDP2.
Source: Olivetti (2014).
hold’s problem is to maximize
U.c; n/ D  ln.c   c/C .1  / ln.n/;
subject to the budget constraint
c   c D wm lm C w f l f   w f qd   c
and the household production technology (2).
Following the same steps as above, it can be
shown that the first-order condition for an in-
terior solution for l f is given by
.2  lm   l f /

R.q/ C .1  /
D .1  /.1  /
 [wm lm   c
w f
C l f
  q R.q/.2  lm   l f /]:(4)
If c D 0, then only the gender wage gap
matters for married female labor supply in
the sense that a proportional increase in both
w f and wm does not affect l f . Suppose that
w f D aw and wm D bw, where w is in-
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terpreted as the general level of wages, and
 D a=b is the gender wage gap. When
c D 0, changes in w will not affect female
labor supply, since the income and substitu-
tion effects from a change in the general level
of wages exactly cancel out. When c > 0,
however, this is not the case anymore. Sup-
pose that wm lm > c, so that the husband’s
income covers the basic necessities of life, a
reasonable assumption. Now, a general in-
crease in wages, or a rise in w, will cause l f
to decline because the income effect from a
general wage change dominates the substitu-
tion effect. A higher value of w increases the
term .wm lm   c/=w f D blm=a   c=.aw/ D
lm=   c=.aw/. This causes the right-hand
side of equation (4) to shift up, which will re-
sult in a smaller value for l f . A narrowing of
the gender gap, due to a lower b or a higher a,
reduces lm=   c=.aw/, so l f will move up.
PROPOSITION 2: ([-shaped married fe-
male labor supply) Suppose wlm > c. Mar-
ried female labor supply, l f , is decreasing in
the general level of wages, w, and the price of
household inputs, q, and is increasing in the
gender gap, .
When wages are low, the fixed cost of house-
hold maintenance, c, makes the marginal util-
ity of market goods high. As wages increase,
the household is better able to cover the cost of
household maintenance and married women
can work less. This effect becomes muted
as c=w gets small. This explains the down-
ward portion of the [. What about the up-
ward portion? To address this, suppose that
at some point in time the price of intermediate
inputs declines and/or the gender gap narrows
(so that  rises.) These forces lead to a rise in
married female labor-force participation.
DISCUSSION
The economic analysis of female labor-
force participation began with the pioneering
works of Mincer (1962) and Cain (1966). The
massive rise in female labor-force participa-
tion over the course of the 20th century has
interested labor economists. Costa (2000) and
Goldin (2006) provide historical perspectives.
Much attention has been devoted to examin-
ing the extent to which the rise in real wages
and the narrowing of the gender gap can ac-
count for the rise in female labor-force par-
ticipation. The classic reference on the gen-
der wage gap is Goldin (1990). Goldin (1995)
presents some evidence that female labor sup-
ply has a [-shaped pattern over time. She
suggests that women have a comparative ad-
vantage in service sector jobs. Therefore, the
structural transformation from manufacturing
to services could be behind the rising part of
the [-shaped pattern. Ngai and Petrongolo
(2014), Olivetti and Petrongolo (2014) and
Rendall (2014) present models that explicitly
link the rise of the service sector to the in-
crease in female labor-force participation and
the declining gender wage gap. The declining
part of the [-shaped pattern can be linked to
the modernization of agriculture and the grow-
ing importance of manufacturing. When the
level of agricultural technology is low, women
need to work hard to cover the subsistence
level of consumption, c. A recent discussion
on the [-shaped female labor supply hypoth-
esis is provided by Olivetti (2014).
Figure 5 shows how the gender wage gap
changed during the 20th century. In 1900,
a female worker earned about 50 percent of
what a man did, and by 1970 this number had
risen to only 60 percent. Today the observed
gender wage gap has shrunk to about 75 per-
cent. A caveat is in order. The gender gap may
be due to many things, not just discrimination.
It may reflect differences in educational attain-
ment and occupational choice. There is also a
tendency for women to experience career in-
terruptions, to take part-time jobs, or to refuse
overtime so that they can keep free time for
raising children, another form of work. Also,
women may prefer to earn lower wages in ex-
change for better benefits, such as child care,
parental leave, and sick leave. Researchers
have found that adjusting for such factors re-
duces significantly the measured gender gap.
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Blau (1998) and Blau and Kahn (2000) pro-
vide surveys of the literature.
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FIGURE 5. THE U.S. GENDER WAGE GAP, 1900-
2010
Note: The gender wage gap is defined as the ratio of female
to male wages. For the 1940-2010 period, the sample is re-
stricted to females over age 18.
Source: The numbers for 1900, 1920 and 1930 are from
Gollin (1990, Table 3.1). For 1940-2010 period, the U.S.
Decennial Censuses for 1940-2000 and the 2010 American
Community Survey (ACS) are used.
Galor and Weil (1996) present an interest-
ing general equilibrium model in which the in-
crease in women’s wages and labor-force par-
ticipation is a by-product of the process of
development. In their analysis, capital accu-
mulation in the market sector raises women’s
wages relative to men’s. The underlying
mechanism is that capital in the market sec-
tor is more complementary to women’s labor
than it is to men’s labor, since it displaces
the need for physical strength. Consequently,
capital accumulation will lead to greater in-
creases in women’s wages than men’s wages.
In a similar vein, Jones, Manuelli and McGrat-
tan (2015) argue that decreases in the gender
wage gap can account for increases in average
hours worked by married women from 1950 to
1990. The negative relation between the gen-
der wage gap and female labor-force partici-
pation also holds in cross-country data. This
is shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 6 for
a set of developed economies.
The economic importance of household
production was probably first recognized in a
classic book by Reid (1934). She carefully re-
ported and analyzed the uses of time and cap-
ital by households of the era. The data was
fragmentary then. Reid (1934) knew in theory
that labor-saving household capital could re-
duce the amount of time spent on housework,
but the just-emerging evidence at the time sug-
gested that this effect was modest (see Table
XIII, p. 91). Important research by Aguiar and
Hurst (2007) puts together different time use
surveys for the United States to obtain a pic-
ture of what has happened to time allocations
over the last five decades. Figure 3 updates
their numbers. Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla
(2012) document similar trends for other in-
dustrialized countries.
In a classic paper, Becker (1965) devel-
ops the modern approach to household pro-
duction: the treatment of the household as a
small factory or plant using inputs, such as
labor, capital and raw materials, to produce
some sort of home goods. Benhabib, Roger-
son and Wright (1991) and Greenwood and
Hercowitz (1991) introduce household pro-
duction theory into dynamic general equilib-
rium models in order to study the movement
of labor over the business cycle. The idea is
that in favorable economic times households
may temporarily move labor out of the home
sector to take advantage of goods market op-
portunities, thereby increasing the elasticity of
married female labor supply. Parente, Roger-
son and Wright (2000) use a similar frame-
work to investigate whether household pro-
duction can explain cross-country income dif-
ferentials. This is very much in the spirit of
Reid (1934).
Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu
(2005) illustrate how labor-saving appliances
and intermediate goods can encourage mar-
ried female labor-force participation. They
embed a Becker-Reid household production
model into a dynamic general equilibrium
model. They also document the decline in the
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prices of household durables during the 20th
century. The Second Industrial Revolution
marked the beginning of the 20th century.
This era is most often associated with the
spread of electricity, the automobile and the
petrochemical industry. But, perhaps just
as important was the rise of central heating,
dryers, electric irons, frozen foods, indoor
plumbing, refrigerators, sewing machines,
washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and
other appliances now considered fixtures of
everyday life. The adoption of appliances
was spurred on by a rapid drop in their prices.
Quality-adjusted time prices declined, for
example, by about 8 percent per annum for
refrigerators and 6 percent for dishwashers
between the 1950s and the 1980s. The decline
for other appliances, such as microwaves, was
even larger.
Empirically, female labor supply is neg-
atively associated with the price of house-
hold appliances, as shown by Cavalcanti and
Tavares (2008) in a panel of OECD coun-
tries. Heisig (2011) looks at a wider set of
countries and finds, using a direct measure
of appliance diffusion, that household tech-
nologies are an important force behind in-
creasing female labor-force participation. The
right-hand panel of Figure 6 shows the rela-
tion between this measure of appliance diffu-
sion (termed an automation index) and female
labor-force participation for a group of devel-
oped countries. Female labor-force participa-
tion is much higher in countries with wide-
spread use of household appliances. Likewise,
Coen-Pirani, Leon and Lugauer (2010) docu-
ment, using U.S. Census micro data, that a sig-
nificant portion of the rise in married female
labor-force participation during the 1960s can
be attributed to the diffusion of household
appliances. Similar evidence is provided by
Dinkelman (2011), who studies the effect of
rural electrification in South Africa.
2. Female Labor Supply over the Life Cycle
As married women entered the labor mar-
ket in greater numbers, their life-cycle pattern
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FIGURE 6. GENDER GAP AND HOUSEHOLD TECH-
NOLOGIES VERSUS FEMALE LABOR-FORCE PAR-
TICIPATION FOR A CROSS SECTION OF COUNTRIES
Note: The left-hand panel shows the cross-country relation
between female labor-force participation (ages 15+) and the
gender wage gap, the ratio of female to male wages. The
right-hand panel shows the cross-country relation between
the diffusion of household appliances and female labor-force
participation (ages 15+).
Source: The automation index is taken from Heising
(2011). The gender wage gap numbers are from Pissarides
et al. (2005) and female labor-force participation is based on
World Bank Development Indicators.
of labor-force participation also changed. In
the 1950s and 60s, women tended to partici-
pate in the labor force before their childbear-
ing years, reduce their labor-force participa-
tion once they had children, and then perhaps
return to the labor force later (see Figure 7).
The dip in female labor-force participation as-
sociated with child bearing has disappeared
in recent years. Today it follows the typical
\-shaped pattern over the life cycle. What
factors can explain these changes? A simple
life-cycle model of female labor supply along
the extensive margin will be presented. To fix
ideas, a static model of the extensive margin
will be developed first.
The economy is populated by married cou-
ples. Each household member has one unit
of time. Suppose again that the husband al-
ways works a fixed amount of hours, lm , at
the wage rate wm . The household collectively
decides whether the wife should work or not.
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PATION ALONG THE LIFE CYCLE, 1900-2010
Note: The figure charts the labor-force participation rates of
married women at different ages for 1960, 1980, 2000, and
2010.
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1960-2000, and the
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
If the wife enters the labor force, she has to
work l f hours. Hence, this decision is dis-
crete. The household cares about the con-
sumption of market goods, c, and each party’s
leisure. Consumption, including leisure, is a
public good. The household’s utility function
is
U.c; n; / D  ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /;
where 1   lm and 1   l f denote the leisure
enjoyed by the husband and the wife, respec-
tively. (One could also think about 1   lm
and 1   l f as time spent in household pro-
duction.) The variable  governs the value
that a couple places on the female’s time spent
at home. It differs across households. Some
households value the female’s time at home
more (a higher ) than others. In particular,
assume that  is distributed across households
in the society according to some cumulative
distribution function 3./.
The household will compare the utility as-
sociated with each option, namely l f D 0 and
l f D l f , and decide which path to take. Sup-
pose first that the wife does not work. Let
V~WORK.w f ; wm/ be the utility for a house-
hold in this scenario. It is given by
V~WORK.w f ; wm/ D  ln.wm lm/
C .1  / ln.1  lm/:
If the woman does not work, then the house-
hold enjoys c D wm lm in consumption. The
husband’s leisure is 1   lm , while the wife
spends all her time at home.
Similarly, let VWORK.w f ; wm; / be the
utility that the household will realize if the
woman works. It reads
VWORK.w f ; wm; / D  ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1  / ln.1  l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/:
A working wife brings more income into the
household, so consumption is higher: but the
household suffers a utility loss in terms of
leisure since .1   / ln.1   l f / < 0. The
higher the value of , the greater is the utility
cost of the woman working. As a result, while
the indirect utility function V~WORK.w f ; wm/
does not depend on  [since .1  / ln.1/ D
0], VWORK.w f ; wm; / is decreasing in .
These indirect utility functions are portrayed
in the upper panel of Figure 8. The threshold
value for  that makes a household indifferent
between the woman working or not is
b D a[ln.lm C l f /  ln.lm/];
where a   [=.1  /]= ln.1  l f / > 0 and
 is the gender wage gap.
The woman will work in a household with
a value of  belowb. The fraction of women
working in the society is given by 3.b/, as
illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 8. It
is immediate that the threshold, b, and mar-
ried female labor-force participation, 3.b/,
are both increasing in w f and decreasing in
wm , while an equal percentage change in both
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has no effect. Indeed, any factor that in-
creases the benefits of joint work, VWORK rel-
ative to V~WORK, as shown by an upward shift
in VWORK in Figure 8, will increaseb and the
female labor-force participation rate. Exactly
how much depends on the shape of 3./.
FIGURE 8. THE DETERMINATION OF MARRIED FE-
MALE LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION ALONG THE
EXTENSIVE MARGIN
Note: The upper panel illustrates V~WORK.w f ; wm / and
VWORK.w f ; wm ; / and the determination of the threshold,b. The lower panel illustrates how the threshold, b, deter-
mines the fraction of married women that work. It is as-
sumed that w0f > w f and/or w0m < wm .
Now, suppose a household lives for two pe-
riods. Assume that in the second period both
the man and woman work. In the first pe-
riod, each household has to decide whether or
not the woman should work. Introduce two
new elements into this environment. First,
each household has a child attached to them
in the first period. Children are costly, both in
terms of time and money. All women need
to spend a fixed amount of their own time,
lc, for child care. This time cost comes out
of the mother’s leisure and captures both the
cost of childbearing and child care. Women
cannot work for some period of time after
birthing a child. Pregnancies can also result in
temporary or permanent debilities, much more
so when medical technology is not advanced.
Child care also involves a fixed time cost for
mothers, especially if they are breastfeeding.
Additionally, if the household decides that the
woman will work, then the family also has to
buy child care at the price pc per unit of time
the mother works. This cost simply reflects
the fact that someone has to take care of the
child when both parents are working. Assume
that a mother who stays at home can take care
of her child while enjoying her leisure.
Second, there are returns to experience for
women. If a woman decides to work in the
first period, then her second-period wage is
greater than her first-period wage by a factor
of  , so that second-period wage isw f .1C/:
If she decides not to work, then her second-
period wage is simply w f . There are no re-
turns to experience for a man, so his wage is
wm in both periods. Finally, households dis-
count the future at rate  2 .0; 1/.
Take a household in which the wife does not
work. The household’s utility will be
V~WORK.w f ; wm; / D  ln.wm lm/
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  lc/
C [ ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /]:
The woman has to incur the time cost lc for
childbearing and child care, independent of
whether she works or not. Consider now the
case where she works. In this case, the house-
hold will enjoy
VWORK.w f ; wm; / D  ln.wm lmCw f l f l f pc/
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  lc   l f /
C [ ln.wm lm C w f .1C /l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /]:
On the one hand, since the wife is working, the
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household has to pay l f pc for child care. On
the other hand, a two-earner household enjoys
a higher income in the first period. Further-
more, by working in the first period, the wife
earns a higher wage next period.
Again, there will be a threshold value for
 that separates households with working
and non-working wives (in the first period).
Note that now both V~WORK.w f ; wm; /
and VWORK.w f ; wm; / are decreasing func-
tions of . The indirect utility function
VWORK.w f ; wm; /, however, has a steeper
slope than V~WORK.w f ; wm; /, since ln.1  
lc  l f / < ln.1  lc/. As a result, a unique so-
lution for the threshold value of  still exists.
The threshold value for  is given by
b D b[ln.lmwmCl f .w f   pc// ln.lmwm/]
C b[ln.wm lm C w f .1C /l f /
  ln.wm lm C w f l f /];
where b  [=.1   /]=[ln.1   lc/   ln.1  
lc   l f /] > 0. Note that @b=@lc < 0:
PROPOSITION 3: (Married female labor-
force participation) Married female labor-
force participation,  D 3.b/, is (i) increas-
ing in the return to labor-force experience,  ,
and (ii) is decreasing in the personal time re-
quired by a mother for child care, lc, and the
price of child care provided by others, pc.
In an economy in which children are costly
and the returns to work are low, women will
tend to stop working during their childbear-
ing years. They will reenter the labor market
once their children are older. This pattern will
start to change as the cost of children declines
or the returns to experience increase. First,
it will be easier for women to combine work
and children. Second, it will be too costly for
women to stay out of the labor market. Both
forces will operate to entice women to work
more during their childbearing years.
TIMING OF BIRTHS
The same forces that affect married
women’s incentives to participate in the labor
market will also shape their incentives about
whether or not to have children and when to
have them. Consider the latter problem here.
Let married couples live for two periods. As-
sume that both the husband and wife work for
both periods, so there is no labor-force partic-
ipation decision for the wife. Each household
can have one child. They decide whether to
have this child in the first or (if possible) sec-
ond period.
Children live for one period and give the
household a utility level  . Some households
value children more than others. Let  be dis-
tributed among households according to the
cumulative distribution function 4./. Sup-
pose further that fecundity declines with the
age of the household. All households who
want to have a child in the first period can have
one with certainty. If the household delays
fertility until the second period, then they can
have a child with probability : Beyond bi-
ological factors, the probability  is affected
by the state of medical technology. Hence,
parents have an incentive due to declining fe-
cundity to have their children sooner rather
than later. Having a child early, however, is
costly for mothers. If a household has a child
in the first period, the wage of the mother is
w f in both periods. If the household decides
to wait, the second-period wage of the mother
is .1 C /w f . Here, again,  captures the
returns to experience. The basic idea is that
mothers, even if they participate in the labor
market, might have to take leave from work
or reduce effort at their jobs. This hurts the
growth in their wages. The lower wage growth
of mothers can also be due to discrimination.
Set all other costs associated to childbearing
to 0; i.e., pc D lc D 0. Then the lifetime util-
ity associated with early childbearing is given
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by
VEARLY.w f ; wm; / D  ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /C 
C [ ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /];
while if the household decides to have their
children in the second period, they enjoy
VLATE.w f ; wm; / D  ln.wm lm C w f l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /
C [ ln.wm lm C w f .1C /l f /
C .1  / ln.1  lm/
C .1  / ln.1  l f /C  ]:
There will be a threshold level of joy from
children,b , such that all household with  >b will have their children in the first period.
Suppose, for simplicity, that lm D l f ; so both
husbands and wives work the same hours in
the market. Then, the threshold level b is
given by
b D [ln.1C .1C //  ln.1C /]
1   ;
where again  D w f =wm represents the gen-
der wage gap. This threshold is increasing in
both  and  . It is immediate that if  D 0,
then all children will be born in the first pe-
riod. If  > 0, however, a positive frac-
tion of children will be born in the second
period. The number of children arising from
period-one and period-two births are given by
1 4.b/ and 4.b/, with the total number of
children being 1 4.b/C 4.b/.
PROPOSITION 4: (Timing of births) The
ratio of late to early births, 4.b/=[1 4.b/],
is increasing in fecundity,  , and the returns
to experience,  . The total number of children
born, 1   .1   /4.b/, is decreasing in the
returns to experience,  .
TAXES
The analysis so far has abstracted from
taxes. Taxes on the extra income that a wife
generates, however, can be an important de-
terrent to female labor-force participation. To
illustrate this, consider again the static, one-
period model of female labor-force participa-
tion with the following twist. Suppose the
husband faces a proportional income tax rate
of  1, while the wife’s income tax rate is  2.
If  1 D  2, then both the primary earner
(the husband) and the secondary earner (the
wife) face the same tax rate. Alternatively, if
 2 >  1, then the secondary earner is taxed
at a higher rate than the primary earner. This
would be the case, for example, in the United
States, where husbands and wives are taxed
jointly. The unit of taxation is the house-
hold, and tax liabilities are determined by total
household income. As a result, the extra in-
come that the secondary earner brings home is
taxed at a higher marginal tax rate than the pri-
mary earner. Since taxes are progressive, the
secondary earner faces a higher tax rate than
she would in a world with separate taxation.
The utilities connected with one and two-
earner households are given by
 ln.wm lm.1   1//C .1  / ln.1  lm/
and
 ln.wm lm.1   1/C w f l f .1   2//
C .1 / ln.1  l f /C .1 / ln.1  lm/:
The threshold value for  that determines a
married female’s labor-force participation is
now
b. 1;  2/ D a[ln.lm.1  1/Cl f .1  2//
  ln.lm.1   1//];
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where again a   [=.1  /]= ln.1  l f / >
0. It is trivial to see that @b. 1;  2/=@ 2 < 0.
Thus, higher taxes on the secondary earner
lower married female labor-force participa-
tion. In contrast @b. 1;  2/=@ 1 > 0, so
higher taxes on the primary earner will en-
courage women to work due to the negative
income effect.
Like taxes, the transfers that households re-
ceive can also affect married female labor-
force participation. Many governments, for
example, subsidize households’ child-care ex-
penditures. Recall that in Section 2.2 house-
holds with a working mother incurred child-
care expenses in the amount pc, which was
subtracted from the household’s income. With
a subsidy, pc would be replaced with .1  
s/pc, where s is the subsidy rate. Higher sub-
sidies would increase the threshold level of 
and married female-labor participation.
HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING
The above analysis assumes that all goods
are public. Furthermore, husbands work a
fixed amount of time, lm . Consider now a
more general setup where the household max-
imizes a weighted sum of the husband’s and
wife’s utilities. Also, let the household decide
on the hours worked both by the husband and
the wife. In particular, consider the optimiza-
tion problem given by
(5) max
c;lm ;l f
[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lm/]
C .1  /[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /];
where
c D wmlm C w f l f ;
and  is the husband’s weight in the objec-
tive function. Consumption, c, is still a public
good. (Note that the weights on  ln c sum to
one.) Now, 1   lm and 1   l f represent the
leisures enjoyed by the husband and the wife,
respectively, and these are evaluated accord-
ing to the weight placed on each party’s utility
function.
The first-order conditions for lm and l f are
given by

wm
c
D .1  / 1
1  lm ;
and

w f
c
D .1  /.1  / 1
1  l f :
These two conditions imply
(6) 1  lm
1  l f D
w f
wm

1  :
Suppose that  is constant and the gender
wage gap declines; i.e., w f =wm increases.
Then, the relative leisure of the husband, .1 
lm/=.1  l f /, will rise. The household, which
is maximizing the sum of utilities, finds it op-
timal to allocate more leisure to the husband
since the wife’s work in the market is now
more productive. As a result, the higher gen-
der wage gap implies more market hours for
the wife relative to her husband.
The wage gap between men and women
has narrowed significantly in the United States
during recent decades. Husbands, however, do
not appear to have seen their leisure increase
relative to their wives. How can this be recon-
ciled with the above framework? One possi-
ble answer is that =.1   / might shift over
time. In particular, if  declines over time,
then .1   lm/=.1   l f / could stay the same
or drop, even if the gender wage gap shrinks.
How could  change?
Imagine a world in which the husband and
the wife use a cooperative bargaining solu-
tion, in particular Nash, to determine lm and
l f , with divorce (or say single life) as their
threat points. Let B and G denote these threat
points for the husband and the wife, respec-
tively. Then, the Nash bargaining problem is
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given by
max
c;lm ;l f
f[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lm/  B]
  ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /  Gg:
The Nash bargaining solution is Pareto opti-
mal. Therefore, there exists a value of  such
that solving the Nash bargaining problem is
equivalent to maximizing a weighted sum of
the couples’ utilities, as given by (5).
Let c, lf , and lm represent the optimal de-
cisions associated with the Nash bargaining
problem. As shown in Appendix A.A2, the
weight, , is given by
 D W   G
.H   B/C .W   G/ ;
where W   ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lf / and
H   ln.c/ C .1   / ln.1   lm/ denote
the value of being married for the wife and the
husband. A higher outside option for the wife,
due to, for example, a smaller gender wage
gap (a biggerw f =wm), will imply smaller val-
ues for . This will, following equation (6),
lead to a fall in .1   lm/=.1   l f /. As a re-
sult, .1   lm/=.1   l f / can remain constant
even if the gender wage gap declines. More
generally, different modes of interaction be-
tween husbands and wives and assumptions
about the marriage market will lead to differ-
ent solutions for . A reasonable presumption
is that if a marriage is formed, the value for 
used in the Pareto problem (5) yields a level of
utility for each party that (weakly) dominates
what they could obtain in single life.
DISCUSSION
Different features of the simple two-period
model of female labor supply developed in
Section 2.2 have been analyzed in the liter-
ature within more realistic multi-period life-
cycle models. The importance of labor mar-
ket experience for female labor-force partici-
pation and wages were emphasized by, among
others, Altug and Miller (1998), Eckstein and
Wolpin (1989), Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011),
and Gayle and Golan (2012). Miller (2011)
estimates that a year of delay in motherhood
is associated with a 9 percent increase in the
total earnings of women between ages 21 and
34. Olivetti (2006) documents that between
the 1970s and 1990s there was a significant in-
crease in the returns to experience for women,
the  term above, in the United States. She
also studies how changes in the returns to ex-
perience can account for the disappearance of
the dent in female labor supply profiles during
childbearing years.
Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos
(2008) build a model that combines several
factors: the returns to experience,  , child-
care costs, pc, and the gender wage gap, :
They document that child-care costs relative
to female earnings declined significantly in
the data between the 1980s and 1990s. They
argue that this decline, together with a rise
in the returns to experience for women and a
lower gender wage gap, contributed to both
higher female labor-force participation and its
changing shape over the life cycle. Eckstein
and Lifshitz (2011) estimate a dynamic
life-cycle model of female labor supply to
analyze different forces behind the rise in
married female labor-force participation and
employment during the last 50 years. They
find that the rise in education levels accounts
for 33 percent of the increase in wages
and the narrowing of the gender wage gap
accounts for another 20 percent, while about
40 percent remains unexplained by observed
household characteristics. They attribute
the unexplained portion to cohort-specific
changes in preferences or the costs of child
rearing and household maintenance.
Family labor supply, the joint behavior of
husbands’ and wives’ labor supplies along
both the extensive and the intensive margins,
also plays a key role in determining earnings
inequality across households, as well as the
ability of households to smooth idiosyncratic
income shocks. Married female labor supply
is highly elastic. As a result, a given increase
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in wage inequality among married women will
translate into an even higher level of earnings
inequality among married households. This
magnification of inequality occurs because the
married women who receive a positive wage
shock will work more than those that don’t.
The increase in household inequality will be
even larger if husbands and wives face shocks
that are positively correlated.
Hyslop (2001) studies the link between ris-
ing wage inequality and family earnings in-
equality for two-earner families in the period
from 1979 to 1985. He shows that labor sup-
ply responses by women can account for 20
percent of the rise in family earnings inequal-
ity. The insurance provided by family labor
supply is studied by Blundell, Pistaferri and
Saporta-Eksten (2016). They estimate a life-
cycle model with two earners making con-
sumption and labor supply decisions: most of
the insurance against permanent wage shocks
is provided by family labor supply, while sav-
ings and transfers play a relatively secondary
role.
Uncertainty in finding a new job or loosing
an existing one, in face of labor-market fric-
tions, constitute an important part of shocks
that households face. Guler, Guvenen and Vi-
olante (2012) analyze the joint search problem
of couples and how it differs from the single-
agent search problem, which dominates the
literature on search and matching in the labor
market. Since families pool their resources, an
unemployed married person with an employed
partner can be more picky about labor mar-
ket opportunities than a single person. On the
other hand, a married person might decline at-
tractive job offers that require changing loca-
tions, which might not be feasible for the other
party in the household.
Child-care costs still constitute an impor-
tant barrier for female labor-force participa-
tion. Table 1 documents total direct expen-
diture on child care as a fraction of a work-
ing mother’s pre-tax income for those families
that make child-care payments. For a college-
educated mother, child-care costs for children
under age 5 claim more than 20 percent of her
income. For households with fewer resources,
the picture is more bleak. A family with less
than $1,500 in monthly income spends almost
half of the mother’s income on child care.
The total cost of children, of course, far ex-
ceeds what households spend on child care.
Table 2 shows total spending on a child as
a fraction of household income by household
structure, household income, and the age of
the child. The expenses are calculated for the
younger child in a two-child family.1 The total
expenditure on a child was about 24 percent
of household income for a two-parent family
whose yearly income is less than $61,530 in
2013. Expenses increase only slightly with the
age of the child. Independent of the child’s
age, housing constitutes about 30 percent of
these expenses (Lino, 2014). As a child ages,
parents spend less on child care and educa-
tion (e.g., about 23 percent for children ages
0 to 2 versus 9.4 percent for the ages between
15 and 17), but more on food, transportation,
clothing and health care (e.g., about 40 per-
cent for children between the ages 0 and 2, and
55 percent for children between the ages 15
and 17). Single-parent households, led mostly
by mothers, spend more percentagewise on
a child. Those with a yearly income below
$61,530 spend between 30 to 36 percent of to-
tal household income on a child.
Public policies can play a role in mitigat-
ing the cost of children for families. Coun-
tries differ greatly in how much benefits they
provide to families and the forms these bene-
fits take, as shown in Table 3. Family bene-
fits consist of direct, often means-tested, cash
transfers to families, direct financing or sub-
1The amount spent on the younger child in a family de-
pends on family size due to economies of scale. To calculate
the expenses for two children, the figures in Table 2 should
be summed for the appropriate age categories. To estimate
the expenses for an only child, multiply the total expense
for the appropriate age category by 1.25. To estimate the
expenses for a family with three or more children, sum the
expenses for each child, using the appropriate age category,
and multiply by 0.78. For further details on the methodology,
see Lino (2014).
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sidies for child care, early education and res-
idential facilities, and tax benefits targeted to
families, such as child tax credits. Both Den-
mark (Dnk) and the United Kingdom (UK),
for example, spend about 4 percent of their
GDPs on family benefits. The amounts are
much smaller in Italy (Ita), Spain (Esp) and
the United States. While most of these ben-
efits are in-kind services in Denmark, they
mainly consist of cash transfers in the United
Kingdom. In other countries, such as Ger-
many (Deu) and the United States, tax benefits
are relatively significant. The last column in
Table 3 shows how much governments spend
on child care and early education for children
under age 5. Scandinavian countries (Fin, Nor
and Swe), for example, devote close to 1 per-
cent of their GDPs for child care, which is
more than 25 percent of total family bene-
fits. In contrast, public spending on child care
in Germany and the United States (USA) is
much smaller, less than 0.1 percent of GDP.
Rogerson (2007), among others, attributes the
high levels of female labor supply in Scandi-
navia to the scope and magnitude of child-care
subsidies there. What would be the effects
of more generous, Scandinavian-style, child-
care subsidies on female labor-force partici-
pation in countries such as Germany or the
United States? Domeij and Klein (2013) and
Bick (2015) try to answer this question for
Germany, while Guner, Kaygusuz and Ven-
tura (2016) do the same for the United States.
There are of course other policies, besides
child-care subsidies, that affect female labor
supply. Many developed countries, for exam-
ple, have mandatory parental leave policies,
which specify a minimum amount of leave
time that a person is entitled to in order to
care for a newborn child, with a guaranteed
job after the leave. Erosa, Fuster and Restuc-
cia (2010) study how these policies affect fe-
male labor supply and fertility decisions.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) document that
there was a significant reduction in maternal
mortality and morbidity between 1930 and
1960. These reductions lower the fixed cost of
childbearing, lc. At the same time, infant for-
mula became available and its price declined
dramatically, about 6.6 percent per year be-
tween 1935 and 1960. Infant formula pro-
vided working mothers an alternative to breast
feeding, again lowering lc. The authors show
that these forces played an important role in
the rise of married female’s labor-force partic-
ipation.
Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2014) docu-
ment how federal income tax liabilities vary
with income, marital status and the number
of dependents. The analysis of taxes and
married female labor-force participation fol-
lows Kaygusuz (2010) and Guner, Kaygusuz
and Ventura (2012). Kaygusuz (2010) shows
that the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms in the
United States, which lowered the progressiv-
ity of income taxes, account for about one-
fourth of the increase in married female labor-
force participation between 1980 and 1990.
Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2012) study
how a hypothetical tax reform, which moves
the U.S. economy from joint to separate taxa-
tion, would affect married female labor-force
participation. They model female labor sup-
ply along both the extensive and the inten-
sive margins and allow for endogenous hu-
man capital accumulation for married women
along their life cycle. As a result, a move to
separate filing, which effectively lowers taxes
for the secondary earner, not only leads to sig-
nificant increases in married female labor sup-
ply, but also results in a smaller gender wage
gap. Bick and Fuchs-Schundeln (2016) an-
alyze how much cross-country differences in
taxes on the secondary earner contribute to
cross-country differences in married female
labor supply.
Women in all developed countries today
have fewer children than they did decades ago.
In 1970, the total fertility rate was 2.5 in the
United States. Today it is less than 2. Par-
ents also have children later. In 1970, 22.0
percent of all births in the United States oc-
curred to women older than 30. This figure al-
most doubled and increased to 43.3 percent by
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2012, as documented by Martin et al. (2013).
Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2002) study a
model of marriage, female labor-force partici-
pation and fertility and show that the increase
in the returns to experience for women may
be responsible for this shift in the timing of
births. Section 2.2 captures the key forces in
their analysis. When the wage penalty asso-
ciated with childbearing is high, women pre-
fer to postpone their fertility and instead first
build their human capital. The parameter  in
the analysis captures the fact that female fe-
cundity declines by age. Fecundity declines
slower for males. The implications of dif-
ferential fecundity between men and women
for labor and marriage markets are studied
by Siow (1998). Diaz-Gimenez and Giolito
(2013) show that differential fecundity is also
important for accounting for the age gap be-
tween men and women at first marriage. The
parameter  also reflects the state of contra-
ceptive technology. The introduction of the
pill in the 1970s, for example, allowed women
to control their fertility more effectively. The
implications of the pill for the labor supply
and the marriage behavior of women is stud-
ied by Goldin and Katz (2002).
Career interruptions will be even longer and
more costly in economies with high unem-
ployment, since women will have a harder
time finding jobs. Furthermore, unemployed
mothers will have a harder time covering the
cost of children. Both forces will compell
women to postpone their fertility and lower
the overall fertility rate. Da Rocha and Fuster
(2006) document that there is a positive rela-
tion between female employment and the to-
tal fertility rate across developed countries to-
day. The right-hand panel of Figure 9 repli-
cates their findings. They build a model
of fertility and female labor-force participa-
tion with labor-market search that generates
the observed positive relation between fertil-
ity and female labor-force participation. Both
in the data and their model, there is a neg-
ative relation between female unemployment
and female labor-force participation. As a re-
sult, in countries, such as Spain and Italy, high
unemployment induces women both to stay
out of the labor force and to have fewer chil-
dren. The relation between female labor-force
participation and fertility was not always posi-
tive, however, a fact noted by demographers—
Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2006). In the
1970s, countries with high fertility rates were
the ones in which female labor-force partici-
pation was low. This is shown in the left-hand
panel of Figure 9.
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FIGURE 9. THE CROSS-COUNTRY RELATION BE-
TWEEN THE TOTAL FERTILITY RATE AND FEMALE
LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE
Note: The left-hand panel shows the relation between female
labor-force participation (ages 25 and 54) and the total fertil-
ity rate for 1975-1980. The right-hand panel shows the same
relation for 2000-2005.
Source: Female labor-force participation, OECD Labor
Force Statistics. Total fertility rate, United Nations (2013).
The analysis of household bargaining in
Section 2.2 follows Knowles (2013). He doc-
uments how the relative leisure of men has not
increased over time. Given equation (6) and
the declining gender wage gap, this suggests
that some sort of bargaining model may be
called for. Different models of household de-
cision making are analyzed in Browning, Chi-
appori and Weiss (2014).
The utility value of a woman staying at
home, as reflected by , is treated as a constant
in the current analysis. This does not have
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to be the case. Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti
(2004) present evidence suggesting that a man
is more likely to have a working wife if his
own mother worked than if she didn’t. In par-
ticular, men who had mothers who worked in
World War II had a higher likelihood of mar-
rying working women than those who didn’t.
They develop a model where attitudes toward
working women become more receptive over
time. Such forces can be captured by changes
in . A man whose mother worked is modeled
as having a lower  than a man whose mother
did not work. As more women start to work,
say due to technological progress, changes in
attitudes will have a reinforcing effect. One
can also imagine that households have some
priors over  and update their beliefs. Beliefs
can change as more women enter the labor
force and information grows about the labor
market experience of working women. Fogli
and Veldkamp (2011) and Fernandez (2013)
show that such learning models can generate
the S-shaped increase in married female labor
supply observed in the data.
3. Marriage and Divorce
To understand the importance of economic
factors in determining marriage and divorce,
consider the facts displayed in Figure 10. A
much smaller proportion of the adult popula-
tion is married now compared with 50 years
ago. In 1950, 75 percent of women were mar-
ried (out of non-widows age 15 or older). By
2016, this had declined to 56 percent. Two
factors underlie these observations. First, the
crude marriage rate declined. In 1950, there
were 11 marriages per 1,000 people compared
with just 7 in 2016. Second, over the period
1950 to 2016 the crude divorce rate spiked,
which led a smaller fraction of the population
being married, although the divorce has been
falling more recently. Even today the crude
divorce rate of 3.2 per 1,000 people exceeds
the 1950 value of 2.6.
These trends had noticeable consequences
for the living arrangements of U.S. house-
holds. As seen in Figure 11, the fraction of
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FIGURE 10. U.S. TRENDS IN MARRIAGE AND DI-
VORCE, 1950-2016
Note: The left-hand panel shows the percentage of non-
widowed women (ages 15 and above) who were married.
The right-hand panel plots the crude marriage and divorce
rates (the number of marriages and divorces per 1,000 peo-
ple).
Source: The data for marriage comes from the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. The data on marriage and divorce rates is from
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); viz,
Monthly Vital Statistics Reports for the pre-1996 period and
from National Vital Statistics Report for the post-1996 pe-
riod.
U.S. households that is married has decreased
continuously, while alternative living arrange-
ments, singles with or without children or per-
sons living with a partner that is not a spouse,
have increased substantially.
At the same time, there has been an in-
creased tendency for people to marry within a
similar socioeconomic class. To see this, con-
sider estimating a regression (using U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau data) between a wife’s educational
level and her husband’s. In particular, run a
regression of the following form for the years
y D 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005:
EDUwmy D  C EDUhmy
C
X
t2T
 t  EDUhmy  YEARt y
C
X
t2T
 tYEARt yC"my , with "my  N .0;  /.
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FIGURE 11. U.S. TRENDS IN LIVING ARRANGE-
MENTS, 1900-2010
Note: The graph shows fractions of different household
types for each year: married couples, singles, singles with
children (single mothers and single fathers), and other types
of households (unrelated individuals living together).
Source: The U.S. Decennial Censuses, 1900-2000, and the
2010 American Community Survey (ACS).
Here EDUhmy and EDUwmy represent the years
of education for the husband and wife in mar-
riage m for year y. The variable YEARt y is a
time dummy. It is set up so that YEARt y D 1,
if t D y, and YEARt y D 0, if t 6D y, where
t 2 T  f1970; 1980; 1990; 2000; 2005g.
The coefficient  measures the impact of a
husband’s education on his wife’s education
for the baseline year 1960, since YEARt y D 0,
for all t , when y D 1960. The coefficient  t
gives the additional impact of a husband’s ed-
ucation on his wife’s relative to the baseline
year, 1960. The evolution of  t over time re-
flects changes in the degree of assortative mat-
ing. The regression also includes a fixed effect
for each year as measured by the constants 
and  t . The  t s control for the secular rise in
the educational levels of the married popula-
tion. Figure 12 plots the upshot of the regres-
sion analysis. As can be seen in the figure,
 t rises over time, implying that the degree of
assortative mating has increased.
1. A Model of Marriage and Divorce
What determines whether a single person
will marry or not? Likewise, whether a mar-
ried couple will divorce? Two motives for
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FIGURE 12. THE RISE OF POSITIVE ASSORTATIVE
MATING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-2005
Note: The variable  t is a measure of assortative mating
for the years t D 1960; 1970;    ; 2000; 2005. A higher
value for  t indicates a higher degree of positive assortative
mating. See the text for a description.
Source: Computed from data that is freely available from
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) web-
site.
marriage are stressed here: (i) love and com-
panionship and (ii) economic motives. The
Irish poet Samuel Lover wrote “Come live
in my heart and pay no rent.” It is hard for
an economist to improve on what a poet can
write about love and companionship. The
love between two people will be modeled
here in clinical fashion, as a term in tastes.
Two people living together may have a higher
level of material well being than if they both
lived alone. This could happen because there
are economies of scale both in the consump-
tion of market goods and in the consump-
tion/production of nonmarket ones. Addition-
ally, public policies such as family assistance
or taxation may favor married or single life.
Households can be composed of z 2 f1; 2g
adults. Suppose that each adult has one unit of
time. This can be split between either working
in the market or at home. A z-adult household
will have a total of z units of time. Let the mar-
ket wage for men and women be represented
byw. Household production is undertaken ac-
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cording to the production function,
(7) nz D

 .dz/ C .1  / .hz/
1=
;
where hz is the household’s labor at home and
dz is the inputs of durable goods into home
production. Suppose that dz can be purchased
at the price wq , where q again measures the
goods price in terms of time. Assume that the
household production function satisfies Con-
dition 1; i.e., 0 <  < 1. This implies that
durables and labor are quite substitutable in
household production in that the elasticity of
substitution exceeds unity (the Cobb-Douglas
case).
Preferences are represented by the utility
function
(8) Uz

cz
z

C .1  /V

nz
z

CMzeb;
where cz and nz denote the household’s con-
sumptions of market and nonmarket goods
and with Mz  I fz D 2g. The utility indexes
Uz and V are
Uz .x/ D ln .x   c=z/ and V .x/ D x = :
With this specification, the constant c, as in
Section 2, is a fixed cost associated with main-
taining a household and is the source of scale
economies here. The parameter  determines
the curvature of the utility function for the
home good. Finally, to incorporate love and
companionship, suppose that upon meeting
a couple draws a bliss variable, eb, which is
added to the household’s utility. The variableeb can be positive or negative and measures
their degree of compatibility. Assume that this
is a random variable drawn from the cumula-
tive distribution function B
 eb.
CONDITION 2: (Strong diminishing mar-
ginal utility for home goods)  < 0:
The above condition implies that the util-
ity function for nonmarket goods is more
concave than the natural logarithm function
. D 0/. Thus, marginal utility diminishes
more rapidly for household goods than mar-
ket goods. As a consequence, as a household
becomes richer it will tend to move consump-
tion toward market goods (in a relative sense).
The optimization problem of a z-adult house-
hold is
Wz .w; q/ D max
cz ;dz ;hz
Uz

cz
z

C
.1  /V

nz
z

CMzeb
subject to
cz D w .z   hz   qdz/
and the household production function (7).
It is useful, for the sake of exposition, to
define the indirect utility associated with the
maximization problems of single and mar-
ried households net of the effect of the blisseb: Define then S .w; q/  W1 .w; q/ and
M .w; q/ W2 .w; q/ eb. The indirect util-
ity functions S and M play an important role in
the analysis. By using the envelope theorem,
it is easy to calculate for future use that
(9) dS .w; q/
dq
D  w d1
c1   c < 0
and
dS .w; q/
dw
D 

1  h1   qd1
c1   c

(10)
D 
w

1
1  c=c1

> 0:
For a married household, the analogous analy-
sis yields
(11) dM .w; q/
dq
D  w d2
c2   c < 0;
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and
(12) dM .w; q/
dw
D 
w

1
1  c=c2

> 0:
The allocations of single and married house-
holds, fcz; hz; dzgzD1;2 relate to each other in
an intuitive fashion.
LEMMA 1: (Household allocations) The
allocations in married and single households
have the following relationships:
(i) .c2   c/ > [.2 c=w/=.1 c=w/] .c1   c/ I
(ii) d2 < [.2  c=w/=.1  c=w/]d1I
(iii) h2 < [.2  c=w/=.1  c=w/]h1I
(iv) .c2   c/=2 > .c1   c/ and c2 > c1I
(v) S.w; q/ < M.w; q/:
Now, a married household has 2   c=w
units of disposable time, after netting out the
fixed cost of household maintenance, to spend
on various things. A single household has
1   c=w units of disposable time. So, the ra-
tio .2   c=w/=.1   c=w/ reflects how much
richer in time a married household is, due to
the economies of scale from marriage; i.e., a
married household spends less time working
per person in order to cover the fixed cost of
the household. Lemma 1, Part (i), states that
a married household will spend a larger frac-
tion of their adjusted time endowment on the
consumption of market goods than will a sin-
gle household. Parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 1
imply that married households spend less than
single households on household inputs, rela-
tive to market goods. That is, qd2=.c2   c/ <
qd1=.c1 c/ andwh2=.c2 c/ < wh1=.c1 c/
so that [qd2 C wh2]=.c2   c/ < [qd1 C
wh1]=.c1   c/. When nonmarket goods ex-
hibit strong diminishing marginal utility, big-
ger households will favor (relative to the con-
sumption patterns of smaller ones) market
consumption for their larger adjusted endow-
ment of time. Part (iv) of Lemma 1 states that
after paying the fixed cost of household main-
tenance, market consumption per person is ef-
fectively higher in a married household than
a single one. Also, married households spend
more on market goods than do single house-
holds. Last, as a consequence of (ii), (iii) and
(iv), a married household is better off than a
single one, at least on economic grounds. This
result is due to the economies of scale from
marriage.
A prospective couple will use the following
criteria to determine whether or not to marry:
MARRY if M.w; q/Ceb > S.w; q/;
SINGLE if M.w; q/Ceb < S.w; q/:
The threshold level of bliss, b, that equates
the value of married and single life is given by
(13) b D S .w; q/ M .w; q/ < 0:
Interestingly, some people will marry for eco-
nomic reasons even though they do not love
each other (because b < 0). Note that
1  B.b/ gives the fraction of the population
that gets married.
FROM ECONOMICS TO ROMANCE
Is the above framework useful for explain-
ing the decline in marriage since the 1950s?
The answer is yes. To see this, break the eco-
nomic development process up into two un-
derlying forces: a rise in wages and a decline
in the price for home inputs. Using (9) to (12)
and (13), it is easy to see that
(14) db

dq
D  w

d1
c1   c  
d2
c2   c

< 0
and
(15)
db
dw
D 
w

1
1  c=c1  
1
1  c=c2

> 0;
where the signs of the above expressions fol-
low from Lemma 1.
Technological advance in the form of either
a falling price for purchased household inputs
or rising real wages reduces the economic gain
from marriage. This leads to an increase in
the threshold value for bliss, b. A fall in
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the price of purchased household inputs leads
to the substitution of purchased household in-
puts for labor in household production. Sin-
gle households use labor-saving products the
most intensively, so they realize the greatest
gain [i.e., d2= .c2   c/ < d1= .c1   c/ in (14)].
The assumption of strong diminishing mar-
ginal utility for nonmarket goods ( < 0) is
important for a drop in the price of purchased
household inputs to reduce the economic re-
turn to marriage. As wages increase, the fixed
cost for household maintenance matters less.
This fixed cost bites the most for single house-
holds [i.e., c=c2 < c=c1 in (15)]. Therefore,
single households benefit the most from a rise
in wages. Equation (15) shows that in the ab-
sence of a fixed cost (c D 0) a change in wages
will have no impact on the utility differential
between married and single life. This leads to
the following lemma:
LEMMA 2: (The decline in marriage) The
fraction of the population that is married,
1   B .b/, is increasing in the time price of
durables, q, and decreasing in wages, w.
DIVORCE
The decision to divorce or not is analo-
gous to the decision to get married. Imag-
ine a couple who is married. Their house-
hold utility is M.w; q/ C eb. Suppose that
the couple gets a new draw for bliss, eb0,
from the distribution B
 eb0. Should they re-
main married? The answer is yes only if
M.w; q/ C eb0 > S.w; q/. It is easy to add
a cost of divorce into the analysis. Let a di-
vorce costs  in units of time per person. The
divorcee’s budget constraint would appear as
c D w.1   h/   wq   w. The indirect util-
ity function for a divorcee should be rewrit-
ten as S .w; q; /, with dS .w; q; / =d D
 w= .c   c/ < 0. Now the couple will re-
main married if M .w; q/ C b0 > S .w; q; /.
The threshold value for a divorce, b0, is de-
fined by b0 D S .w; q; / M.w; q/. Clearly
a drop in the cost of divorce, , will promote
divorce since it raises the value of single life
for a divorcee.
LEMMA 3: (The rise in divorce) The rate
of divorce, B  b0, is declining in cost of
divorce, , decreasing in the time price of
durables, q, and increasing in wages, w.
2. Assortative Mating
To have assortative mating, men and women
need to differ along some dimensions. As-
sume that there are two types of men: those
with low productivity and those with high pro-
ductivity working in the labor market. Denote
a man’s productivity level by i for i D 1; 2,
with 2 > 1. Let there be  i men who
have a productivity level of i . Similarly, sup-
pose that women differ in their market pro-
ductivity as well. Represent a woman’s pro-
ductivity in the market by  j for j D 1; 2,
with 2 > 1. Additionally, let women also
differ in their productivity at home, h , for
h D 1; 2, with 2 > 1. Assume that there are
 jh women with the productivity combination
. j ; h/. Thus, there are two types of men and
four types of women. Each sex has one unit
of time. To keep things simple, suppose that a
man spends all of his time working in the mar-
ket while a married woman divides her time
between market work and household produc-
tion. Normalize the total number of people of
each sex to one; i.e., let 1 C 2 D 1 and
11 C    C 22 D 1. For simplicity, assume
that 22 < 2 and 11 < 1. Who will
marry whom in this economy? Assume that
all matches are based solely on economic con-
siderations. Clearly, not all men can marry a
woman of the ideal type, .2; 2/, and not all
women can wed a man of the best type, 2.
How will matching be done in this economy?
Let the household’s preferences be given
once again by (1). Then the maximization
problem for a marriage between a type-i
man and a type-. j ; h/ woman is
M.i ;  j ; hIw; q/ D maxd;h f ln cC.1 / ln ng;
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subject to
n D d C .1  /  hh 1=
and
c D iw C w j .1  h/  wqd;
where q is the time price of durables (per ef-
ficiency unit of time). It is easy to calculate
that
dM
di
D w
c
> 0;
(16) dM
d j
D w
c
.1  h/ > 0;
and
(17)
dM
dh
D .1  / .1  /
 
h

n
 1
h > 0:
An interesting feature to note is that in a mar-
riage the value of a woman’s productivity in
the market,  j , depends on how much she will
work there, 1   h. Likewise, the value of her
productivity at home, h , is a function of how
much time she labors there, h.
THE GALE-SHAPLEY MATCHING
ALGORITHM
To characterize the implied matching
process, simply make a list of utilities from
the pairings, starting from the top and going to
the bottom. The best women will be matched
with the best men. Now, suppose that there
are more of these men than women. Then,
some of the men will have to match with the
next-best women on the list. The matching
process continues down the list in this fash-
ion. At each stage the remaining best men are
matched with the remaining best women. If
there is an excess supply of one of the sexes,
the overflow of this sex must find a match on
the next line(s) of the list.
Now, suppose that the kth position on
the list is represented by a match of type
.i ;  j ; h/. Some type-i men may have
already been allocated to women that are
higher on the list; i.e., to women that have
a better combination of  j and h . Let
Rkm.i / be the amount of remaining type-i
men that can be allocated at the k-th posi-
tion on the list. Similarly, let Rkf . j ; h/
be the number of available type-. j ; h/
women. The number of matches is given
by minfRkm.i /; Rkf . j ; h/g. Recall that the
number of people of each sex is one. Thus,
the odds of a match are Pr.i ;  j ; h/ D
minfRkm.i /; Rkf . j ; h/g. Any type-i men
that are not assigned a mate at position
k will be available for position k C 1,
and similarly so for type-. j ; h/ women.
Thus, the number of type-i men that will
be available for the next position, k C 1,
will be given by RkC1m .i / D Rkm.i /  
minfRkm.i /; Rkf . j ; h/g, while the number
of type-. j ; h/ women is RkC1f . j ; h/ D
Rkf . j ; h/   minfRkm.i /; Rkf . j ; h/g. To
start things off, R1m.i / D i and
R1f . j ; h/ D  jh . The matching process
is described in Table 4. The odds of some
of the matches happening in the table will be
zero. For example, consider a marriage of type
.2; 1; 1/. There will be no type-2 men
left by the time the algorithm reaches a type-
.1; 1/f woman.
THE RISE IN ASSORTATIVE MATING
What can explain the rise in assortative mat-
ing? Two things come to mind. First, techno-
logical progress in the home. Second, tech-
nological progress in the market or reductions
in discrimination that favor market work by
women. If these drivers reshuffle the entries in
Table 4, then a change in the pattern of assor-
tative mating will occur. The discussion here
is heuristic. Take yesteryear as the starting
point in time. Suppose that women do little
work in the market. A high value for  implies
that a woman will have a high ranking in the
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table. From (16) it can be seen that, if women
work little in the market (h ' 1), then their
value in marriage will not be affected much
by the value of their market productivity. But,
their productivity at home will matter, as (17)
illustrates. Assume that
M.i ; 1; 2; w; q/ > M.i ; 2; 1; w; q/:
Here a man of type i will prefer a woman
who is good at home production and not good
at market work to a woman who is not good at
home production and good at market work.
As the economy changes due to technolog-
ical progress in the home and the market, so
will the ordering in the table. Take each form
of technological progress in turn.
1) Technological Progress in the Home. Let
the price of home durables, q , fall. This
releases labor from the home. As h falls,
the value that a women’s market pro-
ductivity has in a marriage will increase.
The position of M.i ; 1; 2; w; q/ vis
à vis M.i ; 2; 1; w; q/ in the ranking
would be reversed. Now, a man would
prefer a wife who is not good at home
production and good at market work to
the wife who is good at home production
and not good at market work.
2) Technological Progress in the Market.
Suppose that market forces favor a shift
from brawn to brain. This could be
thought of in two ways. First, a woman’s
productivity in the market, , may rise
relative to her productivity at home, .
Second, it could be viewed as an increase
in the market productivity of women, ,
relative to men, . Both of these forces
will result in a higher level of labor sup-
ply, 1   h, by women—see Appendix
A.A4. As a consequence, a woman’s 
will matter more relative to her .
The above illustration assumes that a woman’s
productivity at home and in the market are
uncorrelated. Presumably, they are positively
correlated. To the extent that this is true, the
reordering in the table may be more muted.
DISCUSSION
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) document
some key facts about marriage and divorce
over the last 150 years. A nice survey of the
early theoretical literature on marriage and di-
vorce is provided in Weiss (1997). Brown-
ing, Chiappori and Weiss (2014) provide an
introduction to the modern theory of mar-
riage and divorce. The first search model
of marriage and divorce was developed by
Mortensen (1988). Greenwood and Guner
(2009) develop a dynamic search model of
marriage and divorce and fit it to match the
trends in these variables since World War
II. (A subsection of the paper examines the
model’s prediction over the entire 20th cen-
tury). A model of marriage and divorce is used
in Regalia and Rios-Rull (2001) to account
for the rise in the number of single mothers.
They stress market forces, such as a move-
ment in the gender gap, as explaining this rise.
Jacquemet and Robin (2012) estimate a search
and matching model of the marriage market
for the United States. Their analysis focuses
on how female and male wages affect mar-
riage probabilities and the share of the marital
surplus received by partners.
Fernandez and Wong (2016) examine the
implications of a move towards unilateral di-
vorce in the 1970s. They find that this switch
promoted divorce and increased married fe-
male labor-force participation. In the cur-
rent analysis, think about this as a drop in
. In an econometric investigation, Wolfers
(2006) finds that unilateral divorce laws ex-
plain very little of the long-run rise in di-
vorce rates. Thus, whether unilateral divorce
laws promoted a rise in divorce is an open
question. Fernandez and Wong (2016) also
find that a reduction in the gender gap barely
changed divorce and led to a small reduction
in the number of married women. It did have
a significant impact on married female labor-
force participation. The impact of such laws
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on savings is studied in Voena (2015). She
finds that the unilateral divorce combined with
an equal division of property encourages sav-
ings and discourages female labor-force par-
ticipation. Voena (2015) formulates the al-
locations within a marriage from a dynamic
contracting perspective. Under the unilat-
eral divorce regime, the Pareto weights in the
married household’s problem [a dynamic ana-
logue to (5) in her analysis] may evolve over
time as one party in the marriage attempts to
keep the other within the marriage by trans-
ferring goods and/or leisure to them. Guve-
nen and Rendall (2015) suggest that changes
in divorce laws also contributed to growing
female educational attainment since education
acts as an insurance against bad marriages for
women. Other public policies affect the value
of single versus married life as well. Since
the unit of taxation in the U.S. tax code is the
household, it penalizes married households
with two earners. Chade and Ventura (2002)
build a search model of marriage and divorce
to study the differential tax treatment of single
and married individuals and show that a move
to individual filing would increase the number
of marriages.
The matching algorithm presented here was
developed by Gale and Shapley (1962), who
characterize stable matching without trans-
fers. Every potential marriage is associated
with a given value utility for each partner.
This utility cannot be transferred between par-
ties. The algorithm matches people together.
The allocation is stable when there is no sit-
uation where two people would prefer to be
matched with each other as opposed to with
their current partners. As a special case, sup-
pose men and women differ by a single char-
acteristic, say their labor market productiv-
ities,  and . Let M. ; / be the com-
mon value of a marriage enjoyed by both par-
ties. It is easy to show that if M is strictly
increasing in both arguments, then the sta-
ble Gale-Shapley algorithm will imply posi-
tive assortative mating; that is, high- men
will match with high- women and low-
men will match with low- women.
An alternative would be to assume that the
utility is transferable; that is, the total util-
ity from a match can be split up between
the partners. Shapley and Shubik (1972)
and Becker (1973) characterize stable matches
when utility is transferable. They show that
stable matching requires efficiency in that it
must maximize total utility summed across
all matches. Becker (1973) presented some
conditions under which there will be posi-
tive assortative mating. Again, if agents dif-
fer by a single dimension, then positive as-
sortative mating requires that the function M
be supermodular. In other words, if 0 > 
and 0 > , then M.0; 0/ C M.; / 
M.0; / C M.; 0/. A more thorough
analysis is provided by Browning, Chiappori
and Weiss (2014). It is easy to put random-
ness into the matching process, such as mar-
ital bliss, so that there will not be perfect as-
sortative mating. Choo and Siow (2006) esti-
mate a static transferable utility model of the
U.S. marriage market and show that the gains
to marriage for young adults fell substantially
between the early 1970s and early 1980s.
Burdett and Coles (1999) study assortative
mating within a search framework. They use
a simple framework where agents differ along
a single dimension. In particular, the utility
from a given match for a person is the type of
his/her match. They show that a class struc-
ture will arise: Individuals of a given type will
in equilibrium only marry people whose types
fall within a certain range around the individ-
ual’s type. As a result, while there is still a
tendency for assortative mating, the cost of
search forces agents to be less picky compared
with a frictionless world. Shimer and Smith
(2000) study a search model with transfer-
able utility and show that the household util-
ity function, M.; /, needs to satisfy more
stringent conditions than supermodularity for
positive assortative mating to emerge in equi-
librium.
Couples may sort on many dimensions.
Chiappori, Oreffice and Quintana-Domeque
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 26
(2012) show that body mass is one such fac-
tor. Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) and Fer-
nandez, Guner and Knowles (2005) suggest
that positive assortative mating has implica-
tions for income inequality and vice versa.
Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos
(2016) illustrate within the context of a struc-
tural model how shifts in family formation
(changes in educational attainment, shifts in
the pattern of marriage, and movements in
married female labor-force participation) can
significantly amplify the impact of shifts in
the wage structure on inequality. A dis-
tinguishing feature of the analysis is that
the matching probabilities are determined en-
dogenously. Positive assortative mating pro-
vides a marriage-market return for female ed-
ucational investment, in addition to the tradi-
tional labor-market return. This is analyzed in
Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2009). Eckstein,
Keane and Lifshitz (2016) estimate a model
of family formation, similar in many respects
to Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and Santos
(2016), but they include a fertility decision.
In their analysis, the matching probabilities
are exogenously imposed using the empirical
ones from the data.
The existing empirical literature measures
assortative mating by the correlation, or other
measures of association, between the educa-
tional attainments, as in Figure 12, or the
earnings of husbands and wives. In addition
to household income, educational attainment
of individuals can affect assortative mating
both by shaping partner preferences as well
as by influencing the circle of potential part-
ners that one circulates within. One can imag-
ine that assortative mating along a measure
of socioeconomic class that is independent of
one’s education can possibly shed light on
these two forces. Assortative mating along the
lines of parental education or along distinctive
first or last names could provide such a mea-
sure of socioeconomic class [see Guell, Ro-
driguez Mora and Telmer (2015) and Olivetti
and Paserman (2015)].
As an aside, the model above suggests that
a married woman will do more housework the
higher her productivity is at home relative to
in the market; i.e., the higher is h= j . It
also suggests she will work more in the mar-
ket the higher her productivity is relative to
her husband’s in the market; i.e., the higher
is  j=i . On the first point, Rios-Rull (1993)
inserts household production into an overlap-
ping generations model to examine its impact
on the time allocations of skilled versus un-
skilled labor. In his framework, skilled labor
(relative to unskilled labor) tends to substitute
market goods or services for labor in house-
hold production.
4. Growing up with a Single Mother
There is no longer the need for never-
married adults to find a mate and marry for
economic reasons, as in the past. Likewise,
people no longer have to remain, for economic
reasons, in an unhappy marriage. They can
divorce and live alone or find someone else.
There is a downside, though. Children from
single-parent families are less likely to be suc-
cessful than kids living with both natural par-
ents. This is shown in Table 5. The table
examines various outcomes for a child based
on where they lived between ages 0 to 16. A
two-parent family is defined as a family with
both natural parents present. A single-parent
family is defined as a family with just one
parent present or a family with one natural
parent and one step parent present. A child
is assigned to the category where s/he lived
for the majority of her or his childhood. As
shown in Table 5, children living in single-
parent households are more likely than chil-
dren from two-parent families to drop out of
high school (14.6 percent vs. 9.2 percent), be
idle (25.9 vs. 12.1 percent), experience a birth
before age 20 (32.8 vs. 21.3 percent), and are
less likely to complete college (15.0 percent
vs. 23.6).
What economic factors might be important
in accounting for these differences? Single-
parent families have only half the income
of two-parent familes. Recall from Table 2
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that the cost of raising children for a single-
parent family is very high as a fraction of
their income. Additionally, Table 1 showed
that child-care expenses absorbed a signifi-
cant fraction of a working mother’s income.
Children living with a single mother are much
more likely to live in poverty than those living
within a married household, as the right-hand
panel of Figure 13 shows. A much greater
percentage of female-headed families receive
welfare than married ones do—see the left
panel of Figure 13.
Children in single-parent households also
enjoy less time with their parents. Table 6
shows how much time mothers spend on child
care per week. The upper panel shows total
hours per week, while the lower panel reports
hours per child. The total time spent on child
care increased in recent decades for all groups.
As documented in Section 2, total nonmarket
hours (household work) of women declined
significantly during this period. The numbers
in Table 6 suggest that time saved by better
household technologies was partly used for
spending more time with children. More edu-
cated mothers spend more time with their chil-
dren than the less educated mothers. Finally,
child-care time per child in single-parent fami-
lies is about an hour less per week than in two-
parent families.
1. A Model with Female-Headed House-
holds
Imagine a world where there are two types
of men and women, those with a high level of
productivity, 2=2, and those with a low level,
1=2, so that 1 < 2. A person earns a wage
based on her/his productivity level on the la-
bor market. The fraction of each sex that is the
low type is . Men and women meet in a mar-
riage market. They sort according to their pro-
ductivity so that a paired man and woman are
from the same socioeconomic class. The cou-
ple draws a marital bliss shock, eb 2 f b; bg.
The realized value of the shock will take the
low value,  b, with probability ". The couple
decides whether or not to marry based upon
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the realized value of this shock. Regardless of
whether they marry or not, each woman has
two children, a girl and a boy. If the couple
separates, the children always live with their
mother. An adult’s productivity level is in-
fluenced by the amount of human capital in-
vestment (education) that s/he received when
young. In particular, if a household invests 
in their children’s education, then both chil-
dren will draw the high level of productivity,
2=2, with probability  . If they do not, then
both children will draw the high level with
probability  <  .
Let a married household have preferences
of the form
ln c C 20 Ceb;
where c is consumption, 0 2 f1=2; 2=2g
represents the productivity level of the chil-
dren, and eb 2 f b; bg denotes the level of
marital bliss. Parents care about the success
of their children, as measured by the kids’ pro-
ductivity. Utility for a single mother is given
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by
ln c C 20:
She does not realize any bliss from marriage.
The preferences for a single man have the
form
ln c:
Since the children do not live with single fa-
thers, it is assumed that the latter does not en-
joy a benefit from the former. Therefore, an
estranged father will not willingly invest in his
children because he does not care about them.
Should a household invest or not in educat-
ing their children? If a single mother of type i
does not invest in her children, her consump-
tion will be i=2. The expected utility from
her children is then .1   /01 C 02. Alter-
natively, if she does invest in her children, she
will realize expected utility from them in the
amount .1 /01C02 > .1 /01C02,
but her consumption will be reduced to i=2 
 < i=2. Let e D 0 indicate if a household
does not invest in its children (or does not ed-
ucate them) and e D 1 denote that it does. The
single mother’s decision to invest in her chil-
dren is summarized by
e D
8>><>>:
1; if ln
 
i=2

  ln  i=2  
 .   /  02   01 ;
0; otherwise.
A single mother will only invest in her chil-
dren if the gain in utility from improved child
quality, .   /.02   01/, exceeds the loss
from the drop in her consumption, ln.i=2/ 
ln.i=2   /. The gain in utility from im-
proved child quality derives from the higher
odds,  > , of getting a good draw, 02 > 01.
The decision for a married household is
very similar:
e D
8<: 1; if ln
 
i
  ln  i   
 .   /  02   01 ;
0; otherwise.
Note that ln.i /  ln.i   / is decreasing in
i . So, a married household is more likely
to invest in their children because they are
wealthier, i > i=2.
2. An Equilibrium with Single Mothers
It is easy to construct the following situation
where:
1) Some children will grow up with a single
mother.
2) Children who grow up with single moth-
ers will have on average lower levels of
human capital than those who don’t.
3) Girls who grow up living with a single
mother are more likely to become single
mothers than girls who grow up in a two-
parent family.
To construct such an equilibrium, assume
the following conditions:
CONDITION 3: (All married couples edu-
cate their children)
ln.1/  ln.1   / <
.   /.02   01/:
Observe that if the above equation holds for
a type-1 household, then it certainly holds for
a type-2 one, because ln.i /   ln.i   / is
decreasing in i .
CONDITION 4: (Single mothers do not ed-
ucate their children)
ln.2=2/  ln.2=2  / >
.   /.02   01/:
If a high-type single mother chooses not to ed-
ucate her child, then a low-type one won’t ei-
ther, since ln.i=2/   ln.i=2   / falls with
increases in i .
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 29
CONDITION 5: (Couples with the high
bliss shock, b, always marry.)
ln.1   /C .1  /01 C 02 C b >
ln.1=2/C .1  /01 C 02:
The left side gives the value of marriage for
a type-1 couple which draws the high value
for the bliss shock, b. The right side gives
the value of single life for the woman. The
man will also want to marry if this condition
holds, because the value of single life for him
is ln.1=2/. Again, ln.i   /  ln.1/ is in-
creasing in i , so that if the above condition
holds for 1, then it also holds for 2.
CONDITION 6: (High-productivity cou-
ples with a bad bliss shock,  b, choose to
marry while low-productivity ones do not)
ln.2   /C .1  /02 C 02   b >
ln.2=2/C .1  /01 C 02;
and
ln.1   /C .1  /01 C 02   b <
ln.1=2/C .1  /01 C 02:
When the first condition holds for a type-2
woman, then it will also hold for a type-2
man. Whether the second condition holds for
a type-2 man is irrelevant, since if the woman
doesn’t want to marry, then a union won’t
form.
THE STEADY STATE WITH SINGLE
MOTHERS
Now think of an overlapping generations
model where a person lives two periods,
the first as a child, the second as an adult.
Given the above conditions, type-1 matches
that draw the low value for the bliss shock,
 b, will not result in a marriage. The sin-
gle woman will then pick not to educate
her children—condition (4). Let v denote
the steady-state fraction of low-productivity
adults. By assumption, then, v will not change
over time. It is determined by
 D ".1  /C v.1  "/.1  /C
.1  /.1  /:
To understand this equation, focus on the
right-hand side. There are exactly three ways
a person can become a low-productivity adult.
First, s/he may have had a low-productivity
mother. There are v low-productivity moth-
ers in the population. A fraction " of these
will remain unmarried because they draw the
low value for the bliss shock. Their chil-
dren will be a low type with probability .1  
/. Thus, the number of low-type children
spawned from low-type mothers is ".1  /.
This explains the first term. Second, a low-
productivity mother marries with probability
1  ". Even though the children in her house-
hold will be educated, they may still turn out
to be a low type with probability 1    . This
gives the second term. Third, there are 1   
high-type marriages in the population. A frac-
tion .1   / of these marriages will have
low-type children. Therefore, the number of
low-type children arising from high-type mar-
riages is .1   /.1   /. Consequently, the
right-hand side gives the total number of low-
type children, which in a steady state must
equal , or the left-hand side. Solving gives
0 < v D 1  
1  "[.1  /  .1  /] < 1:
Taking stock of the situation:
1) The fraction of mothers who are single
is ". Not surprisingly, this fraction is
increasing in the odds that a low-type
mother will not get married, ". This frac-
tion also rises in the probabilities that
children will turn out to be low types,
1   and 1   .
2) The expected level of human capital for
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a child growing up with a single mother
is .1   /1 C 2, which is less than
the expected level of human capital for a
child growing up in a two-parent family,
.1  /1 C 2.
3) The odds of a girl who grew up with a
single mother becoming a single mother
herself are ".1   /, while the proba-
bility of a girl who grew up in a two-
parent family becoming a single mother
is ".1  /, where ".1  / > ".1  /.
3. Discussion
Economic status is highly correlated across
generations. Corak (2013) and Durlauf and
Shaorshadze (2015) review the extensive liter-
ature on intergenerational mobility. Measur-
ing intergenerational mobility is a challeng-
ing task that requires panel data that link the
economic status of children to that of their
parents. Guell, Rodriguez-Mora and Telmer
(2015) and Clark (2014) propose a new
methodology for measuring intergenerational
mobility that exploits the cross-sectional data
on the joint distribution of surnames and eco-
nomic outcomes. Clark (2014) documents that
there has been very little change in social mo-
bility over the past few centuries.
A growing body of literature in economics
and other social sciences emphasizes the im-
portance of initial conditions for intergenera-
tional mobility. Carneiro and Heckman (2003)
and Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov
(2006), among others, show that differences
between children, both in their cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, appear at very early ages
and that the family environment plays a sig-
nificant role in generating these differences.
Furthermore, Cunha and Heckman (2007) and
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) em-
phasize the importance of early childhood in-
vestment for the effectiveness of investment at
later ages. Huggett, Ventura and Yaron (2011)
calculate that the initial conditions at labor
market entry, ages 20 to 25, can account for
about 60 percent of the variation in lifetime
earnings—considerably more than shocks re-
ceived during the working lifetime. Keane and
Wolpin (1997) find an even larger role for ini-
tial conditions.
Becker and Tomes (1979 and 1986) and
Loury (1981) constitute the main building
blocks of theoretical research on intergener-
ational mobility. In the Becker and Tomes
model, altruistic parents, given their prefer-
ences and constraints, decide how much to in-
vest in their children. Lee and Seshadri (2014)
integrate the Becker and Tomes framework
into a standard life-cycle economy. Their re-
sults suggest that investment in children and
parents’ human capital, rather than the persis-
tence of innate abilities, have the largest im-
pact on intergenerational mobility. Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004) and Caucutt and Lochner
(2012) also study models with multi-period
human capital investment and show that pub-
lic policies that target early ages are more suc-
cessful than later interventions.
The plight of children living with a single
mother was documented in a classic book by
McLanahan and Sandefur (1994). Aiyagari,
Greenwood and Guner (2000) build an over-
lapping generations model with endogenous
marriage and divorce to analyze the impact of
single parenthood on intergenerational mobil-
ity. Their analysis combines the Becker and
Tomes model of human capital investment on
children with a search model of marriage. The
analysis is extended to include endogenous
fertility in Greenwood, Guner and Knowles
(2003). Suppose that single women are eli-
gible for a lump-sum welfare payment in the
amount !. From examining condition (6) it
can be seen that this payment makes it more
likely for a low-productivity woman to choose
single life because the value of not marrying
increases to ln.1=2C!/C .1  /1C 2.
Still, if the payment were large enough per-
haps a single mother would invest in her chil-
dren’s education since now the cost of doing
this is ln.1=2 C !/   ln.1=2 C !   /,
which is decreasing in !—condition (4). In
a similar vein, suppose that a single father
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has to pay child support in the amount  .
This reduces the value of single life for a
low-productivity man to ln.1=2   /, so he
would more likely remain married—his ana-
logue to condition (6). This raises the value
of single life for a low-productivity woman
and also gives her more wherewithal to ed-
ucate her kids. The impact of welfare pay-
ments on single motherhood is modelled in
Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2000). In
situations where the household solves a bar-
gaining problem, as discussed in Section 2.2,
the relative weight on the female’s utility in
the household optimization problem may shift
as a result of changes in public policy—see
Greenwood, Guner and Knowles (2003).
5. Social Change
Just as families have changed over time,
so have culture, social norms and social in-
stitutions. Clearly, these societal changes in-
fluence what happens within families. Like-
wise, widespread shifts in the structure of
families will have an impact on culture, social
norms and social institutions. The approach
here models both family structure and culture
and social institutions as functions of the eco-
nomic environment. As the economy changes,
so do family structure, culture and social insti-
tutions. The induced changes in family struc-
ture and culture and social institutions interact
with each other.
1. Women’s Rights in the Workplace
Milestones for women’s rights in the United
States are presented in Table 7. This list is far
from complete. It emphasizes topics discussed
here, to wit: married female labor-force par-
ticipation, marriage and divorce, and repro-
duction. In 1920 an amendment to the U.S.
constitution granted women the right to vote.
In the same year, the U.S. Department of La-
bor established the Women’s Bureau. Its pur-
pose was to collect information about women
in the workforce and to improve their work-
ing conditions. The Equal Pay Act was passed
in 1963. This act made it illegal to pay a
woman less than what a man would earn for
the same job. Around the same time, the Civil
Rights Act, Title VII, prohibited employment
discrimination on the basis of sex. The act
established the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC), charged with in-
vestigating complaints and imposing penal-
ties. In 1970, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled that Title VII applied
to jobs with “substantially equal” task require-
ments for men and women, although not nec-
essarily in title or job description. Title IX of
the Education Amendments, passed in 1972,
banned discrimination against women in edu-
cation. This facilitated entry into professional
schools, among other things. Employment
discrimination against pregnant women was
prohibited in 1978. Last, in 1986 the Supreme
Court found that sexual harassment on the job
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
2. A Model of Women’s Rights
A stylized model of the process whereby
women gain rights in the workplace is now
formulated. Imagine an economy populated
by married households, each with two chil-
dren. Both the husband and wife have one unit
of time. The husband spends all of his time
working in the market at the wagew. The wife
has three potential uses of her time: work-
ing at home, spending time with her children,
and working in the market at the wage rate
rw, where r 2 f0; g reflects women’s rights
in the workplace. When r D 0 (no rights)
married women are prohibited from working,
while when r D   1 (equal rights) they
can work at the wage w.2 Here,  represents
the gender gap. Even in a world without dis-
crimination, women may be paid differently
than men at a particular point in time. This
could occur because jobs in the past required
2Think about the situation corresponding with r D 0
as reflecting a world where there is severe discrimination
against women making it undesirable for them to work. This
equilibrium could be supported by a trigger strategy mech-
anism, whereby people won’t truck with other people who
hire women or other people who do business with people
that hire women.
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more brawn than brains. Labor is indivisible.
A mother must spend the fixed amount of time
h on housework. If the woman works in the
market, then she must work the fixed amount l
there.
The household’s utility function is given by
c C q C q;
where c is the household’s consumption, q is
the quality of the two children, and q is the av-
erage quality of children in society. The con-
stant  measures how households in society
care about other people’s children, as opposed
to their own, which is reflected by . The
variable  is distributed across households ac-
cording to a uniform distribution on the inter-
val [0; 1]. Thus, some households care more
(less) about the quality of their offspring (con-
sumption) than others. The quality of children
is specified by
q D ln t;
where t is the mother’s time spent with them.
Households also care about the average qual-
ity of children in society, q. Low quality chil-
dren in society may lead to social problems
such as crime, unwanted pregnancies, unem-
ployment and the like.
The household must decide whether or not
the woman should work. The woman’s unit of
time is split between housework, h, working
in the market, l 2 f0; lg, and improving the
quality of the household’s children, t ; thus,
t D 1   h   l. The household’s decision
amounts to solving the maximization problem
max
l2f0;lg
fw C rwl C  ln.1  h  l/C qg;
where l indicates whether the wife works in
the market (l D l) or not (l D 0). Withb de-
fined as the threshold value where the house-
hold is indifferent between the woman work-
ing in the market or not, it is easy to deduce
that
l D
8<: l; if  <
b D 3.r/  rwl
= ln[.1  h/=.1  l  h/];
0; otherwise.
The fraction of women working in society is
justb D 3.r/, which is a function of women’s
rights, r . When r D 0 (an absence of rights)
thenb D 3.0/ D 0 and no women will work.
LEMMA 4: (Married female labor-force
participation) The fraction of women working
in society,b D 3.r/, is increasing in women’s
rights, r , and decreasing in the amount of
housework required, h. It is not affected by
the average quality of children in society, q.
Observe that the average quality of chil-
dren in society, q, does not impact whether or
not the woman in a household works in the
market, at least given the level of women’s
rights, r . It turns out that the level of women’s
rights is influenced by the quality of children,
though, and vice versa. As will be seen, this is
the channel through which the economic envi-
ronment affects women’s rights.
Goldin (1990) discusses marriage bars that
prevented married women from working.
These were regulations in the first half of the
20th century that barred single women from
working after marriage and that prohibited
employers from hiring married ones. In 1928,
for example, 62 percent of school districts
would not hire married women. This figure
rose to 77 percent in 1942. Private firms had
similar proscriptions.
Suppose that households can vote on a law
that allows married women to work or not.
When women can work, then r D , and
when they cannot, r D 0. For a law to
pass, 50 percent of households must vote for
it. The median voter in society is the house-
hold with  D 0:5. The law will pass if and
only if the median household is in favor of it.
When women can work, the average quality
of children will be q D b ln.1   l   h/ C
.1   b/ ln.1   h/, while when they can’t it
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is q D ln.1   h/, where again b D 3.r/ is
the fraction of women who work. A house-
hold will only vote for the law, if the wife
will work. It is easy to understand why. If
the wife in the household will not work, then
that household will not gain any income from
voting for the law. But, the average quality
of children in society will fall. So, the house-
hold will vote no. If the median household
( D 0:5) votes for the law, then so will all
households with a  < 0:5.
The criteria underlying the median house-
hold’s vote is straightforward to formalize. If
women can work (a yes vote), the median
household’s utility will be
w.1C l/C 0:5 ln.1  l  h/
C f3./ ln.1  l  h/
C [1 3./] ln.1  h/g;
while if they can’t [a no vote, which impliesb D 3.0/ D 0], it is
w C 0:5 ln.1  h/C  ln.1  h/:
Notice that the median household cares about
the average quality of children in society,
which is a function of the aggregate level of
married female labor-force participation,b D
3./. So, the median household will vote yes
if wl   3./ ln[.1   h/=.1   l   h/] >
0:5 ln[.1   h/=.1   l   h/] and no otherwise.
By solving out forb D 3./, the decision to
vote yes (r D ) or no (r D 0) to grant women
the right to work can be written as
r D
8<: ; if wl.1  /> 0:5 ln[.1  h/=.1  l  h/];0; otherwise.
PROPOSITION 5: Women’s rights are more
likely in societies where the requirement for
housework, h, is low and the value of a
woman’s work in the market place, w, is
high. Women are likely to have fewer rights
in society’s that place more emphasis on chil-
dren or where  is high.
Therefore, technological progress in the
home, or a reduction in h, is conducive to the
development of women’s rights. So is techno-
logical progress in the market. The latter can
occur due to either an increase in the general
level of wages, w, or from an increase in the
value of jobs that women are suited for as re-
flected by –say because of a shift away from
brawn to brain.
DISCUSSION
Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004) model
shifts in culture as changes in tastes over
time. They build a dynamic model of culture
in which mothers’ employment affects their
sons’ preferences toward their wife working
or not. In their model, sons with a work-
ing mother become less biased against their
wives working. As more women enter the la-
bor force, a new culture is transmitted from
mothers to sons, which leads to even more
women entering the labor force in the next
generation. Empirically, the authors find that
the employment status of a man’s mother has
a significant impact on the likelihood that his
wife works. This is true even after control-
ling for various characteristics of husbands
and wives, such as education, income, and re-
ligion. In followup work, Fernandez and Fogli
(2009) find that second-generation American
women whose ancestors worked in countries
where married female labor-force participa-
tion is higher tend themselves to have higher
rates of labor-force participation. Likewise,
second-generation American women tend to
have higher rates of fertility when their ances-
tors originated from countries where fertility
is higher.
The model of women’s rights in the work-
place is inspired by Doepke and Tertilt (2009).
They model the empowerment of women over
time. In their framework, at the start of
time, only the husband’s preferences matter
for household decisions. The world then tran-
sits to a situation where both the husband’s
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and wife’s preferences are weighted equally.
Women in their framework value the welfare
of descendants more than men. A man faces
a tradeoff. On the one hand, he would like
to run his own household. On the other, he
would like his daughter to be empowered in
her household. As the return to education in-
creases, it pays for men to empower women
in the household. This result arises because
women care more about children than men.
Consequently, women’s empowerment spurs
human capital investment and increases the
welfare of the lineage. Eventually, this effect
is strong enough so that men favor empower-
ment. Doepke, Tertilt and Voena (2012) sur-
vey the literature on women’s rights. They
note that the extent of female empowerment in
a nation is highly correlated with its income—
see Doepke, Tertilt and Voena (2012, Fig-
ure 1). This fact suggests that culture, so-
cial norms and social institutions are likely
to be functions of the economic environment.
Miller (2008) discusses how suffrage rights
for women in the United States led to an ex-
pansion of public health spending that resulted
in a reduction in child mortality. In a similar
vein, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011) find that
increased labor-force participation for women
is associated with larger government. Still,
culture may change slowly. Alesina, Giuliano
and Nunn (2013) show that historical differ-
ences in agricultural technology across coun-
tries (labor-intensive shifting cultivation done
by women versus capital-intensive plough
agriculture done by men) have left their marks
on the status of women even today.
3. The Sexual Revolution, 1900-2000
There may be no better illustration of so-
cial change than the sexual revolution that oc-
curred during the 20th century. It is an excel-
lent example of how technological progress,
in this case contraception, can lead to a dra-
matic change in culture. At the beginning of
the past century, only a paltry number of un-
married teenage girls engaged in premarital
sex; 6 percent in 1900 (see Figure 14). By
the end of the century, a large majority did,
roughly 75 percent in 2002. What caused this
increase? The contraception revolution.
Both the technology for contraception and
education about its use changed dramatically
over the course of the past century. Con-
doms and diaphragms became more effective,
the birth control pill and IUDs arrived, and
contraception became widely available due to
the establishment of birth control clinics and
changes in laws. Some of these laws are doc-
umented in Table 7. In 1936, in the U.S. v.
One Package the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit established Margaret Sanger’s
right to order a pessary (a diaphragm) through
the mail from a doctor in Japan. Similarly, in
1965 the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Con-
necticut struck down a Connecticut law that
banned people from using “any drug, medi-
cinal article or instrument for the purpose of
preventing conception.” Estelle Griswold had
opened a birth control clinic. In 1972, a
women’s right to an abortion was affirmed in
Roe v. Wade. These rulings resulted in a dra-
matic drop in the cost of premarital sex. In ad-
dition, the annual failure rate for contraception
fell precipitously. In 1900, following the con-
ventional birth control practices at the time,
a teenage girl would have had a 72 percent
chance of becoming pregnant if she engaged
in premarital sex for the full course of a year.
By 2002, this dropped to 28 percent.
How did societies in yesteryear prevent out-
of-wedlock births? Providing unwed moth-
ers with material support was a great finan-
cial burden for parents, churches, and govern-
ments of the time. Societial real incomes were
very low. So, society worked hard to pun-
ish young men and women who engaged in
sex outside of marriage. Often, this involved
shaming the people involved. For example,
in 1601 England, the Lancashire Quarter Ses-
sions ordered an unmarried father and mother
of a child to be publicly whipped. The two
then had to sit in the stocks naked from the
waist up with a placard on their heads that
read “These persons are punished for forni-
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FIGURE 14. PREMARITAL SEX AND THE FAILURE
RATE FOR CONTRACEPTION, THE UNITED STATES
Note: The graph shows the fraction of 19-year-old women
who had premarital sex as well as the annual failure rate for
contraception.
Source: Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014).
cation.” Even today, the shame an unmarried
teenage girl associates with sex is related to
her propensity to engage in it. A girl who
feels premarital sex is shameful is much less
likely to engage in it, as Table 8 makes clear.
In 2002, only 17 percent of teenage girls (15 to
19 year olds) who thought that premarital sex
would cause shame had sexual intercourse,
compared with 77 percent who felt that it
would not cause shame. In a similar vein, just
31 percent of girls who felt that their moth-
ers would strongly disapprove if they had pre-
marital sex had coitus compared with 81 per-
cent who thought that their mothers would be
agnostic. People’s attitudes are an input into
culture. So, modeling how they are formed
and evolve is important for understanding so-
cial change.
4. A Model of Premarital Sex
Imagine a problem facing a teenage girl.
She is deciding whether or not to engage in
premarital sex. When making the decision,
she rationally calculates the costs and benefits
from this activity. The benefit is joy from sex.
Suppose this is governed by the level of the
girl’s libido, denoted by l (for this subsection).
Let libido be distributed across girls according
to a uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The cost
of the activity is the chance that the girl be-
comes pregnant. A teenage pregnancy reduces
the odds that a girl will attain a good educa-
tion, work in a fulfilling job, or find a desirable
partner in the marriage market. Represent the
utility that a girl with an out-of-wedlock birth
will have when she is an adult by Ao, and the
utility that a girl without one will realize by
An . Presume, of course, that An > Ao. Think
about An   Ao as representing the economic
cost of pregnancy. Additionally, assume that a
girl who becomes pregnant will feel shame in
the amount s. The determination of the level
of shame will be discussed later. Finally, even
if the girl engages in premarital sex, she may
not become pregnant. The level of  reflects
the state of society’s contraceptive technology.
Let  give the odds of safe sex, or not becom-
ing pregnant. Therefore, 1  is the probabil-
ity of becoming pregnant, or the failure rate.
A TEENAGE GIRL’S DECISION MAKING
Direct attention now to a teenage girl’s de-
cision about whether or not to engage in pre-
marital sex. On the one hand, if the girl is ab-
stinent, then she will realize an expected life-
time utility level of An . On the other hand, if
she engages in premarital sex, she will real-
ize the enjoyment l, but will become pregnant
with probability 1   . Her expected lifetime
utility level will be lC AnC.1  / Ao. Ad-
ditionally, if she becomes pregnant she will
feel shame in the amount s, which must be
netted out of Ao. The teenage girl will pick
the option that generates the highest level of
expected lifetime utility. Her decision can be
summarized as follows:8<: ABSTINENT, if A
n  l C  An
C .1  / .Ao   s/;
SEXUALLY ACTIVE, otherwise.
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PREMARITAL SEXUAL ACTIVITY
How much premarital sexual activity will
there be in society? The threshold level of li-
bido, l, at which a girl is indifferent between
having premarital sex or not is given by3
l D .1  /  An C s   Ao :
This has a nice interpretation. The expression
equates the utility of sex, given by l, with
its expected cost, the difference in future utili-
ties induced by an out-of-wedlock birth, mul-
tiplied by the probability of pregnancy. All
girls with an l > l will engage in premarital
sex while those with a l < l will not. The
number of girls experiencing premarital sex,
p, is given by
(18)
p D 1  l D 1  .1  /  An C s   Ao :
LEMMA 5: (Premarital sex) The fraction of
teenage girls engaging in premarital sex, p, is
decreasing in the failure rate of contraception,
1    ; the amount of shame associated with
an out-of-wedlock birth, s; and the economic
cost of an out-of-wedlock birth, An   Ao.
One might expect that girls from a higher
socioeconomic background will have more
to lose from having an out-of-wedlock birth.
That is, An  Ao will be larger for girls from a
higher socioeconomic background than for the
ones from a lower one. In fact, in the United
States, the odds of a girl having premarital sex
decline with family income. In the 2002 Na-
tional Survey of Family Growth, for instance,
70 percent of girls between the ages of 15 and
19 in the bottom income decile had experi-
enced it, versus 47 percent in the top one.
SOCIALIZATION BY PARENTS
How is the level of shame determined? Sup-
pose that it is determined by parental social-
ization. In particular, assume that parents try
3The threshold level of libido must lie between zero and
one. Clearly, it will always be positive since An > Ao. Set
l D 1 whenever .1  /.An C s   Ao/ > 1.
to mold their daughters’ psyches when they
are young so that they will be less likely to
engage in premarital sex when they are older.
Parents do this recognizing that their teenage
daughters will do whatever is in their own
best interest. In economic terms, daughters
will maximize their own utilities subject to the
constraints that they face. But, parents can in-
fluence the paths that their children will fol-
low as adults by molding their offsprings’ util-
ity functions when they are young. Hence,
the actions a daughter takes as a teen will be
partially based upon the socialization she re-
ceived when young. To operationalize this
idea, let parents choose the level of shame,
s, to minimize the odds of an out-of-wedlock
birth for their daughter. Shaming is a costly
socialization process. It requires parental ef-
fort in terms of instilling sexual mores in a
daughter. The cost function for this is given
by
s1C1=
1C 1= ; where 0 <  :
Assume that parents do not know the level
of libido that their teenage daughter will have.
The odds of an out-of-wedlock birth are given
by .1  / 1  .1  / .An C s   Ao/.
The parents’ decision problem can be
formulated as
min
s
 .1  /
 1  .1  /  An C s   Ao
C s
1C1=
1C 1= ;
where the term  governs the disutility par-
ents realize if their teenage daughter becomes
pregnant. The solution to this minimization
problem is
(19) s D
h
 .1  /2
i
:
LEMMA 6: (Parental socialization) The
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amount of parental socialization, s, that a
daughter receives is increasing in the failure
rate for contraception, 1    , and in the
parents’ disutility from an out-of-wedlock
birth to their teenage daughter, .
SOCIALIZATION BY CHURCH AND STATE
Other participants in the economy may
also have an interest in socializing children.
Churches and governments desire to curtail
premarital sex by teenagers. They do this for
both economic and moral reasons. Govern-
ments provide welfare for unwed mothers and
their children. Historically, this was a large
expense for the church. Social institutions de-
sire to minimize this expense. Teenage girls
who are religious are less likely to participate
in premarital sex. A girl who says religion is
very important is much less likely to have pre-
marital sex than one who does not think so.
In 1994, only 38 percent of 15-to-19 year old
teenage girls who said religion was “very im-
portant” to them had premarital sex versus the
60 percent who said that religion was “fairly
unimportant”—see Table 8.
Now suppose that the church can influence
the disutility that parents will experience if
their daughters become pregnant. Recall that
 reflects the disutility that parents place on a
daughter having an out-of-wedlock birth. Let
(20)  D r
=
1=
; 0 <  < 1;
where r is the amount of religious indoctrina-
tion that the church undertakes. Thus, the par-
ents will incur a higher level of disutility the
bigger is the amount of religious indoctrina-
tion. Indoctrination is costly and undertaken
according to the cost function
r :
The church wants to minimize the number
of out-of-wedlock births, while taking into ac-
count the cost of religious indoctrination. The
number of out-of-wedlock births can be calcu-
lated using (18), (19), and (20) to be
.1  / [1 .1 /.An Ao/ r


.1 /1C2 ]:
Suppose that the church’s objective is to mini-
mize the sum of out-of-wedlock births and the
cost of religious indoctrination. The church’s
minimization problem will appear as
min
r
.1  /


1  .1  /  An   Ao  r

.1  /1C2

C r ;
which has the solution
r D

.1  /2C2
 
1=.1 /
:
LEMMA 7: (Socialization by the church)
The amount of religious indoctrination, r , is
increasing in the failure rate for contracep-
tion, 1    , and is decreasing in cost of re-
ligious education,  .
SOCIAL CHANGE
It is now easy to deduce that as contra-
ception becomes more effective, there will be
less socialization by parents, the church and
the state against the perils of premarital sex.
This reduction happens because as the odds
of a sexually active unmarried teenage girl
becoming pregnant drop, there is less need
for socialization and socialization is a costly
process. When the failure rate, 1    , falls,
so does the amount of religious indoctrina-
tion, r , by Lemma 7. Parents will care less
if their teenage daughters become pregnant,
since  will now be smaller. Thus, by Lemma
6 parents too will engage in less socialization.
Therefore, s will drop. All of this causes a
rise in premarital sex, according to Lemma 5.
A sociologist would observe a simultaneous
rise in premarital sex and a decrease in pro-
scription against it. He may then interpret this
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as social change causing the rise in premarital
sex.
PROPOSITION 6: (Social change) A drop
in the failure rate for contraception, 1    ,
will cause a rise in premarital sex, p, and a
drop in parental, s, and religious, r , proscrip-
tion against it.
DISCUSSION
Parents want the best for their children.
They spend a great deal of time and effort
educating their kids. Children must learn
many things in order to function effectively
as adults. Not all of the lessons taught by
parents are of a formal nature. Parents may
tell their children to study and/or work hard,
not drink excessively or do drugs, be wise
with their money, and not be dishonest, etc.
Becker (1993) started the modern analysis of
how a child’s preferences can be molded by
parental investments. He explored how par-
ents may predispose children’s preferences to-
ward providing them with old age support.
Becker and Mulligan (1997) analyze how par-
ents can manipulate a child’s rate of time pref-
erence. This idea is extended in Doepke and
Zilibotti (2008), who study the decline of the
aristocracy that accompanied the British In-
dustrial Revolution. They argue that parents
who thought their children might enter the
class of skilled workers instilled in their off-
spring a patience that allowed the children to
sacrifice today to acquire the human capital
necessary so that they would earn more to-
morrow. Doepke and Zilibotti (2014) study
the effects of parenting styles. They show
that a lower level of household inequality re-
sults in more permissive parenting because the
stakes are lower, a prediction supported by the
empirical evidence. The model of premarital
sex developed here is a simplified version of
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014). It has obvious similarities with the
above work, but extends the notion to show
how other players in society, such as churches
or governments, may also try to shape prefer-
ences. Their work illustrates how shifts in the
economic environment can lead to changes in
culture.
A different perspective on preference for-
mation is taken in the well-known work of
Bisin and Verdier (2001). They assume that
parents want their children to behave like
them. The cultural transmission of corruption
is modelled by Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002)
using a variant of the Bisin and Verdier (2001)
framework. They assume that an honest per-
son will suffer by behaving dishonestly. Hon-
est parents educate their children, at a cost,
with the hope that the latter will inherit (in a
probabilistic manner) this notion of guilt asso-
ciated with dishonest behavior. This is similar
to the concept of shame analyzed here.
6. Fertility
The birth of a child radically changes a
family. It obviously increases its size, but
it also changes its age and sex composition.
The birth of a child is also costly. It re-
quires resources such as time and goods, of-
ten for many years. Finally, birth rates have
first-order effects on population growth and on
the age structure of a population. For all these
reasons, economists have developed models to
better understand the determinants and effects
of fertility decisions.4
The Demographic Transition—A “demo-
graphic transition” was experienced by coun-
tries throughout the world, starting in Europe
and North America around 1800. The transi-
tion was from the high mortality and fertility
rates that characterized the pre-industrial era
toward the low mortality and fertility rates of
the modern era. This can be seen in Figure
15, which plots crude birth rates for four re-
gions of the world. Besides the crude birth
rate, which measures contemporaneous fertil-
ity, lifetime fertility also plummeted in coun-
tries experiencing a demographic transition.
In the United States, for example, the total fer-
tility rate (the average births over a woman’s
4There exist a variety of ways to measure fertility, which
are reviewed in Appendix A.A10.
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life) for a white woman was seven in 1800
but had fallen to two by 1980—see Hernan-
dez (1993). Before the demographic transi-
tion, some areas of the world experienced flat
or increasing birth rates.
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FIGURE 15. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS BY RE-
GION
Note: The graph shows population-weighted crude birth
rates. North America: Canada and the United States; Eu-
rope: Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom; Latin America: Ar-
gentina, Chile and Mexico; Asia: China, India and Japan.
Source: Mitchell (2013).
The Income-Fertility Correlation—There is
a negative cross-sectional correlation between
fertility and income. Figure 16 shows this re-
lationship for various cohorts in the United
States. The negative correlation between fer-
tility and income not only holds in cross
sections of individuals but also across coun-
tries, as documented by Manuelli and Seshadri
(2009). In the case of the U.S. economy, Jones
and Tertilt (2008) compute an overall elastic-
ity of children ever born to income of  0:38
across various cohorts. They also document
that although this correlation varies from one
cohort to another, it remains significantly neg-
ative between 0:45 (for the 1888 cohort) and
 0:16 (for the 1933 cohort).
The Baby Boom—Many developed coun-
tries experienced a baby boom about the mid-
dle of the 20th century. This baby boom is
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TIONAL INCOME IN THE UNITED STATES
Note: The graph shows children ever born by occupational
income for select cohorts of women in the United States.
Source: Jones and Tertilt (2008).
most clearly seen in the North America panel
of Figure 15 and spans the years 1936 to 1965.
In the United States, the number of children
ever born went from 2.3 for women born in
1907 (whose average child was born in 1934)
to 3.1 for women born in 1932 (whose aver-
age child was born in 1959).5 But the baby
boom was not just in the United States. Aus-
tralia, New-Zealand, Canada, France, Norway
and Sweden, to cite only a few, also experi-
enced baby booms.
Fertility and Social Upheaval—Periods of
wars, civil wars, revolutions, bouts of occu-
pation by foreign invaders, etc, typically lead
to lower fertility, as documented by Caldwell
(2004). In Spain, for instance, births declined
during the civil war years (1935-1942) just as
much as during the preceding 35 years. In Eu-
rope, World War I was associated with a very
large decline in fertility, about 50 percent be-
low trend—see Figure 15. The missing births
during the war were at least as large as, and
sometimes larger than, the military casualties
on the battlefield. The dent in the age com-
position of European demography caused by
5See Hernandez (1993, Table 2.2, p. 24).
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World War I was felt long after the war and
throughout the 20th century.
1. A Model of Fertility
A model is now presented to describe some
of the key trade-offs associated with fertility
choices, as emphasized in the literature. The
economy is populated by households formed
by two adults, a husband and a wife. Assume
that the husband and wife are of the same age
and live for two periods. They both have one
unit of time per period. Each period, the hus-
band spends all of his time working in the mar-
ket at the wage wm . The wife has two poten-
tial uses of her time: working and spending
time taking care of children. Denote the pro-
ductivity of the wife when she works by w f .
Productivity, w f ; can be interpreted either as
a market wage or as productivity in home pro-
duction.
The preferences of the household are repre-
sented by the utility function
(21) U.c; k; q/C U.c0; k0; q/:
In this specification,  2 .0; 1/ is the sub-
jective discount factor. The function U is a
utility index with standard properties. The
variables c and c0 represent household con-
sumption in the first and second periods, re-
spectively. Similarly, the variables k and k0
represent the number of kids in the house-
hold during these periods. Assume that k0
may differ from k because some children may
die between the first and second periods. Let
s 2 .0; 1/ represent the fraction of children
that are still present in the household during
the second period
(22) k0 D sk:
The variable k (as opposed to k0) measures fer-
tility. The variable q represents the average
quality of children.
Children are costly; recall Table 2, which
shows their monetary cost and Table 6 which
shows their time cost. Let the function
C.k; qIw f /measure the period cost of raising
k children with quality q when the wife’s op-
portunity cost of time is w f . Depending on its
specific form, this function regulates the cost
of children in goods and/or time. The func-
tion C is a description of the technology link-
ing inputs, goods and/or time, to the number
of children produced. The budget constraint
of the household is
(23)
c C c
0
r
C C  k; qIw f C C

sk; qIw0f

r
D wm C w f C
w0m C w0f
r
;
where r is the gross rate of interest.6 The
household’s optimization problem is to choose
consumption, c and c0, the number of children,
k, and their quality, q , to maximize (21) sub-
ject to (23). At an optimum, the following
first-order condition must be satisfied for k:
(24) U2.c; k; q/C sU2.c0; sk; q/ D
U1.c; k; q/

C1.k; qIw f /
C sC1.sk; qIw
0
f /
r

:
The marginal (lifetime) utility of children is
on the left-hand side of this equation; that is,
the increase in lifetime utility resulting from
an additional birth. The right-hand side shows
the marginal (lifetime) cost of children. The
term in brackets is the marginal goods cost of
children; that is, the increase in the present
value of costs resulting from an additional
birth. This is multiplied by the marginal util-
6Even though the term w f appears on the right-hand
side of the budget constraint, the disposable income of the
household in the first period is not wm C w f : The func-
tion C
 
n; qIw f

represents the purchase of all the inputs
needed to raise children, including potentially the wife’s time
at price w f .
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ity of current consumption, so as to convert
the cost into utils.
A second optimality condition must be sat-
isfied for q:
(25) U3.c; k; q/C U3.c0; sk; q/ D
U1.c; k; q/

C2.k; qIw f /
C C2.sk; qIw
0
f /
r

:
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit of
increasing children’s quality while the right-
hand side is the marginal cost. Finally, an
Euler equation must hold to equalize the mar-
ginal cost and marginal benefit of savings:
(26) U1 .c; k; q/ D rU1
 
c0; sk; q

:
In what follows, simplified versions of this
generic model are studied to analyze how pro-
ductivity, mortality and changes in the cost
and/or demand for children quality affect fer-
tility.
2. The Effects of Technology
Consider the following form for the utility
function
U .c; k; q/ D U .c/C  V .k/ :
This version of the model abstracts from child
quality to simplify the discussion. A child
may require  units of the wife’s time and/or
e units of goods. The cost function is then
C
 
k; qIw f
 D  e C w f  k:
Different cases can be represented using this
formulation. There is a general case where a
child requires time and goods, that is  > 0
and e > 0. There are also two special cases.
One case is when a child requires only time,
that is  > 0 and e D 0, and another case is
when a child requires only goods, that is  D 0
and e > 0:Wages grow at the common (gross)
rate g > 1: w0f D gw f and w0m D gwm .
The first-order condition for fertility, equation
(24), now reads
(27)  V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/ D
U1 .c/

e

1C s
r

C w f

1C gs
r

:
Observe that the left-hand side of equation
(27), which represents the marginal benefit of
children, is decreasing in k while the right-
hand side, or the marginal cost, is increasing.
The solution of this equation is depicted in
Figure 17.7
Technology affects the household’s deci-
sions via the following channels. First, it can
change the productivity of the husband and/or
that of the wife, that is wm and/or w f : Sec-
ond, it can affect the resources needed to pro-
duce children, that is e and/or  . Accordingly,
the effects of changes in technology are now
developed in four propositions.
FIGURE 17. THE DETERMINATION OF FERTILITY
PROPOSITION 7: (Husband’s earnings
and fertility) Fertility, k, is increasing in the
productivity of the husband, wm .
7In Figures 17 and 18 the quantity displayed on the ver-
tical axis is marginal utility.
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To understand Proposition 7, contemplate
equation (27). It reveals that an increase in
wm; the productivity of the husband, reduces
the marginal cost of children and therefore,
raises fertility. To understand why, hold fer-
tility, k, constant at any arbitrary level. An
increase in wm unambiguously raises con-
sumption and, thus, reduces its marginal util-
ity. This implies that the cost of diverting
resources away from consumption and into
more kids is reduced. Thus, the right-hand
side of equation (27) decreases, as represented
in Figure 18, implying an increase in the opti-
mal fertility choice. This is an income effect.
REMARK 1: (Fertility and wars) Proposi-
tion 7 can be used to deduce the effect of a
war on fertility. Recall that wars are asso-
ciated with large decreases in fertility rates.
This is because male-specific wartime mortal-
ity is akin to a decrease in expected house-
hold income. That is, when making its fertility
choice, the household takes into account that
the woman may have to raise the children on
just her own income, if her husband becomes
a casualty of war. This implies a decrease in
fertility via the income effect. Death benefits
and the possibility of remarriage would miti-
gate this effect.
FIGURE 18. THE EFFECT OF A DECREASE IN THE
MARGINAL COST OF CHILDREN ON FERTILITY
PROPOSITION 8: (Wife’s earnings and
fertility)
A - Children cost goods ( D 0; e > 0)—
Fertility, k, is increasing in the productivity of
the wife, w f .
B - Children cost time ( > 0; e D 0)—An
increase in w f causes fertility, k, to
(i) decrease if U1 .c/ c is nondecreasing;
(ii) either increase or decrease if U1 .c/ c is
decreasing.
Part A of Proposition 8 can be explained
with the same argument as for Proposition 7.
When a child requires no time, an increase in
the wife’s productivity acts as an income ef-
fect. It raises consumption and, therefore, de-
creases the marginal cost of a child.
Part B of Proposition 8 deals with the case
where an increase in the wife’s productivity
implies both an income and a substitution ef-
fect. These effects may act in the same or
opposite directions, depending upon the shape
of preferences. To see this, it pays to rewrite
equation (27) as
(28)  V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/"
1

 
1C

w f
wm
 1! g C r
gs C r   k
#
D U1 .c/ c C U1
 
c0

c0:
(See Appendix A.A5 for a derivation of this
equation.) First, when w f increases, there
is an increase in the opportunity cost of the
wife’s time. This is represented by a decrease
of the left-hand side of equation (28) for each
value of k. Second, an increase in w f raises
consumption. This reduces the marginal cost
of a child since U1 .c/ drops, and hence, so
does the cost of taking resources away from
consumpton. To understand what will happen
to the left-hand side of equation (28) for each
value of k, consider the case of logarithmic
utility, U .c/ D ln .c/. The term U1 .c/ c is
constant and so will be the right-hand side of
equation (28). In this case, fertility decreases
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from k to k, as represented in Figure 19. If
the utility index U is such that U1 .c/ c is in-
creasing, the right-hand side of equation (28)
rises and fertility further decreases to k as
represented in Figure 19. Therefore, when
U1 .c/ c is nondecreasing, fertility falls as w f
increases, as stated in Part B(i) of Proposition
8. When U1 .c/ c is decreasing, however, the
reduction in the marginal utility of consump-
tion may be strong enough to offset a part, or
all, of the rising opportunity cost of time for
the wife. In this case (which is not represented
in Figure 19) the final value of fertility would
be greater than k. Its position relative to
the initial fertility, k, is ambiguous, however,
without additional restrictions on the shape of
preferences.
FIGURE 19. THE EFFECT OF WOMEN’S PRODUC-
TIVITY ON FERTILITY
The result in Proposition 8 deserves a few
additional remarks. First, the shape of the
utility index V is immaterial to the conclu-
sion. Note, however, that it is relevant for
the magnitude of the effect of productivity on
fertility. Second, the term U1 .c/ c is infor-
mative because it measures the pace at which
the marginal utility of consumption, which
is a component of the cost of children, de-
creases relative to the rise in consumption in-
duced by productivity increases. A decreas-
ing U1 .c/ c means that the marginal utility
of consumption decreases “fast” as consump-
tion increases, implying the marginal cost of a
child may eventually decrease. An increasing
U1 .c/ c has the opposite interpretation.
REMARK 2: (Gender earnings gap and
fertility) Proposition 8 can be used to de-
duce the effect of changes in the ratiow f =wm ,
which in the context of this model mea-
sures the gender gap in earnings. Specifi-
cally, Proposition 8 is equivalent to studying
changes in the gender gap, w f =wm , holding
wm fixed.
PROPOSITION 9: (Earnings and fertility)
A - Children cost goods ( D 0; e > 0)—A
proportional increase in wm and w f causes
fertility, k, to increase.
B - Children cost time ( > 0; e D 0)—A pro-
portional increase in wm and w f causes fer-
tility, k, to
(i) remain constant if U1 .c/ c is constant (in-
come and substitution effects cancel out);
(ii) increase if U1 .c/ c is decreasing (domi-
nating income effect);
(iii) decrease if U1 .c/ c is increasing (domi-
nating substitution effect).
Proposition 9 describes the effect of propor-
tional growth in wm and w f : Think, for exam-
ple, of two generations: the first one faces low
values for wm and w f while the second one
faces high values because wm and w f grow.
Note that the two generations face the same
growth rate, g. Part A of Proposition 9 follows
from an inspection of equation (27): a propor-
tional increase in wm and w f raises consump-
tion, which unambiguously reduces the mar-
ginal cost of a child when  D 0: Part B of the
Proposition deals with the case when there is a
time cost for children. In this case there is both
an income and a substitution effect. Consider
equation (28) again. A proportional change
in wm and w f leaves its left-hand side un-
changed. Thus, the result depends only upon
the property of the right-hand side of the equa-
tion as consumption rises. Three cases are dis-
cussed and illustrated by Figure 20. In the
case of a logarithmic utility index U , the term
U1 .c/ c is constant. Fertility remains con-
stant at k when both wm and w f increase
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proportionately. This is the well-known case
where the income and substitution effects can-
cel each others out. If U1 .c/ c is increasing,
the substitution effect dominates and fertility
decreases. If U1 .c/ c is decreasing, the oppo-
site result prevails.
FIGURE 20. THE EFFECT OF A PROPORTIONAL
INCREASE IN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF MEN AND
WOMEN ON FERTILITY
PROPOSITION 10: (Household technology
and fertility) A decrease in the time cost of
raising a child,  , and/or in the good cost, e,
increases fertility.
The result in Proposition 10 derives directly
from an inspection of equation (27) since a de-
crease in  and/or e leads to a decrease in the
marginal cost of raising a child. The effect
of such change is represented, graphically, in
Figure 18.
3. The Effect of Infant and Child Mortality
To discuss the effects of a change in child
mortality, that is, a change in the survival para-
meter, s, return to equation (27). Note that the
survival probability s affects both the left- and
the right-hand sides of the equation. On the
right-hand side of equation (27), an increase
in s raises the expected cost of children. On
the left-hand side, the marginal (lifetime) util-
ity of children depends upon the survival prob-
ability via two channels. Focus on the term
sV1 .sk/. Again, hold k fixed at any arbitrary
level. On the one hand, an increase in s raises
the marginal (lifetime) utility of children be-
cause it raises the expected flow of utils de-
rived from children. On the other hand, an
increase in s implies that more children are
present in the household in the second pe-
riod. This reduces the (period) marginal util-
ity, V1 .sk/, and, therefore, reduces the mar-
ginal lifetime utility of children. Which effect
dominates depends upon the specific func-
tional form chosen for V .
The following proposition gives a condition
under which the effect of s on the number of
children born, and the number of surviving
children, is unambiguous.
PROPOSITION 11: (Effect of child mortal-
ity) When sV1 .sk/ is nonincreasing in s, an
increase in the survival probability, s, reduces
fertility, k, so that dk=ds < 0, and raises
the number of surviving children, implying
d.sk/=ds > 0.
The proof of this result is given in Ap-
pendix A.A6. The condition that sV1 .sk/
is nonincreasing in s implies that V1 .sk/ C
skV11 .sk/  0. It is therefore a condition on
the curvature of the utility function V . Under
this condition, the effect of an increase in s
can be represented, graphically, by an upward
shift of the increasing (marginal cost) curve
in Figure 17, and a downward shift of the de-
creasing (marginal benefit) curve. Note that in
the case of logarithmic utility, V .k/ D ln .k/,
the function sV1 .sk/ is a constant. The two
effects of s on the marginal utility of a child
exactly offset each other. In this case the sole
effect of an increase in s is to raise the mar-
ginal cost of a child. Proposition 11 also states
that the number of surviving children, sk, in-
creases with the survival rate, s. That is, when
the survival rate, s, increases by 1 percent, fer-
tility, k, decreases by less than 1 percent. As
a result the number of surviving children, sk,
increases.
When sV1 .sk/ is increasing in s, the mar-
ginal (lifetime) utility of children is increasing
in their survival. Graphically, the effect of an
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 45
increase in s would be represented by upward
shifts of both curves in Figure 17, so the effect
on k is ambiguous without further specifying
functional forms and parameters. Examples 1
and 2 below use common forms for the utility
function that are found in the literature.
EXAMPLE 1: (CRRA preferences for fer-
tility) Let V .k/ D k1 = .1  / with   1.
Then sV1 .sk/ D s1 k  is nonincreasing
in s: An increase in s reduces fertility and in-
creases the number of surviving children.
EXAMPLE 2: (Logarithmic preferences
for fertility with a minimum number of
children) Let V .k/ D ln .k   k/ where k > 0
is a minimum requirement for the number
of children. Then sV1 .sk/ D 1= .k   k=s/
is decreasing in s. An increase in s reduces
fertility and increases the number of surviving
children.
4. Quality and Human Capital
THE QUALITY-QUANTITY TRADEOFF
To simplify the discussion, consider a static
version of the model; that is, let  D 0. Pref-
erences are represented by the utility function
(29) U .c/C  V .k/C H .q/ :
To specify the cost function suppose that a
child requires  units of time and that he
can be endowed with quality q through goods
spending, e: Specifically, imagine that there is
a production function
q D Q .e/ ;
describing the relationship between expendi-
ture per child and the quality of children. As-
sume that the household has a total of one unit
of time and that the market wage is w. That
is, for simplicity, abstract from the distinction
between husband and wife. The budget con-
straint now reads
(30) c C k .e C w/ D w:
The first-order conditions for fertility, k, and
expenditures, e; are
(31)  V1 .k/ D U1 .c/ .e C w/ ;
and
(32) J1 .e/ D U1 .c/ k:
where J .e/  H .Q .e//. The right-hand side
of equation (31) is the marginal cost of a child.
It depends upon the marginal utility of con-
sumption, U1 .c/, as well as on the wage rate,
w, and the level of expenditures on quality, e.
This is because (i) the higher the marginal util-
ity of consumption, the more costly it is to use
resources for childrearing instead of consump-
tion; (ii) the higher the wage rate, the higher
the opportunity cost of time spent with a child;
and (iii) the higher the expenditures per child,
the more costly the marginal child. The right-
hand side of equation (32) is the marginal cost
of goods spending on quality. Imagine in-
creasing expenditure on child quality by one
unit. This will cost k units of consumption be-
cause the household has k kids. To convert
this into cost in utility terms, multiply this by
the marginal utility of consumption, to cap-
ture the loss from cutting consumption by k
units. Note that the marginal cost of investing
in child quality is increasing in the number of
children.
To discuss the effect of productivity on fer-
tility, it is useful to define the elasticity of sub-
stitution between fertility and consumption,
 ck , and between fertility and expenditures on
quality,  ek :
 ck  d ln .c=k/d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c// ;
and
 ek  d ln .e=k/d ln .V1 .k/ =J1 .e// ;
where  ck;  ek > 0. The elasticity  ck shows
how the c=k ratio changes along an indiffer-
ence curve as the relative price of consump-
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tion and fertility changes. The latter, at an op-
timum, is equal to the marginal rate of substi-
tution; hence, the term d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c// in
the denominator for  ck . Similarly, the elas-
ticity  ek shows how the e=k ratio changes
along an indifference curve as the relative
price of expenditures and fertility changes.
Note, here, that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between expenditures and fertility,
V1 .k/ =J1 .e/, depends on the function J ,
which reflects a composition of the utility and
production functions for child quality. As the
price of, say, fertility relative to consumption
rises—that is, as the marginal rate of substitu-
tion V1 .k/ =U1 .c/ rises—the optimal c=k ra-
tio rises in a proportion given by  ck . A high
elasticity of substitution means, therefore, a
high willingness to substitute away from the
relatively more expensive commodity. Thus,
these elasticities control how the household
will adjust its spending on c, k, and e as
wages, w, change. These elasticites play an
important role in the proposition below. Ap-
pendix A.A7 derives their exact formulas.
PROPOSITION 12: (Productivity and the
quality-quantity tradeoff) The effect of pro-
ductivity, w, on fertility, k, and expenditure on
child quality (in intensive form), e=w, is de-
scribed by
d ln .k/
d ln .w/
D(33)
1
1

c
w   c

1
 ck
  1

1
 ek
  ek
w   c

C 1
1

ek
w   c

1
 ek
  1

1
 ck
C c
w   c

;
and
d ln .e=w/
d ln .w/
D  1 1 .1= ek   1/
(34)


1= ck   1C 11  c=w

;
where 1 > 0 is defined in Appendix A.A8.
The proof of this result is given in Appendix
A.A8.
CASE 1:  ek D  ck D 1. It follows from equa-
tion (33) that d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ D 0; i.e.,
fertility remains constant when produc-
tivity increases. This is the well-known
case where income and substitution ef-
fects cancel out. Specifically, an increase
in productivity makes the time spent tak-
ing care of a child relatively more expen-
sive. This is a force toward a reduction in
fertility. But, there is also an income ef-
fect: the household can afford more chil-
dren. This is a force toward an increase
in fertility. In the case at hand, these
two effects exactly offset each other. It
is obvious from equation (34) that e=w
remains constant. This implies that ex-
penditure per child, e, rises in lockstep
with wages.
CASE 2:  ek > 1 and  ck D 1. Equation (33) im-
plies d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ < 0; i.e., fertility
decreases when productivity increases.
Here, fertility declines because it is more
substitutable with expenditures than in
Case 1. Equation (34) reveals that e=w
rises. Thus, expenditure per child, e,
moves up at a faster clip than wages, w.
Thus, due to the high degree of substi-
tutability between k and e, the house-
hold reduces the quantity of children in
favor of higher quality per child, as pro-
ductivity rises and expenditures on qual-
ity become relatively cheaper. [Equation
(A16) in Appendix A.A8 establishes that
c=w remains constant.]
CASE 3:  ek D 1 and  ck > 1. Equa-
tion (33) implies d ln .k/ =d ln .w/ < 0;
i.e., fertility decreases when productiv-
ity increases. In this case, the fertil-
ity decline occurs for a different rea-
son than in the previous case: fertil-
ity declines because it is more substi-
tutable with consumption than in Case
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1. The household substitutes the quantity
of children for more consumption as pro-
ductivity rises and expenditures on con-
sumption become relatively cheaper. As
can be seen from equation (34), e=w re-
mains constant. Therefore, it is obvious
from the budget constraint that c=w must
move up with productivity—the doubter
can check equation (A16) in Appendix
A.A8. So, the high substitutability of
the quantity of children with consump-
tion induces the household to increase its
spending on consumption at a faster rate
than the increase in productivity, while
maintaining the budget share of quality
spending constant.
So, there are at least two distinct mecha-
nisms through which increases in productivity
lead to decreases in fertility: the substitution
of fertility for quality as in Case 2, or the sub-
stitution for consumption as in Case 3. Note
that the two mechanisms are not observation-
ally equivalent. The behavior of c=w and e=w
can help one tell, using data, which case is at
hand.
It is important to note that  ek , the elasticity
of substitution between the quantity of chil-
dren and their average quality, depends upon
the properties of the function J .e/ (see Ap-
pendix A.A7), which is identical to H .Q .e//.
This function combines, therefore, character-
istics of preferences, via H , as well as tech-
nology, via Q. The examples below use some
common forms for tastes and technology that
are found in the literature.
EXAMPLE 3: (CRRA preferences for
consumption, logarithmic preferences
over quantity and quality, and an
isoelastic production technology) Let
U .c/ D c1 =.1   /, with 0 <  < 1,
V .k/ D ln k, H .q/ D ln q, and
Q .e/ D 0e1 . Then,  ck > 1 and
 ek D 1—see the elasticity formulas in
Appendix A.A7. It is immediate that Case 3
will transpire. Fertility will fall with wages
while expenditure per child will increase in
proportion with them.
EXAMPLE 4: (Logarithmic preferences
for consumption and quantity, CRRA
preferences over quality, and an isoelastic
production technology) Let U .c/ D ln c,
V .k/ D ln k, H .q/ D q1 =.1   /, with
0 <  < 1, and Q .e/ D 0e1 . Then,
 ck D 1 and  ek > 1—see Appendix A.A7.
Here Case 2 will obtain. Again, fertility will
fall with wages, while expenditure per child
will increase faster than them.
HUMAN CAPITAL (AS CHILD QUALITY)
In the previous setup parents derive util-
ity from the quality of their children. It is
straightforward to turn this into a model where
they care about their offspring’s earnings. To
achieve this, interpret Q .e/ as human capi-
tal that can be rented on the labor market in
exchange for a wage. Suppose that children
leave their parents’ home and become adults
after one period. Let the parents’ preferences
be represented by a slightly modified version
of equation (29):
U .c/C  V .k/C H .gwQ .e// :
The term gwQ .e/ represents the future earn-
ings of a child supplying human capital,
Q .e/ ; at the wage rate per efficiency unit of
labor prevailing next period, gw. The hu-
man capital of each parent is normalized to 1.
Thus, in this setup, parents’ preferences are
defined over the future earnings of their chil-
dren, which they can influence via investment
in education. The budget constraint and first-
order condition for k are as described by equa-
tions (30) and (31), respectively. The first-
order condition for e now reads
(35) H1 .gwQ .e// gwQ1 .e/ D U1 .c/ k:
A difference between the quality-quantity
model of the previous section and the human
capital model can be seen by comparing the
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first-order conditions (32) and (35). In equa-
tion (32) a change in the wage, w, affects the
optimal decision because it changes the mar-
ginal cost of expenditures on quality, on the
right-hand side, via a change in the marginal
utility of consumption. This effect is also
present in the human capital model. But, there
is another effect: a change in productivity also
changes the marginal benefit of expenditures,
on the left-hand side of equation (35), because
it changes the future earnings of a child.
Note that the growth rate of productivity,
g, also matters for the determination of fertil-
ity. This is another difference with the quality
model of the previous section. A change in
the growth rate of productivity has two oppos-
ing effects. On the one hand, an increase in
g lowers the marginal benefit of a child’s fu-
ture earnings because, all else equal, it raises
these earnings. This is represented by the term
H1 .gwQ .e// on the left-hand side of equa-
tion (35). On the other hand, an increase in
g raises the marginal benefit of investing in
the quality of the child since each unit of hu-
man capital gets paid at a higher price. This
is represented by the term gwQ1 .e/ on the
left-hand side of equation (35). Which one
of these two effects dominates depends on the
shape of preferences. The following result is
established in Appendix A.A9.
PROPOSITION 13: (The effect of produc-
tivity growth on fertility and human capital)
Assume that U .c/ D ln .c/ ; V .k/ D ln .k/,
and H .q/ D q1 = .1  /, with  > 0. An
increase in the growth rate of productivity, g,
causes fertility, k, to
(i) decrease if  2 .0; 1/;
(ii) remain constant if  D 1;
(iii) increase if  > 1.
Human capital, Q .e/, moves oppositely with
fertility, k.
5. Discussion
The modern approach to fertility in macro-
economics stems from the work of Razin and
Ben-Zion (1975) and Barro and Becker (1988,
1989). These authors are among the first to
model fertility decisions in versions of the op-
timal growth model, which has proven useful
in the analysis of growth-related phenomena.
Economists have argued that the demo-
graphic transition may be, among other things,
a response of fertility to rising income and/or
productivity. Galor and Weil (1996), for
instance, propose a model where the accu-
mulation of physical capital leads to an in-
crease in women’s relative wages because cap-
ital is more complementary to women’s input
than to men’s. This increase in the relative
wages of women raises the cost of childbear-
ing and, thus, leads to a reduction in fertil-
ity. In the language of the model developed
above, the mechanism proposed by Galor and
Weil (1996) works as described in Proposi-
tion 8B(i). Galor and Weil (2000) present a
theory of the long-run relationship between
population growth, technology, and economic
growth. In their theoretical model an economy
can stagnate, then enter a regime where both
population growth and technological progress
increase, and, finally, experience a demo-
graphic transition jointly with sustained eco-
nomic growth. Galor (2012) presents a sim-
ilar, simplified model. Galor (2005, 2011)
presents a unified view of the transition from
stagnation to growth that, in the data, coin-
cided with the demographic transition.
Galor (2005, 2011) also insists on the im-
portance of human capital and education to
understand the demographic transition. A key
aspect of his analysis is that the production
of human capital depends on expenditures as
well as on the future growth rate of produc-
tivity. In Section 6.4 this was modeled by
letting the quality of a child be measured di-
rectly by his future earnings: gwQ .e/. As
shown in Proposition 13, this mechanism can
lead to the to fewer children being born, but
now they are of higher quality. On the quality-
quantity tradeoff, Cavalcanti, Kocharkov, and
Santos (2016) observe that the total fertility
rate in Kenya for 2008 was 4.6. Out of this,
unwanted children corresponded to 1.2 kids.
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 49
They analysis the impact of lowering the cost
of contraception (including abortion). They
find that this can lead to a significant increase
in per capita GDP, because it results in fewer
children of higher quality.
In Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and
Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005), the driving force behind the secular
decline in fertility is rising productivity. Both
of the models are fit to very long-run U.S. fer-
tility data. In the former, an education deci-
sion is modeled so that the analysis is consis-
tent with the rise in education and the reallo-
cation of labor from agriculture to industry. In
the latter, the rise in productivity generates an
increase in the opportunity cost of raising chil-
dren, following the logic explained in Propo-
sition 9 of Section 6.2.
The decline in infant and child mortality
has also been discussed as a potential factor
explaining the demographic transition. Many
authors have adopted versions of the perfect
foresight model presented in here, where there
is no uncertainty over the number of surviving
children. Eckstein, Mira and Wolpin (1999) is
an example. They posit a period utility func-
tion for children of the form presented in Ex-
ample 2, that is V .k/ D ln .k   k/, where
k > 0 acts as a minimum number of children
needed in the household. They estimate their
model using Swedish times series data, and
find that the reduction in infant and child mor-
tality rates is the most important factor driving
the fertility decline. Productivity also reduced
fertility, but the reduction in adult mortality
had no effect by itself. Reductions in infant
and child mortality rates, alone, cannot ex-
plain the decline in the number of surviving
children, as shown by Propostion 11.
Bar and Leukhina (2010) propose a model
of the transition from stagnation to growth,
along the lines of Barro and Becker (1989)
and Hansen and Prescott (2002). The mech-
anism through which infant and child mortal-
ity reduces fertility, in their model, is simi-
lar to that described in Proposition 11. Bar
and Leukhina (2010) use their model to as-
sess the contribution of productivity growth
versus that of declining mortality in explain-
ing the time series of fertility in England be-
tween 1650 and 1950. They find that changes
in young-age mortality account for close to 60
percent of the decline in fertility.
Boldrin and Jones (2002) present a version
of the Barro and Becker model where children
care about their parents’ old-age consump-
tion. In this model fertility is an investment
into future consumption and a decrease in in-
fant mortality reduces fertility. Doepke (2005)
also presents versions of the Barro and Becker
model to analyze the effect of infant and child
mortality. He distinguishes two classes of
models, one where there is no uncertainty over
the number of surviving children and another
where there is. In the model developed in this
section, there is no uncertainty. Theoretical re-
sults for models with uncertainty on the num-
ber of surviving children are also presented in
Sah (1991) and Kalemli-Ozcan (2003). In a
quantitative exercise Doepke (2005) finds that
calibrated versions of his models yield simi-
lar implications: they all predict a decline in
fertility rates as infant mortality declines, but
none predicts a decline in the number of sur-
viving children as seen in the data. These are
the results of Proposition 11.
Besides technological progress, the demand
for human capital and mortality, other fac-
tors have been contemplated in the economic
literature discussing the demographic transi-
tion. Doepke (2004) analyzes differences in
the timing and pace of the demographic tran-
sition across countries (see Figure 15), and
ascribes them to differences in child labor
laws. Boldrin, de Nardi and Jones (2015)
argue that government-provided old-age pen-
sions are strongly associated with a low fertil-
ity.
Barro and Becker (1988) ascribe the baby
boom to a catch-up effect associated with low
fertility during World War II. Greenwood, Se-
shadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) present a
list of arguments to dispute the notion that the
baby boom was a response to World War II.
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They propose a theory where the main impe-
tus for the baby boom comes from improve-
ments in household productivity that made it
possible for women to spend less time rais-
ing children. They argue that such improve-
ments were made available by the diffusion of
electricity and associated appliances, the in-
troduction of new goods such as frozen foods,
the growing availability of running water and
gas heaters, etc., as well as the rationaliza-
tion of the home following scientific manage-
ment principles discovered on factory floors.
In the framework of the model presented here,
their theory can be viewed as technological
advance causing a decrease in  , the time cost
of raising a child. Suppose, as they do, that
U1 .c/ c is increasing. Then, in the long run,
proportional increases to wm and w f lead to
a downward trend in fertility. When a new
technology is introduced to save time in the
household in the form of a lower  , the right-
hand side of equation (28) increases, leading
to an increase in fertility—see Proposition 10
above. As time passes, the continued growth
of productivity eventually takes over, and fer-
tility resumes its declining trend: the baby
boom is over.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2014) also propose
an explanation of the baby boom based on
technological improvements. They document
that there has been a remarkable decline in
maternal mortality during the Twentieth Cen-
tury: in 1900 the maternal mortality rate was
above 80 deaths (per 10,000 live births), while
it was below 10 by 1950. Thus, most of the
gain occurred during the first half of the cen-
tury, namely, during the 1930s. They conduct
an empirical analysis to assess the effect of
maternal mortality on fertility. They find that a
decline in maternal mortality of 10 deaths (per
10,000 live births) yields an increase in com-
pleted fertility of 0.27 children per married
woman. One can again associate improve-
ments in medical technology with a decline in
 , in the context of the model presented here.
The idea behind this association is that  may
be composed of both the time spent recover-
ing from the delivery of the child and the time
spent taking care of the child. Improvements
in medical technology reduce the time spent
recovering from the delivery and therefore re-
duce the cost of a child.
Another attempt at explaining the baby
boom using modern macroeconomic tools is
by Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015). Their
theory links the baby boom to the job mar-
ket conditions faced by young women imme-
diately after the World War II. These condi-
tions were worse than usual. This was because
older women, who started to work during
the war and gained experience, retained these
jobs after the war. This increased labor-force
participation of older women lowered mar-
ket wages for women relative to men and in-
duced younger women to stay home and raise
children. Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015)
present evidence of the decline in the rela-
tive wage of women and the increased labor-
force participation of older women after the
war. They build an equilibrium model of fer-
tility and labor-force participation, which they
calibrate to U.S. data. In their main experi-
ment, they find that their model accounts for
80 percent of the increase in fertility during
the baby boom, as a consequence of World
War II, which they model as a shock to gov-
ernment spending, and male and female labor-
force participation. In the framework of the
model presented here, equation (28) shows
that a decline in w f =wm raises fertility. This,
in a nutshell, summarizes part of the argument
in Doepke, Hazan and Maoz (2015): The poor
labor-market conditions for women following
World War II lead to an increase in fertility.
Zhao (2014) associates the baby boom with
changes in the marginal tax rate induced by
World War II. Specifically, Zhao (2014) shows
that the marginal income tax rate for an aver-
age American increased from 4 to 25 percent
during the war. He proposes a model where
children cost time and where, using the lan-
guage of the simple model described above,
preferences are such that U1 .c/ c is increas-
ing. Thus, an increase in the marginal tax rate
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reduces the opportunity cost of time and the
marginal cost of a child, as per the result of
Proposition 9. On the basis of a computational
experiment, Zhao (2014) concludes that this
change in tax policy was an important cause
of the baby boom.
Manuelli and Seshadri (2009) document,
and seek to explain, the negative correlation
between fertility and income across coun-
tries. They build a model of fertility choice
and investment in both a child’s human and
health capitals. In a quantitative exercise, they
find that differences in productivity across
countries account for a large fraction of
cross-country differences in fertility. Jones,
Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2011) review a vari-
ety of mechanisms that may generate the neg-
ative income-fertility correlation. They em-
phasize that almost all theories rely on the ex-
istence of a time cost of raising a child. In the
language of the model presented here,  > 0
is critical. They also emphasize that models
that distinguish between husbands and wives
need to rely on positive assortative match-
ing of spouses for fertility to be declining
in the husband’s income. Positive assorta-
tive mating is discussed in Section 3.2. Fi-
nally, they consider models with endogenous
investment in child quality. They find that
modeling the choice of a child’s quality does
not, per se, lead to a negative income-fertility
correlation—in line with Proposition 12.
Caldwell (2004) documents how fertility
typically collapses during periods of war and
social unrest. Barro and Becker (1988) ar-
gue that the increase in military spending in
the United States during World War II re-
duced wealth and, therefore, lowered fertil-
ity. Similarly, Vandenbroucke (2014) presents
a quantitative analysis where the outbreak of
a war is akin to an expected income shock;
i.e., the expected income of the household de-
creases when the husband is more likely to
die. To the extent that children are normal
goods, the model then predicts that fertility
should decline during periods of war.
7. Quantitative Theory
This section presents a simple example
illustrating how macroeconomic models of
family-related decisions can be used to answer
quantitative questions. The question at hand
regards the baby boom in the United States.
Specifically, how did technological innovation
in the household sector contribute to the baby
boom?
1. A Structural Model of the Baby Boom
A one-period version of the model pre-
sented in Section 6 is laid out. This amounts
to setting  D 0 in equation (21). There is
only one adult in each family, so the model
abstracts from differences between men and
women. Preferences are represented by
U.c; k; q/ D  c
1 
1   C .1  / k;
implying that there is no quality dimension to
children. The cost of children is specified by
C .k; qIw/ D wk;
so that only the time spent on children mat-
ters. There are two technologies available to
help a family raise children. The technolo-
gies are differentiated by their time cost,  ,
and their price, p. The first technology (old)
has a high time cost, high, while the second
technology (new) has a low cost,  low, where
 low < high. The new technology has a price
of p D e, while the old one is free so that
p D 0. Thus, technology is represented by the
bundle .; p/.
The decision problem for a family who has
chosen technology .; p/ is
V .w; ; p/ D max
c;k


c1 
1   C .1  / k

;
subject to
c C wk D w   p:
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 52
The technology adoption decision for a family
is given by
.; p/ D
8><>:
.high; 0/–old,
if V .w; high; 0/
> V .w;  low; e/;
. low; e/–new,
if V .w; high; 0/
< V .w;  low; e/:
One might expect that a high-wage family will
be more inclined to adopt the second technol-
ogy. To address this, in what follows, families
will differentiated by their wage rate, w.
2. Empirical Estimation
The model will now be matched with the
U.S. data. Depending on the question at
hand, researchers may use cross-sectional
data, time-series data, or a combination of
both. Models can be matched to various types
of stylized facts. These facts may be key
moments in the data, such as means, stan-
dard deviations, and correlations. Models may
also be matched with the results of regression
equations, such as the estimated coefficients
on certain variables. The matching may be
done informally (the eyeball metric), or for-
mally using various distance estimators, such
as minimum distance or simulated method of
moments. Often when regression coefficients
are matched in the analysis an indirect infer-
ence procedure is incorporated into the esti-
mation.
For the purpose of this illustration, the
model will be matched to data from cross-
sections of U.S. counties: data at the house-
hold level is not available. First, the model
must be readied to generate within- and
across-county heterogeneity. Let lnwi j 
N
 
w j ;  A

denote the distribution of wages
for individual i in county j , and the let w j be
distributed in line with ln
 
w j
  N .0;  B/ :
Second, two periods must be considered. The
first period will correspond to the lowest to-
tal fertility rate in the U.S. before the baby
boom, the mid-1930s. The second period will
correspond to the peak of the baby boom, the
late 1950s. To be precise, the total fertil-
ity rate of women born in 1932 (whose av-
erage child was born in 1959) was 28 per-
cent higher than that of women born in 1907
(whose average child was born in 1934). This
increase in fertility will be targeted in the em-
pirical estimation. The differences between
the first and second period will be engineered
by assuming that all wages grow by 2 percent
per year and that the cost of the new tech-
nology, e, decreases by 2 percent per year.
There are 1959   1934 D 25 years between
the two periods. Assume that  low D 0:5 
high. The parameters of the model, !  
; ; e; high;  A;  B

, are estimated via the
following, unweighted, minimum distance es-
timation:
min
!
M .!/0 M .!/
where M .!/ is a 6  1 vector of the differ-
ences between the moments implied by the
model and their empirical counterparts. An in-
direct inference procedure is incorporated into
the estimation. Specifically, the moments used
are the following:
1) The variance of log income across U.S.
counties. This statistic is obtained from
Haines (2004). The earliest year in his
dataset is 1950, and the figure for the
variance of log-income across counties
in that year is 0:17.
2) The variance of log income across U.S.
households. The value 0:35 is obtained
from U.S. Census data for 1940.
3) The fraction of households that had
adopted a modern technology in 1940.
The value of this statistic is 0:35 and is
taken from Bailey and Collins (2011).
This measure is built from Census data
reporting the proportion of housing units
equipped with refrigerators, washing
machines, electric stoves and electric ser-
vices.
4) The ratio of the total fertility rate of the
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late 1950s to that of the mid 1930s. The
value of this statistic is 1:28:
5) The coefficient from a regression of fer-
tility on adoption and income in the
first period using county-level data. The
value of this statistic is  0:35 and is es-
timated in Baily and Collins (2011).
6) The coefficient from a regression of the
change in fertility on the change in adop-
tion and the change in income using
county-level data. The value of this sta-
tistic is  0:17, and again the source is
Bailey and Collins (2011).
RESULTS
The estimated parameters are
 D 0:10;  D 0:49; e D 1:60;
high D 15:62;  A D 0:66;  B D 0:51:
The fit to the targeted moments is reported in
Table 9. The model is able to replicate the ob-
served baby boom that took place between the
mid 1930s and the late 1950s. The engine be-
hind the baby boom is technological progress
in the household sector, which implied a drop
in the price of the time-saving technology.
The adoption of the time-saving technology
promotes fertility—recall Proposition 10. The
baby boom occurred despite the fact that at the
same time wages rose, which would have op-
erated to curtail fertility—Proposition 9 B(iii).
KOOPMANS (1947)
At first glance, the above regression coeffi-
cients would appear to contradict the result in
Proposition 10, that a fall in the time cost of
raising children will lead to a rise in fertility.
This may lead an empirical researcher to re-
ject the model. Yet, the model mimics these
results almost perfectly. Koopmans (1947)
noted some time ago that care must be ex-
ercised when interpreting the coefficients on
nonstructural regression equations. First, the
theory outlined is specified at the level of the
household, while the regressions are run using
county-level data. Second, adoption, fertil-
ity, and income are all endogenous variables.
These factors do not invalidate the use of the
above regression coefficients in the indirect in-
ference exercise. They affect their interpreta-
tion, though. Recall that households differ by
their wage rates. High-wage households will
have lower fertility. Now, high-wage house-
hold are more likely to adopt the expensive
new technology than are low-wage ones. So,
if high-wage households adopt the new tech-
nology first, then a regression of fertility on
adoption, at the county-wide level, may show
that technology adoption is associated with a
drop in fertility; i.e., even though the fertil-
ity rate of those who have adopted the new
technology may have risen, their rate will still
be lower than for those who did not adopt the
technology.
3. Discussion
The model of the baby boom estimated
here is a simplified version of the Greenwood,
Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) model
that is presented in Greenwood, Seshadri and
Vandenbroucke (2015). For more detail on
the estimation procedure, see the latter pa-
per. This type of estimation procedure is com-
mon in modern family economics. For ex-
ample, Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov and
Santos (2016) use minimum distance estima-
tion to match a dynamic stochastic model of
marriage, divorce, educational attainment, and
married female labor-force participation to the
post WW II U.S. data. Eckstein, Keane and
Lifshitz (2016) do a similar exercise using
simulated method of moments.
Bailey and Collins (2011) misconstrue,
for the reasons discussed earlier, the regres-
sion coefficients presented above as rejecting
the Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke
(2005) hypothesis. As is shown, their regres-
sions results can easily be appended to an esti-
mation of the Greenwood, Seshadri and Van-
denbroucke (2015) model by using an indirect
inference procedure; the model is fully capa-
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ble of matching them in addition to other styl-
ized facts. This is an example of how care
must be taken when interpreting nonstructural
regression equations. For an introduction to
simulation-based estimation, in general, and
to indirect inference, in particular, see Renault
(2008) and Smith (2008), respectively.
Example of papers (previously discussed)
in the genre of quantitative theory are numer-
ous. A short and non-exhaustive list cov-
ering various topics and quantitative meth-
ods is as follows: Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991) study household production;
Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005)
research married female labor-force partici-
pation; Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) investi-
gate the joint decisions of women to work
and bear children; Regalia and Rios-Rull
(2001) examine the rise in the number of
single mothers; Fernandez and Wong (2016)
and Voena (2015) probe the marriage market;
Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014) explore premarital sex; Eckstein, Mira
and Wolpin (1999) and Greenwood, Seshadri
and Vandenbroucke (2005) analyze fertility.
8. Conclusions
This review surveys macroeconomic mod-
els of married female labor-force participa-
tion, marriage and divorce, social change, and
fertility. The modern macroeconomic litera-
ture dealing with family-related decisions can
be read through the lenses of these models.
This literature has not answered all questions,
but much progress has been made, thanks to
the use of economic modeling, in explaining
(i) the huge rise in married female labor-force
participation; (ii) the large drop in marriage
and the increase in divorce; (iii) the uptick in
positive assortative mating; (iv) the issue of
children living in poverty with a lone parent;
and (v) baby booms and busts.
An example is provided illustrating how
macroeconomic models of the family can be
matched with stylized facts from the data, us-
ing minimum distance estimation. Theories
must be quantified before they can be used for
any serious policy analysis. The set of mo-
ments to be targeted can include facts from
nonstructural regression analysis. So, non-
structural regression may be used as an input
into quantitative theory. Sometimes care must
be taken when interpreting the results from
nonstructural regressions. The connection be-
tween economic theory and nonstructural re-
gressions may at times prove to be elusive.
To date, a general equilibrium model of fer-
tility, marriage and divorce, and married fe-
male labor-force participation has not been
developed. It seems likely that the secular
decline in fertility is connected with the rise
in married female labor-force participation.
Matching these long-run facts, in addition to
the cross-sectional facts on female labor-force
participation and fertility, would be an impor-
tant thing to do. The development of such a
macroeconomic model is essential for under-
standing a host of policy questions surround-
ing the family.
Some sample policy questions include the
following: First, should child care be sub-
sidized? Such policies may help working
women manage jobs and families. This
is important because disruptions to working
women’s careers, due to child birth, may ac-
count for a large portion of the gender wage
gap. Additionally, in a world with declining
fertility, where the ratio of the elderly to the
young population is high, such policies might
be important for publicly financing retirement.
This leads to the second question: Should fer-
tility be promoted? Third, should the tax sys-
tem be designed to promote marriage? As
was discussed, children growing up in single-
parent families appear to do worse in life than
those growing up in two-parent families. So,
in a world where more and more children
are born out of wedlock, promoting marriage
could be important. Additionally, the move-
ment toward more single-parent households is
connected to the recent rise in income inequal-
ity. Should aid be given to single parents? On
the one hand, this helps to lift many single-
parent households out of poverty and aids chil-
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dren, while on the other hand it might promote
an increase in the number of single house-
holds with children. This leads to the last
question. How much insurance is provided
within a family when their members are hit by
earnings or health shocks? While traditionally
taxes and transfers have been the key tools of
social insurance, making the female labor sup-
ply more flexible, as a result of, for example,
better child care arrangements, could be an ef-
fective policy tool as well. These are difficult
questions for which modern macroeconomic
models are well suited.
Another avenue for future research is to
study further how children’s preferences are
formed. In particular, young adults’ attitudes
about leisure, work, and time preference are
important. Economic theory predicts that in-
dividuals who place a low weight on leisure
and who have a low rate of time preference
will work more, accumulate more human cap-
ital and wealth, and invest more in their health.
Thus, these factors could play a role in deter-
mining poverty and its intergenerational trans-
mission. Rich parents instill a different set of
ideals in their kids than poor parents. How
parents, peer groups, and social institutions,
such as schools, affect children’s preferences
is important to study. As was discussed, re-
search shows that the amount of shame a child
feels about engaging in risky behavior has an
impact on their actions. So, such channels
matter.
The growing availability of data for the de-
veloping world also offers directions for fu-
ture research. Existing models of family-
related behavior have, to a large extent, been
constructed to understand today’s developed
countries and their past demographic and eco-
nomic histories. Can these models confront
the data from developing countries? For ex-
ample, the decline in fertility in developing
countries is much more rapid than what oc-
curred in developed countries, as can be seen
from Figure 15. Is this due to more rapid
growth in income or are these transitions fun-
damentally different? Similar questions also
arises for theories of women’s labor-force par-
ticipation, marriage, divorce, sexual behavior,
etc. Can one use models built for developed
countries or are new ones needed? An answer
to this question is important for guiding devel-
opment policies around the world.
REFERENCES
Aiyagari, S. Rao, Jeremy Greenwood and
Nezih Guner. 2000. “On the State of
the Union.” Journal of Political Economy
108(2): 213-244.
Aguiar, Mark, and Erik Hurst. 2007. “Mea-
suring Trends in Leisure: The Allocation of
Time Over Five Decades.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 122 (3): 969-1006.
Albanesi, Stefania and Claudia Olivetti.
2014. “Maternal Health and the Baby
Boom.” Quantitative Economics 5 (2): 225-
269.
Albanesi, Stefania and Claudia Olivetti.
2016. “Gender Roles and Medical Progress.”
Journal of Political Economy, 124 (3): 650-
695.
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano and Nathan
Nunn. 2013. “On the Origins of Gender
Roles: Women and the Plough.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 128 (2): 469-530.
Altug, Sumru and Robert A. Miller, 1998.
“The Effect of Work Experience on Female
Wages and Labour Supply.” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 65 (1): 45-85.
Attanasio, Orazio, Hamish Low, and Vir-
ginia Sanchez-Marcos. 2008. “Explaining
Changes in Female Labor Supply in a Life-
Cycle Model.” American Economic Review
98 (4): 1517-1552.
Bailey, Martha J. and William J. Collins.
2011. “Did Improvements in Household
Technology Cause the Baby Boom? Evi-
dence from Electrification, Appliance Diffu-
sion, and the Amish.” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 3 (2): 189-217.
Bar, Michael and Oksana Leukhina. 2010.
“Demographic Transition and Industrial
Revolution: A Macroeconomic Investiga-
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 56
tion.” Review of Economic Dynamics 13 (2):
424-451.
Barro, Robert J. and Gary S. Becker. 1989.
“Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic
Growth.” Econometrica 57 (2): 481-501.
Becker, Gary S. and Robert J. Barro. 1988.
“A Reformulation of the Economic Theory
of Fertility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
103 (1): 1-25.
Becker, Gary S. 1965. “A Theory of the Allo-
cation of Time.” Economic Journal 75 (299):
493-517.
Becker, Gary S. 1973. “A Theory of Mar-
riage: Part I.” Journal of Political Economy
81 (4): 813-846.
Becker, Gary S. 1993. “The Economic Way
of Looking at Behavior.” Journal of Political
Economy 101 (3): 385-409.
Becker, Gary S. and Casey B. Mulligan.
1997. “The Endogenous Determination of
Time Preference.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 113 (3): 729-758.
Becker, Gary S. and Nigel Tomes. 1979. “An
Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of In-
come and Intergenerational Mobility.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 87 (6): 1153-1189.
Becker, Gary S. and Nigel Tomes. 1986.
“Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of
Families.” Journal of Labor Economics 4
(3): S1-S39.
Benhabib, Jess., Richard Rogerson and Ran-
dall Wright. 1991. “Homework in Macroeco-
nomics: Household Production and Aggre-
gate Fluctuations.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 99 (6): 1166-1187.
Bick, Alexander. 2015. “The Quantitative
Role of Child Care for Female Labor Force
Participation and Fertility.” Journal of the
European Economic Association 14 (3):
639-668.
Bick, Alexander and Nicola Fuchs-
Schundeln. 2016. “Taxation and Labor
Supply of Married Women across Countries:
A Macroeconomic Analysis.” Unpublished.
Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier. 2001.
“The Economics of Cultural Transmission
and the Evolution of Preferences.” Journal of
Economic Theory 97 (2): 298-319.
Blau, Francine D. 1998. “Trends in the Well-
Being of American Women, 1970-1995.”
Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1): 112-
165.
Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn.
2000. “Gender Differences in Pay.” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 14 (4): 75-99.
Blundell, Richard, Luigi Pistaferri and Itay
Saporta-Eksten. 2016. “Consumption In-
equality and Family Labor Supply.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 106 (2): 387-435.
Browning, Martin, Pierre-Andre Chiappori
and Yoram Weiss. 2014. Economics of the
Family. Cambridge: Cambridge Unversity
Press.
Boldrin, Michele and Larry E. Jones. 2002.
“Mortality, Fertility and Saving in a Malthu-
sian Economy.” Review of Economic Dynam-
ics 5 (4): 775-814.
Boldrin, Michele, Mariacristina de Nardi
and Larry E. Jones. 2015. “Fertility and So-
cial Security.” Journal of Demographic Eco-
nomics 81 (3): 261-299.
Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles. 1999.
“Marriage and Class.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 112 (1): 141-168.
Cain, Glenn G. 1966. Married Women in
the Labor Force: An Economic Analysis.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Caldwell, John C. 2004. “Social Upheaval
and Fertility Decline.” Journal of Family
History 29 (4): 382-406.
Carneiro, Pedro, and James J. Heckman.
2003. “Human Capital Policy.” In Inequality
in America: What Role for Human Capital
Policies?, edited by James J. Heckman, Alan
B. Krueger and Benjamin M. Friedman, 77-
239. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Caucutt, Elizabeth, Nezih Guner and John
Knowles. 2002. “Why Do Women Wait?
Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incen-
tives for Fertility Delay.” Review of Eco-
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 57
nomic Dynamics 5 (4): 815-855.
Caucutt, Elizabeth M. and Lance Lochner.
2012. “Early and Late Human Capital Invest-
ments, Borrowing Constraints, and the Fam-
ily.” NBER Working Paper 18493.
Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V., Georgi
Kocharkov, and Cezar Santos. 2016.
“Family Planning and Development: Ag-
gregate Effects of Contraceptive Use.”
Unpublished.
Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V. and Jose Tavares.
2008. “Assessing the ‘Engines of Libera-
tion’: Home Appliances and Female Labor
Force Participation.” Review of Economics
and Statistics 90 (1) 81-88.
Cavalcanti, Tiago V. de V. and Jose Tavares.
2011. “Women Prefer Larger Governments:
Growth, Structural Transformation and Gov-
ernment Size.” Economic Inquiry 49 (1):
155-171.
Chade, Hector and Gustavo Ventura. 2002.
“Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search
Analysis.” International Economic Review
43 (3): 955-985.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Murat F. Iyigun,
and Yoram Weiss. 2009. “Investment in
Schooling and the Marriage Market.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 99 (5): 1689-1713.
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, Sonia Oreffice, and
Climent Quintana-Domeque. 2012. “Fatter
Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeco-
nomic Matching on the Marriage Market.”
Journal of Political Economy 120 (4): 659-
695.
Choo, Eugene and Aloysius Siow. 2006.
“Who Marries Whom and Why.” Journal of
Political Economy 114 (1): 175-201
Clark, Gregory. 2014. The Son Also Rises.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Coen-Pirani, Daniele, Alexis Leon and
Steven Lugauer. 2010.“The Effect of House-
hold Appliances on Female Labor Force
Participation: Evidence from Micro Data.”
Labour Economics 17 (3): 503-513.
Corak, Miles. 2013. “Income Inequality,
Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenera-
tional Mobility.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 27 (3): 79-102.
Costa, Dora L. 2000. “From Mill Town to
Board Room: The Rise of Women’s Paid La-
bor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14
(4): 101-122.
Cunha, Flavio, James J. Heckman, Lance J.
Lochner, and Dimitriy V. Masterov. 2006.
“Interpreting the Evidence on Life Cycle
Skill Formation.” In Handbook of the Eco-
nomics of Education, ed. Eric A. Hanushek
and Frank Welch, 697-812. Amsterdam:
North-Holland-Elsevier.
Cunha, Flavio and James J. Heckman. 2007.
“The Technology of Skill Formation.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 97 (2): 31-47.
Cunha, Flavio, James J. Heckman, and Su-
sanne M. Schennach. 2010. “Estimating the
Technology of Cognitive and Noncognitive
Skill Formation.” Econometrica 78 (3): 883-
931.
Da Rocha, Jose Maria and Luisa Fuster.
2006. “Why are Fertility and Female
Employment Ratios Positively Correlated
Across OECD Countries.” International
Economics Review 47 (4): 1187-1222.
Diaz-Gimenez, Javier and Eugenio Gi-
olito. 2013. “Accounting for the Timing of
First Births.” International Economic Review
54(1): 135-158.
Dinkelman, Taryn. 2011. “The Effects of
Rural Electrification on Employment: New
Evidence from South Africa.” American
Economic Review 101 (7): 3078-3108.
Doepke, Matthias. 2004. “Accounting for
Fertility Decline During the Transition to
Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (3):
347-383.
Doepke, Matthias. 2005. “Child Mortality
and Fertility Decline: Does the Barro-Becker
Model Fit the Facts?" Journal of Population
Economics 18 (2): 337-366.
Doepke, Matthias, Moshe Hazan and Yishay
D. Maoz. 2015. “ The Baby Boom and World
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 58
War II: A Macroeconomic Analysis.” Review
of Economic Studies 82 (3): 1031-1073.
Doepke, Matthias and Michele Tertilt. 2009.
“Women’s Liberation: What’s in It for
Men?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124
(4): 1541-1591.
Doepke, Matthias, Michele Tertilt, and
Alessandra Voena. 2012. “The Economics
and Politics of Women’s Rights.” Annual Re-
view of Economics 4 (July): 339-372.
Doepke, Matthias and Fabrizio Zilibotti.
2008. “Occupational Choice and the Spirit
of Capitalism.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 123 (2): 747-793.
Doepke, Matthias and Fabrizio Zilibotti.
2014. "Parenting with Style: Altruism
and Paternalism in Intergenerational Prefer-
ence Transmission.” NBER Working Paper
20214.
Domeij, David and Paul Klein. 2013.
“Should Day Care be Subsidized?” Review
of Economic Studies 80 (2): 568-595.
Durlauf, Steven N. and Irina Shaorshadze.
2015. “Intergenerational Mobility.” In
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behav-
ioral Sciences, edited by Robert A. Scott
and Stephen M. Kosslyn. Sherman Oaks,
CA: Sage Publishing, forthcoming.
Eckstein, Zvi and Osnat Lifshitz. 2011. “Dy-
namic Female Labor Supply.” Econometrica
79 (6): 1675-1726.
Eckstein, Zvi, Michael Keane and Osnat
Lifshitz. 2016. “Sources of Change in the
Life-Cycle Decisions of American Men and
Women: 1962-2014.” Centre for Economic
Policy Research, DP11393.
Eckstein, Zvi, Pedro Mira and Kenneth I.
Wolpin. 1999. “A Quantitative Analysis of
Swedish Fertility Dynamics: 1751-1990.”
Review of Economic Dynamics 2 (1): 137-
165.
Eckstein, Zvi and Kenneth I. Wolpin. 1989.
“Dynamic Labour Force Participation of
Married Women and Endogenous Work Ex-
perience.” Review of Economic Studies 56
(3): 375-390.
Erosa, Andres, Luisa Fuster and Diego
Restuccia. 2010. “A General Equilibrium
Analysis of Parental Leave Policies.” Review
of Economic Dynamics 13 (4): 742-758.
Fernandez, Raquel. 2013. “Culture as Learn-
ing: The Evolution of Female Labor Force
Participation over a Century.” American Eco-
nomic Review 103 (1): 472-500.
Fernandez, Raquel and Alessandra Fogli.
2009. “Culture: An Empirical Investigation
of Beliefs, Work and Fertility.” American
Economics Journal: Macroeconomics 1 (1):
146-77.
Fernandez, Raquel, Alessendra Fogli and
Claudia Olivetti. 2004. “Mothers and Sons:
Preference Formation and Female Labor
Force Dynamics.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119 (4): 1249-1299.
Fernandez, Raquel, Nezih Guner and John
A. Knowles. 2005. “Love and Money:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of
Household Sorting and Inequality.” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 120 (1): 273-
344.
Fernandez, Raquel and Richard Rogerson.
2001. “Sorting and Long-Run Income In-
equality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
116 (4): 1305-1341.
Fernandez, Raquel and Joyce Cheng Wong.
2016. “Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis
of Divorce Regimes.” Unpublished.
Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus, Jeremy Green-
wood, and Nezih Guner. 2014. “From Shame
to Game in One Hundred Years: An Eco-
nomic Model of the Rise in Premarital Sex
and its De-Stigmatization.” Journal of the
European Economic Association 12 (1): 25-
61.
Fogli, Alessandra and Laura Veldkamp.
2011. “Nature or Nurture? Learning and Fe-
male Labor Force Participation.” Economet-
rica 79 (4): 1103-1138.
Gale, David and Lloyd S. Shapley. 1962.
“College Admissions and the Stability of
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 59
Marriage.” American Mathematical Monthly
69 (1): 9-15.
Galor, Oded. 2005. “From Stagnation to
Growth: Unified Growth Theory.” In Hand-
book of Economic Growth, vol. 1A, edited by
Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, 171-
293. Elsevier: Amsterdam.
Galor, Oded. 2011. Unified Growth Theory.
Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
Galor, Oded. 2012. “The Demographic Tran-
sition: Causes and Consequences.” Cliomet-
rica 6 (1): 1-28.
Galor, Oded and David N. Weil. 1996. “The
Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 86 (3): 374-387.
Galor, Oded and David N. Weil. 2000. “Pop-
ulation, Technology, and Growth: From
Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic
Transition and Beyond.” American Eco-
nomic Review 90 (4): 806-828.
Gayle, George-Levi and Limor Golan. 2012.
“Estimating a Dynamic Adverse-Selection
Model: Labour-Force Experience and the
Changing Gender Earnings Gap 1968-1997.”
Review of Economic Studies 79 (1): 227-267.
Gimenez-Nadal, Jose Ignacio and Almudena
Sevilla. 2012. “Trends in Time Allocation:
A Cross-country Analysis.” European Eco-
nomic Review 56 (6): 1338-1359.
Goldin, Claudia. 1990. Understanding the
Gender Gap: An Economic History of Amer-
ican Women. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Goldin, Claudia. 1995. “The U-Shaped Fe-
male Labor Force Function in Economic De-
velopment and Economic History.” In Invest-
ment in Women’s Human Capital and Eco-
nomic Development, edited T. P. Schultz, 61-
90. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Goldin, Claudia. 2006. “The Quiet Revo-
lution That Transformed Women’s Employ-
ment, Education, and Family.” American
Economic Review 96 (2): 1-21.
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence F. Katz. 2002.
“The Power of the Pill: Oral Contracep-
tives and Women’s Career and Marriage De-
cisions.” Journal of Political Economy 110
(4): 730-770.
Greenwood, Jeremy, and Nezih Guner. 2009.
“Marriage and Divorce since World War
II: Analyzing the Role of Technological
Progress on the Formation of Households.”
In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2008,
edited by Daron Acemoglu, Kenneth Rogoff,
and Michael Woodford, 231-276. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Nezih Guner, John
Knowles. 2000. “Women on Welfare: A
Macroeconomic Analysis.” American Eco-
nomic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 90
(2): 383-388.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Nezih Guner, John
Knowles. 2003. “More on Marriage, Fertil-
ity, and the Distribution of Income.” Interna-
tional Economic Review 44 (3): 827-862.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Nezih Guner, Georgi
Kocharkov and Cezar Santos, 2016. “Tech-
nology and the Changing Family: A Unified
Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational
Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force
Participation.” American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 8 (1): 1-41.
Greenwood, Jeremy and Zvi Hercowitz.
1991. “The Allocation of Capital and Time
over the Business Cycle.” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy 99 (6): 1188-1214.
Greenwood, Jeremy and Ananth Seshadri.
2002. “The U.S. Demographic Transition.”
American Economic Review 92 (2): 153-159.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Ananth Seshadri, and
Mehmet Yorukoglu. 2005. “Engines of Lib-
eration.” Review of Economic Studies 72 (1):
109-133.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Ananth Seshadri and
Guillaume Vandenbroucke. 2005. “The Baby
Boom and Baby Bust.” The American Eco-
nomic Review 95 (1): 183-207.
Greenwood, Jeremy, Ananth Seshadri and
Guillaume Vandenbroucke. 2015. “Measure-
ment without Theory, Once Again.” Journal
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 60
of Demographic Economics 81 (3): 317-329.
Guell, Maia, Jose V. Rodriguez Mora and
Christopher I. Telmer. 2015. “The Informa-
tional Content of Surnames, the Evolution
of Intergenerational Mobility and Assorta-
tive Mating.” Review of Economic Studies 82
(2): 693-735.
Guler, Bulent, Fatih Guvenen and Gio-
vanni L. Violante. 2012. “Joint-Search The-
ory: New Opportunities and New Frictions.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 59 (4): 352-
369.
Guner, Nezih, Remzi Kaygusuz, and Gus-
tavo Ventura. 2012. “Taxation and House-
hold Labor Supply.” Review of Economic
Studies 79 (3): 1113-1149.
Guner, Nezih, Remzi Kaygusuz, and Gus-
tavo Ventura. 2016. “Child-Related Trans-
fers, Household Labor Supply and Welfare.”
CEMFI. Manuscript.
Guner, Nezih, Remzi Kaygusuz, and Gus-
tavo Ventura. 2014. “Income Taxation of
U.S. Households: Basic Facts.” Review of
Economic Dynamics 17 (4): 559-581.
Guvenen, Fatih, and Michele Rendall. 2015.
“Women’s Emancipation through Education:
A Macroeconomic Analysis.” Review of Eco-
nomic Dynamics 18 (4): 931-956.
Haines, Michael R. and Inter-university Con-
sortium for Political and Social Research.
2004. Historical, Demographic, Economic,
and Social Data, 1790-2000. ICPSR02896-
v2. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research.
Hansen, Gary D., and Edward C. Prescott.
2002. “Malthus to Solow.” American Eco-
nomic Review 92 (4): 1205-1217.
Hauk, Esther and Maria Saez-Marti. 2002.
“On the Cultural Transmission of Corrup-
tion.” Journal of Economic Theory, 107 (2):
311-335.
Heisig, Jan Paul. 2011. “Who Does More
Housework: Rich or Poor? A Comparison
of 33 Countries.” American Sociological Re-
view 76 (1): 74-99.
Hernandez, Donald J. 1993. America’s Chil-
dren, Resources from Family, Government
and the Economy. Russell Sage Foundation,
New York, N. Y.
Huggett, Mark, Gustavo Ventura, and Amir
Yaron. 2011. “Sources of Lifetime Inequal-
ity.” American Economic Review 101 (7):
2923-54.
Hyslop, Dean R. 2001. “Rising U.S. Earn-
ings Inequality and Family Labor Supply:
The Covariance Structure of Intrafamily
Earnings.” American Economic Review 91
(4): 755-777.
Jacquemet, Nicolas and Jean-Marc Robin.
2012. “Assortative Matching and Search
with Labor Supply and Home Production.”
Unpublished.
Jones, Larry E., Rodolfo E. Manuelli and
Ellen R. McGrattan. 2015. “Why Are Mar-
ried Women Working So Much?” Journal of
Demographic Economics 81 (1): 75-114.
Jones, Larry E., and Michèle Tertilt. 2008.
“An Economic History of Fertility in the
U.S.: 1826-1960.” In Frontiers of Family
Economics, vol. 1, edited by Peter Rupert,
165-230. Emerald Press: Bingley.
Jones, Larry E., Alice Schoonbroodt, and
Michèle Tertilt. 2011. “Fertility Theories:
Can They Explain the Negative Fertility-
Income Relationship?” In Demography and
the Economy, edited by John B. Shoven, 43-
100. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem. 2003. “A Stochas-
tic Model of Mortality, Fertility, and Human
Capital Investment.” Journal of Development
Economics 70 (1): 103-118.
Kaygusuz, Remzi. 2010. “Taxes and Female
Labor Supply.” Review of Economic Dynam-
ics 13 (4): 725-741
Keane, Michael, and Kenneth Wolpin. 1997.
“The Career Decisions of Young Men.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 105 (3): 473-522.
Knowles, John. 2013. “Why are Married
Men Working So Much? An Aggregate
Analysis of Intra-Household Bargaining and
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 61
Labour Supply.” Review of Economic Studies
80 (3): 1055-1085.
Kohler, Hans-Peter, Francesco C. Billari and
Jose A. Ortega. 2006. “Low Fertility in Eu-
rope: Causes, Implications and Policy Op-
tions.” In The Baby Bust: Who will do the
Work? Who will Pay the Taxes?, edited by
Fred, R. Harris, 48-109. Lanham, MD: Row-
man and Littlefield Publishers.
Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1947. “Measurement
Without Theory.” Review of Economics and
Statistics 29 (3): 161-172.
Laughlin, Lynda. 2013. Who’s Minding the
Kids? Child Care Arrangements: Spring
2011. Current Population Reports, P70-135.
Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau.
Lee, Sang Yoon and Ananth Seshadri. 2014.
“On the Intergenerational Transmission of
Economic Status.” Unpublished.
Lino, Mark. 2014. Expenditures on Children
by Families, 2013. Miscellaneous Publica-
tions No. 1528-2013. Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutri-
tion Policy and Promotion.
Loury, Glenn C. 1981. “Intergenerational
Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings.”
Econometrica 49 (4): 843-867.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1980. “Methods and
Problems in Business Cycle Theory.” Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking 12 (4, Part
2): 696-715
Manuelli, Rodolfo and Ananth Seshadri.
2009. “Explaining International Fertility
Differences.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 124 (2): 771-807.
Martin Joyce A., Brady E. Hamilton,
Michelle J.K. Osterman, Sally C. Curtin, and
T.J. Mathews. 2013. Births: Final Data for
2012. National Vital Statistics Reports vol-
ume 62, number 9. Hyattsville, MD: Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics.
McLanahan, Sara, and Gary Sandefur. 1994.
Growing up with a Single Parent: What
Hurts and What Helps. Cambridge and Lon-
don: Harvard University Press.
Miller, Amelia R. 2011. “The Effects of
Motherhood Timing on Career Path.” Jour-
nal of Population Economics 24 (3): 1071-
1100.
Miller, Grant. 2008. “Women’s Suffrage, Po-
litical Responsiveness, and Child Survival
in American History.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123 (3): 1287-1327.
Mincer, Jacob. 1962. “Labor Force Partici-
pation of Married Women: A Study of La-
bor Supply.” In Aspects of Labor Economics:
A Conference of the Universities-National
Bureau Committee for Economic Research,
edited by Gregory H. Lewis, 63-105. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mitchell, Brian R. 2013. International His-
torical Statistics. Palgrave MacMillan: New
York, N.Y.
Mortensen, Dale T. 1988. “Matching: Find-
ing a Partner for Life or Otherwise.” Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 94 (suppl.): S215-
S240.
Ngai, L. Rachel and Barbara Petrongolo.
2014. “Gender Gaps and the Rise of the
Service Economy.” CEPR Discussion Paper
9970.
Olivetti, Claudia. 2006. “Changes in
Women’s Aggregate Hours of Work: The
Role of Returns to Experience.” Review of
Economic Dynamics 9 (4): 557-587.
Olivetti, Claudia. 2014. “The Female La-
bor Force and Long-run Development: The
American Experience in Comparative Per-
spective.” In Human Capital in History: The
American Record, edited by Leah Platt Bous-
tan, Carola Frydman and Robert A. Margo,
161-197. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Olivetti, Claudia and M. Daniele Paserman.
2015. “In the Name of the Son (and the
Daughter): Intergenerational Mobility in the
United States, 1850-1940.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 105 (8): 2695-2724.
Olivetti, Claudia and Barbara Petrongolo.
2014. “Gender Gaps across Countries and
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 62
Skills: Demand, Supply and the Industry
Structure.” Review of Economic Dynamics
17 (4): 842-859.
Parente, Stephen L., Richard Rogerson, and
Randall Wright. 2000. “Homework in Devel-
opment Economics: Household Production
and the Wealth of Nations.” Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 108 (4): 680-687.
Pissarides, Christopher, Pietro Garibaldi,
Claudia Olivetti, Barbara Petrongolo and
Etienne Wasmer. 2005. “Women in the La-
bor Force: How well is Europe Doing?” In
Women at Work: An Economic Perspective,
edited by Tito Boeri, Daniela Del Boca, and
Christopher Pissarides, 7-63. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Razin, Assaf and Uri Ben-Zion. 1975.
“An Intergenerational Model of Population
Growth.” American Economic Review 65 (5):
923-933.
Regalia, Ferdinando and Jose-Victor Rios-
Rull. 2001. “What Accounts for the Increase
in the Number of Single Households?” Uni-
versity of Minnesota. Manuscript.
Reid, Margaret G. 1934. Economics of
Household Production. New York: John Wi-
ley & Sons Inc.
Renault, Eric. 2008. “Simulation-Based Es-
timation.” In The New Palgrave Dictio-
nary of Economics Online, Second Edition,
edited by Lawrence E. Blume and Steven N.
Durlauf. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Rendall, Michele. 2014. “Rise of the Service
Sector and Female Market Work.” University
of Zurich. Manuscript.
Restuccia, Diego and Carlos Urrutia. 2004.
“Intergenerational Persistence of Earnings:
The Role of Early and College Education.”
American Economic Review 94 (5): 1354-
1378.
Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor. 1993. “Working in
the Market, Working at Home, and the Ac-
quisition of Skills: A General-Equilibrium
Approach.” American Economic Review 83
(4) : 893-907.
Rogerson, Richard. 2007. “Taxation and
Market Work: Is Scandinavia an Outlier?”
Economic Theory 32 (1): 59-85.
Sah, Raaj K. 1991. “The Effects of Child
Mortality Changes on Fertility Choice and
Parental Welfare.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 99 (3): 582-606.
Shapley, Lloyd and Martin Shubik. 1972.
“The Assignment Game I: The Core.” Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 1 (1): 111-
130
Shimer, Robert and Lones Smith. 2000. “As-
sortative Matching and Search.” Economet-
rica 68 (2): 343-369.
Siow, Aloysius. 1998. “Differntial Fecun-
dity, Markets, and Gender Roles.” Journal of
Political Economy 106 (2): 334-354.
Smith, Jr., Anthony A. 2008. “Indirect Infer-
ence.” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics Online, Second Edition, edited
by Lawrence E. Blume and Steven N.
Durlauf. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmil-
lan.
Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers. 2007.
“Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their
Driving Forces.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 21 (2): 27-52.
United Nations. 2013. World Population
Prospects: The 2012 Revision. New York,
NY: United Nations, Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Population Divi-
sion.
Vandenbroucke, Guillaume. 2014. “Fertil-
ity and Wars: The Case of World War
I in France.” American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 6 (2): 108-136.
Voena, Alessandra. 2015. “Yours, Mine and
Ours: Do Divorce Laws Affect the Intertem-
poral Behavior of Married Couples?” Amer-
ican Economic Review 105 (8): 2295-2332.
Weiss, Yoram. 1997. “The formation and dis-
solution of families: Why marry? Who mar-
ries whom? And what happens upon di-
vorce.” In Handbook of Population and Fam-
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 63
ily Economics, edited by Mark R. Rosen-
zweig and Oded Stark, 81-123. Amsterdam:
Elsevier Science.
Wolfers, Justin. 2006. “Did Unilateral Di-
vorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Recon-
ciliation and New Results.” American Eco-
nomic Review 96 (5): 1802-1820.
Zhao, Kai. 2014. “War Finance and the Baby
Boom.” Review of Economic Dynamics 17
(3): 459-473.
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 64
TABLE 1—U.S. CHILD-CARE EXPENDITURE AS A
PERCENTAGE OF THE MOTHER’S INCOME, 2011
Household Type Age of Child
< 5 5 to 14
Marital Status
married 22.2 14.4
divorced 19.9 11.6
never married 26.1 15.3
Educ. of Mother
less than HS 34.2 22.3
HS 29.0 18.5
some Col. 23.2 15.9
Col+ 21.1 12.3
Emp. of Mother
employed, full 20.9 13.3
employed, part 30.5 19.3
self-employed 35.8 17.7
Family Inc.
less than $1,500 46.6 39.3
$1,500-$2,999 27.9 20.2
$3,000-$4,499 29.7 18.2
$4,500 and over 20.8 12.6
Note: The sample comprises families with at least one child
under the age of 15 and with employed mothers that make
child-care payments for at least one of their children. The
numbers refer to total direct child-care expenditures and in-
clude expenditures on organized care (e.g. day care centers
or nurseries) and other non-relative care (e.g., family day
care or child care in the child’s home). For further detail,
see Laughlin (2013).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Who’s Minding the Kids?
Child Care Arrangements: 2011 – Detailed Tables, Table
6. The calculations are based on the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), 2008 Panel.
TABLE 2—TOTAL SPENDING ON A CHILD AS
A FRACTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013
Two-Parent Families
Household Income, $
< 61,530 61,530 >106,540
-106,540
Age (39,360) (82,790) (186,460)
0-2 0.24 0.16 0.11
3-5 0.24 0.16 0.11
6-8 0.23 0.15 0.11
9-11 0.25 0.17 0.12
12-14 0.26 0.17 0.13
15-17 0.26 0.18 0.14
Single-Parent Families
Household Income, $
< 61,530 > 61,530
Age (27,290) (111,660)
0-2 0.30 0.16
3-5 0.33 0.17
6-8 0.32 0.17
9-11 0.35 0.17
12-14 0.36 0.18
15-17 0.35 0.19
Note: The calculations are based on the 2005-2006 Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey and the amounts are updated to
2013 dollars by using the consumer price index. The sam-
ple consists of households with at least one child age 17 or
younger. The figures represent estimated expenses on the
younger child in a two-child family. Household expendi-
tures include housing, food, transportation, clothing, health
care, child care and education, personal care, entertainment
and reading materials. The numbers in parentheses are mean
household income for the indicated income class.
Source: Lino (2014, Tables 1 and 7).
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TABLE 3—PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON FAMILY
BENEFITS IN OECD COUNTRIES, PERCENT OF
GDP, 2011
Cntry Cash Serv. Tax Total Child
Care
Dnk 1.63 2.42 0.00 4.05 0.68
Fra 1.24 1.69 0.00 3.64 0.58
Fin 1.58 1.65 0.00 3.22 0.84
Deu 1.21 0.97 0.87 3.05 0.06
Ita 0.74 0.76 0.52 2.01 0.18
Nor 1.29 1.79 0.11 3.20 0.88
Esp 0.54 0.84 0.13 1.51 0.56
Swe 1.49 2.14 0.00 3.64 1.06
UK 2.60 1.37 0.29 4.26 0.41
USA 0.09 0.63 0.47 1.19 0.06
Note: The table reports, as a fraction of GDP, public ex-
penditure on child-related cash transfers to families, services
(in-kind transfers) for families with children, financial sup-
port for families provided through the tax system, and child
care. Public spending includes financial support that is ex-
clusively for families with children. Spending recorded in
other social policy areas such as health and housing also as-
sist families with children, but not exclusively so, and is not
included. The last column is total public spending on child
care and early (under age 5) education. Public expenditure
on child care and early educational services is all public fi-
nancial support (in cash, in-kind or through the tax system)
for families with children participating in formal day-care
services (e.g. crèches, day-care centers and family day care
for children under 3) and pre-school institutions (including
kindergartens and day-care centers which usually provide an
educational content as well as traditional care for children
aged from 3 to 5, inclusive).
Source: OECD Family Database; (i) PF1.1, Public Spend-
ing on Family Benefits (Chart PF1.1A); and (ii) PF3.1,
Public Spending on Childcare and Early Education (Chart
PF3.1.A).
TABLE 4—MATCHING PROCESS
Rank Match Odds
1 .2; 2; 2/ 22
:::
:::
:::
k .i; j; h/ minfRkm.i /; Rkf . j ; h/g
:::
:::
:::
8 .1; 1; 1/ minfRkm.1/; Rkf .1; 1/g
D 11
Note: In the second column, .i; j; h/ is shorthand for the
match .i ;  j ; h ):
TABLE 5—U.S. CHILD WELLBEING BY FAMILY
STRUCTURE
1 Parent, % 2 Parent, %
Relative Income 51.4 100
<High School 14.6 9.2
College 15.0 23.6
Teen Births 32.8 21.3
Idle, at age 19-21 25.9 12.1
Note: See the main text for details.
Source: Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 1968-
2011
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TABLE 6—U.S. CHILD-CARE TIME BY MOTHERS,
HOURS PER WEEK
Year > Col. Col. Unmar. Mar.
Total
1965 8.56 10.81 6.02 10.31
1975 7.73 7.38 6.80 7.94
1985 7.65 8.82 5.76 8.77
2003 12.51 16.39 11.14 14.41
2013 13.00 15.63 11.51 14.5
Per Child
1965 3.38 5.09 2.82 4.71
1975 4.02 3.63 3.98 3.90
1985 4.67 5.38 3.72 5.27
2003 7.24 9.63 7.38 8.04
2013 7.76 9.39 7.42 8.47
Note: The numbers in the upper panel are hours spent on to-
tal child care (primary, educational and play) by women. The
lower panel reports hours per week per child in the house-
hold. The sample is restricted to households with a child
present.
Source: Aguiar and Hurst (2007, Table II) updated with the
2004-2013 American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
TABLE 7—SELECTED U.S. WOMEN’S RIGHTS
MILESTONES
Year Event
1920 19th Amendment
1920 Women’s Bureau
1936 U.S. v. One Package
1960 Birth Control Pill
1963 Equal Pay Act
1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII
1964 EEOC
1965 Griswold v. Connecticut
1969 No Fault Divorce, California
1970 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.
1972 Title IX, Education Amendments
1973 Roe v. Wade
1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act
1986 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
TABLE 8—THE PERCENTAGE OF U.S. TEENAGE
GIRLS HAVING PREMARITAL SEX AS A FUNCTION
OF GUILT, MOTHER’S FEELINGS AND RELIGION
Feel guilty from sex? %
Strongly agree 17
Agree 37
Neither agree or disagree 57
Disagree 75
Strongly disagree 77
How would your mother feel? %
Strongly disapprove 31
Disapprove 50
Neither approve or disapprove 81
Approve 76
Role of Religion %
Very important 38
Fairly important 53
Fairly unimportant 60
Not important at all 49
Source: Fernandez-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner
(2014)
TABLE 9—TARGETED MOMENTS: DATA AND
MODEL
Moments Model Data
Var. of county income 0:17 0:17
Var. of household income 0:37 0:35
Adoption, 1940 0:38 0:35
TFR ratio 1:25 1:28
Coef, fert on adopt  0:32  0:35
Coef, 1 fert on 1 adopt  0:17  0:17
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A1. Proof of Proposition 1 (Married Female Labor Supply)
Consider an interior solution; i.e., assume that l f > 0. To begin with, the budget constraint
can be written as
c D w f

1

lm C l f   qd

:
Substituting the budget constraint and
d D

.1  /q

 1
 1
.2  lm   l f /  R.q/.2  lm   l f /
into the first-order condition for l f yields

1
 lm C l f   R.q/.2  lm   l f /q
 D .1  /.1  /.2  lm   l f / 1[[R.q/.2  lm   l f /] C .1  /.2  lm   l f / ]
D .1  /.1  /[R.q/ C .1  /].2  lm   l f / ;
which can be rearranged to arrive at
(A1) [R.q/ C .1 /].2  lm  l f / D .1 /.1 /

1

lm C l f   R.q/q.2  lm   l f /

:
Using the above formula for d ,
@R.q/
@q
D   1
1   .
1  

/
1
 1 q
2 
 1 < 0;
and
@[R.q/q]
@q
D   
1   .
1  

/
1
 1 q
1
 1 < 0;
since 0 <  < 1. Hence,  R.q/q is increasing in q . As a result, a lower q is associated with
an upward shift in the left-hand side of equation (A1). The right-hand side of equation (A1) is
increasing in q . Hence, a lower value of q is connected with a downward shift in the right-hand
side of equation (A1). Thus, the female labor supply must go up as a result of a lower q . It is
easy to deduce that l f is increasing in .
A2. Nash Bargaining Solution
First consider the problem where the household maximizes a weighted sum of utilities
max
c;lm ;l f
[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lm/]C .1  /[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /];
subject to
c D wmlm C w f l f :
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 68
Focus on the first-order condition for l f : It is given by
(A2) w f
c
D .1  /.1  / 1
1  l f :
Consider now the Nash bargaining problem with B and G as outside options for the man and
woman. It is given by
max
c;lm ;l f
f[ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  lm/  B] [ ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /  G]g:
The first-order condition for l f is now given by
22 ln.c/
1
c
w f C .1  /1
c
ln.1  l f /w f C .1  /1
c
ln.1  lm/w f    1
c
w f G    1
c
w f B
D .1  / ln.c/ 1
1  l f C .1  /
2 ln.1  lm/ 11  l f   .1  /
1
1  l f B;
which can be written as
w f
c
[2 ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /C .1  / ln.1  lm/  B   G](A3)
D .1  / 1
1  l f [ ln.c/C .1  /.1  lm/  B]:
Let
1  D [ ln.c/C .1  /.1  lm/  B][2 ln.c/C .1  / ln.1  l f /C .1  / ln.1  lm/  B   G] D
H   B
.H   B/C .W   G/ ;
where W   ln.c/ C .1   /.1   l f / and H   ln.c/ C .1   /.1   lm/. It is immediate
that the first-order conditions in equations (A2) and (A3) are identical. Similar steps can be
followed to show that the first-order conditions for lm are also identical for these two problems
when  D .W   B/=[.H   B/C .W   G/].
A3. Proof of Lemma 1 (Household Allocations)
To start, define the size variable z as taking the value 1 for a single household and 2 for a
married one. Substitute out for c   c and n in the objective functions for the single and married
households. Then maximize with respect to d and h to obtain the following two first-order
conditions (for z D 1; 2):
(A4) 
c   cwq D .1  /z
  [d C .1  /h ]= 1d 1;
and
(A5) 
c   cw D .1  /z
  [d C .1  /h ]= 1.1  /h 1:
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(The z subscript has been dropped on the endogenous variables to conserve on notation.) Next,
divide (A5) into (A4) and simplify to get
(A6) d D h

.1  /q

1=. 1/
 R.q/h:
Finally, by substituting (A6) and the household’s budget constraint into equation (A5), a single
equation in h arises (for z D 1; 2):
(A7)  R.q/ C .1  /1 = h1  D .1  /.1  /z  hz   c
w

  h   q R.q/h
i
:
Proof of the Lemma—Rewrite equation (A7) as
[R.q/ C .1  /]1 = h  h C .1  /.1  /[1C q R.q/]z  h
D .1  /.1  /z  .z   c=w/:
Now begin with Part (iii). If z increases by the factor  > 1, then z   c=w rises by the factor
  .z   c=w/=.z   c=w/ > . Now the right-hand side rises by the factor  . Observe
that if h rises by the factor , then the left-hand side will increase by more than the factor  ,
because   >   when  < 0. Therefore, to restore equality between the left-hand and right-
hand sides of the above equation, h must rise by less than the factor . Next, Part (ii) is implied
by equation (A6) and Part (iii). By using Parts (ii) and (iii), in conjunction with the household’s
budget constraint, Part (i) arises. Part (iv) follows from Part (i) by noting that .c2 c/  2.c1 c/,
since [.2  c=w/=.1  c=w/]  2. Thus, .c2   c/=2  .c1   c/, which implies c2 > c1. Now, it
is feasible for a married household to choose c2 D 2c1, d2 D 2d1, and h2 D 2h1. The fact they
didn’t implies that M.w; q/ > S.w; q/. Hence, Part (v) holds. 
A4. The Rise in Assortative Mating
In the setup used in Section 3.2, the married household’s first-order conditions are

c
wq D .1  /[d C .1  /.hh/ ] 1d 1;
and
(A8) 
c
w j D .1  /[d C .1  /.hh/ ] 1.1  /h h 1:
This now implies that
(A9) d D
"
.1  /h q
 j
#1=. 1/
h  R.q/

 j
h
1=.1 /
hh:
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Finally, by substituting equation (A9) and the household’s budget constraint into equation (A8),
a single equation in h arises:
 j
"
R.q/

 j
h
=.1 /
C .1  /
#
h
D .1  /.1  /
"
i C  j    j h   q R.q/

 j
h
1=.1 /
hh
#
:
This equation can be rearranged to achieve
h D .1  /.1  /.1C  j=i /
. j=i /

R.q/

 j
h
=.1 / C .1  /C .1  /.1  /. j=i / 1C q R.q/  jh =.1 /
 :
Housework, h, is decreasing in the ratio of the wife’s productivity in the market to her produc-
tivity at home,  j=h , and in the ratio of her productivity in the market to her husband’s,  j=i .
A5. Derivation of Equation 28
Consider equation (27) and divide through by e .1C s=r/C w f .1C gs=r/:

 V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/
 1
e
 
1C s
r
C w f  1C gsr  D U1 .c/ :
Multiply by lifetime income, which is given by the intertemporal budget constraint
c C c
0
r
D  wm C w f  1C g
r

  k
h
e

1C s
r

C w f

1C gs
r
i
to obtain

 V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/
 "  wm C w f   1C gr 
e
 
1C s
r
C w f  1C gsr    k
#
D U1 .c/

c C c
0
r

:
Using the Euler equation, U1 .c/ D rU1
 
c0

; to rewrite the right-hand side as U1 .c/ c C
U1
 
c0

c0, assuming e D 0, and rearanging the left-hand side yields

 V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/
 "1

 
1C

w f
wm
 1! g C r
gs C r   k
#
D U1 .c/ c C U1
 
c0

c0:
A6. Proof of Proposition 11
The optimization problem can be written
max
k;c
fF .k; c/ D U .c/C U  c0C  V .k/C  V .sk/g;
FAMILY ECONOMICS WRIT LARGE 71
subject to
c0 D r W   rc   k  r x C x 0s ;
where W  wm C w f C

w0m C w0f

=r is the household’s total wealth, and x  e C w f
and x 0  e C w0f represent the current and future cost of a child. Assume that sV1 .sk/ is a
non-increasing function of s. This implies
V1 .sk/C skV11 .sk/  0:
At a maximum for F , the following first- and second-order conditions must hold:
Fk; Fc D 0;
Fkk; Fcc < 0;
Fkk Fcc   F2kc  1 > 0:
These derivatives are
Fk D  U1
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0C  V1 .k/C  sV1 .sk/ ;
Fc D U1 .c/  rU1
 
c0

;
Fkk D U11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 02 C  V11 .k/C  s2V11 .sk/ ;
Fcc D U11 .c/C r2U11
 
c0

;
Fkc D rU11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0 :
The discriminant, 1, is given by
1 D
h
U11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 02 C  V11 .k/C  s2V11 .sk/i hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
  .r/2 U11
 
c0
2  
r x C sx 02 ;
which simplifies to
1 D
h
 V11 .k/C  s2V11 .sk/
i h
U11 .c/C r2U11
 
c0
iC U11  c0  r x C sx 02 U11 .c/ :
Note also the following derivatives
Fks D U11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0 kx 0   U1  c0 x 0 C  V1 .sk/C  skV11 .sk/ ;
Fcs D rU11
 
c0

kx 0:
THE SIGN OF dk=ds
Total differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to c, k and s yields
Fkk Fck
Fck Fcc
 
dk=ds
dc=ds

D
 Fks
 Fcs

:
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Cramer’s rule states that
dk
ds
D 1 1
 Fks Fck Fcs Fcc
 :
Let X represent the determinant in the above expression, which can be written as
X D   U11  c0  r x C sx 0 kx 0   U1  c0 x 0 C  V1 .sk/C  skV11 .sk/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
C .r/2 U11
 
c0
2 kx 0  r x C sx 0 ;
or
X D    U1  c0 x 0 C  V1 .sk/C  skV11 .sk/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
  U11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0 kx 0U11 .c/ :
Recall that V1 .sk/ C skV11 .sk/  0 by assumption. It follows that the first bracketed term is
negative. Hence X < 0, and dk=ds < 0.
THE SIGN OF d.sk/=ds
Establishing that d.sk/=ds > 0 is equivalent to showing that  dk=ds  s=k < 1. Now, the
elasticity of k with respect to s is
dk
ds
s
k
D  8s
1k
;
where
8 D  X D  U1  c0 x 0 C  V1 .sk/C  skV11 .sk/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
CU11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0 kx 0U11 .c/ :
Note that 8 D  X > 0. The objective is to prove that jdk=ds  s=kj < 1, which amounts to
demonstrating that 8s  1k < 0. Consider the difference 8s  1k:
8s  1k D  U1  c0 x 0 C  V1 .sk/C  skV11 .sk/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i s
CU11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0 kx 0U11 .c/ s
 
h
 V11 .k/C  s2V11 .sk/
i h
U11 .c/C r2U11
 
c0
i
k   U11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 02 U11 .c/ k;
or
8s  1k D  U1  c0 x 0s C  sV1 .sk/   kV11 .k/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
 r xU11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0U11 .c/ k:
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The first-order condition Fk D 0 implies  U1
 
c0

sx 0 D U1
 
c0

r x    V1 .k/   sV1 .sk/.
The difference 8s  1k then becomes
8s  1k D U1  c0 r x    V1 .k/   kV11 .k/ hU11 .c/C r2U11  c0i
 r xU11
 
c0
  
r x C sx 0U11 .c/ k:
Recall that V1 .k/ C kV11 .k/  0 by assumption. It follows that the first-bracketed term is
positive. Hence 8s  1k < 0 and
 dk
ds
s
k
< 1:
A7. Elasticities of Substitution,  ck and  ek
Consider the preferences described in equation (29). The elasticity of substitution between
the number of children, k, and consumption, c, is determined below, as well as the elasticity of
substitution between k and expenditures on quality, e.
CONSUMPTION AND FERTILITY,  ck
Holding expenditures, e , constant, an indifference curve in the .c; k/ plane is represented by
d ln .c/ D   k
c
V1 .k/
U1 .c/
d ln .k/ :
This implies
d ln .c=k/ D  

1C  k
c
V1 .k/
U1 .c/

d ln .k/ :
Consider the marginal rate of substitution,  V1 .k/ =U1 .c/. Taking derivatives implies
d ln

V1 .k/
U1 .c/

D V11 .k/
V1 .k/
kd ln .k/  U11 .c/
U1 .c/
cd ln .c/
D V11 .k/
V1 .k/
kd ln .k/C  U11 .c/
U1 .c/
k
V1 .k/
U1 .c/
d ln .k/ :
Therefore,
 ck D d ln .c=k/d ln .V1 .k/ =U1 .c//
D   1C 
k
c
V1.k/
U1.c/
V11.k/
V1.k/ k C 
U11.c/
U1.c/
V1.k/
U1.c/k
:
EXPENDITURES ON QUALITY AND FERTILITY,  ek
Holding expenditures, c , constant, an indifference curve in the .e; k/ plane is represented by
d ln .e/ D  

k
e
V1 .k/
J1 .e/
d ln .k/ ;
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implying
d ln .e=k/ D  

1C 

k
e
V1 .k/
J1 .e/

d ln .k/ :
Consider the marginal rate of substitution, . =/ V1 .k/ =J1 .e/. Taking derivatives implies
d ln

V1 .k/
J1 .e/

D V11 .k/
V1 .k/
kd ln .k/  J11 .e/
J1 .e/
ed ln .e/
D V11 .k/
V1 .k/
kd ln .k/C 

J11 .e/
J1 .e/
k
V1 .k/
J1 .e/
d ln .k/ :
Hence,
 ek D d ln .e=k/d ln .V1 .k/ =J1 .e//
D   1C


k
e
V1.k/
J1.e/
V11.k/
V1.k/ k C


J11.e/
J1.e/ k
V1.k/
J1.e/
:
A8. Proof of Proposition 12 (Productivity and the Quality-Quantity Tradeoff)
Rearranging the first-order conditions (31) and (32), while making use of (30), gives


V1 .k/ =J1 .e/
e=k
D 1C w=e and  V1 .k/ =U1 .c/
c=k
D w=c   1:
Logging and then taking the total differential of the two expressions yields
.1= ek   1/ d ln .e=k/ D 1C w=e d .w=e/ ;
.1= ck   1/ d ln .c=k/ D 1
w=c   1d .w=c/ :
This can be rearranged into
.1= ek   1/ d ln .e=k/ D   
e=w C  d ln .e=w/ ;(A10)
.1= ck   1/ d ln .c=k/ D   11  c=wd ln .c=w/ :(A11)
Note also that
d ln .e=k/ D d ln .e=w/C d ln .w/  d ln .k/
d ln .c=k/ D d ln .c=w/C d ln .w/  d ln .k/ :
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Thus, the system (A10)-(A11) can be rewritten as
(A12)

1= ek   1C 
e=w C 

d ln .e=w/  .1= ek   1/ d ln .k/
D   .1= ek   1/ d ln .w/ ;
(A13)

1= ck   1C 11  c=w

d ln .c=w/  .1= ck   1/ d ln .k/
D   .1= ck   1/ d ln .w/ :
The budget constraint (30) can be used to write
(A14) d ln .k/ D   c=w
1  c=wd ln .c=w/ 
e=w
e=w C  d ln .e=w/ :
Subsituting equation (A14) into the system (A12)-(A13) leads to the following formulation:"
1= ek   1C e=wC C .1= ek   1/ e=we=wC .1= ek   1/ c=w1 c=w
.1= ck   1/ e=we=wC 1= ck   1C 11 c=w C .1= ck   1/ c=w1 c=w
#

d ln .e=w/ =d ln .w/
d ln .c=w/ =d ln .w/

D
   .1= ek   1/
  .1= ck   1/

:
Let 1 denote the discriminant of this system. The second-order conditions of the optimization
problem imply that, at a maximum, 1 > 0: Applying Cramer’s rule to this system, one finds
(A15) d ln .e=w/
d ln .w/
D  1 1 .1= ek   1/

1= ck   1C 11  c=w

;
and
(A16) d ln .c=w/
d ln .w/
D  1 1 .1= ck   1/

1= ek   1C 
e=w C 

:
Substituting these equations into (A14) yields
d ln .k/
d ln .w/
D 1
1
c
w   c .1= ck   1/

1= ek   ek
w   c

C 1
1
ek
w   c .1= ek   1/

1= ck C c
w   c

:
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
A9. Proof of Proposition 13 (The effect of productivity growth on fertility)
Preferences are represented by ln .c/ C  ln .k/ C H .gwQ .e//. The first-order conditions
for c and k imply =k D .e C w/ =c. It follows, then, from the budget constraint (30) that
c D w= .1C / and
(A17) k D 
1C 
w
e C w :
The optimization problem then becomes equivalent to maxe H .gwQ .e//  ln .e C w/, with
the following first-order condition:
(A18)  .gw/1  Q .e/  Q1 .e/ D 
e C w :
Write this first-order condition as A .e; g/  B .e/ D 0, and note that the second-order condition
for a maximum implies A1 .e; g/  B1 .e/ < 0: Implicitly differentiating with respect to e and g
yields
de
dg
D   A2 .e; g/
A1 .e; g/  B1 .e/ ;
where A2 .e; g/ D .1  / g w1 Q .e/  Q1 .e/. Thus, the sign of de=dg, and hence
d Q.e/=dg D Q1 .e/ de=dg, is the same as the sign of A2 .e; g/. The result for fertility follows
from the observation that k is decreasing in e, as indicated by equation (A17).
A10. Measures of Fertility
There are many measures of fertility. To review them, define ki;t as the average number of
children born to a woman of age i during year t :
ki;t D Number of births to women of age iNumber of women of age i :
This is a first measure known as the Age-Specific Fertility Rate. Let p fi;t denote the denominator
of this ratio, that is, the total number of women of age i during year t: Similarly, let pmi:t denote
the total number of men. Another measure of fertility is the Crude Birth Rate
Crude Birth Ratet D
X
i ki;t p
f
i;tX
i

p fi;t C pmi;t
 ;
which is simply the number of birth per population during a particular period of time. A third
measure, the General Fertility Rate, reports births per women in their child-bearing period during
a particular time:
General Fertility Ratet D
X49
iD15 ki;t p
f
i;tX49
iD15 p
f
i;t
:
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These are measures of contemporaneous fertility. Two additional measures deal with lifetime
fertility. The Total Fertility Rate measures the number of children a woman would have over the
course of her fertile life if she experienced the current Age-Specific Fertility Rates throughout
her life. For women 15 years of age at date t , the Total Fertility Rate is
Total Fertility Ratet D
X49
iD15 ki;t :
Note, again, that the total fertility rate at time t is built from the Age-Specific Fertility Rate
observed at time t . A 15-year-old woman at time t may not experience at age 16—that is,
at date t C 1—the same Age-Specific Fertility Rate that a 16-year-old experiences at time t .
That is, kiC1;tC1 may differ from ki;t . Thus, the Total Fertility Rate measures the fertility of
an “imaginary” woman who would experience throughout the rest of her life the current Age-
Specific Fertility Rates of each age group. The Total Fertility Rate is useful to build projections
about the lifetime fertility of a young cohort, assuming that Age-Specific Fertility Rates will
remain constant. For women past their childbearing years, it is possible to construct a final
measure, the Completed Fertility Rate for a woman born at date t :
Completed Fertility Ratet D
X49
iD15 ki;tCi:
This is a measure of realized lifetime fertility.
